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Electricity markets around the world are in transition from monopoly operations to free 
competitive  markets.  Production  and  sales  are  opened  up  to  competition,  whereas 
transmission  and  distribution  have  remained  regulated  due  to  their  natural  monopoly 
characteristics.  Three Nordic countries,  Norway,  Sweden and Finland were among the 
first  countries  in the  world to deregulate  their  electricity markets,  both wholesale and 
retail markets. Development started in Norway in 1991, followed by Sweden and Finland 
in the latter half of the 1990s. All three markets have been fully open for around 10 years. 
In the previous studies,  Swedish and Norwegian retail markets have proved to be rather 
competitive with both active retailers as well as customers, whereas Finnish market has 
shown more moderate results, at least measured with the common competition indicators. 
This thesis views these three residential retail markets mainly from a comparative point of 
view, identifying the differentiating factors of the markets, and especially aiming to define 
the drivers of the Swedish and Norwegian markets on the one hand and the restrictions of 
the Finnish market  on the other  hand.  This  thesis  is  based on a  literature survey and 
interviews of electricity market professionals conducted in all the three countries.
This thesis concludes that the basic structure (e.g. regulatory framework, market structure) 
of  the Norwegian and Swedish markets  creates a solid basis  for  effective competition 
without  more  significant  hindrances,  but  in  addition,  exceptionally  active  retailers 
combined with some other, more particular factors, such as large price volatility due to the 
hydro-based system, the strong political characteristic of electricity, wide media coverage 
and the reputation of power sector have altogether resulted in rather dynamic markets. 
Furthermore,  new entrants,  which  have  often  been  judged as  failures  in  the  previous 
studies, appear to have driven the competition at least to some extent, even if many of 
them  have  later  left  the  market.  The  Finnish  market,  on  the  other  hand,  has  some 
restrictions in the basic regulations, which clearly hinder dynamic competition and create 
a somewhat stiff system with both passive retailers as well as customers. In addition, the 
conditions for new entrants are very difficult in the Finnish market and there have only 
been few new companies,  which have not  managed to create movements  in the same 
extent as in the Norwegian and Swedish markets. However, it was also noted that, in fact, 
there exists competition also in the Finnish market, although it occurs in a different form 
than in Norway and Sweden and this has kept the prices in a rather low and competitive 
level despite the lack of dynamic competition in terms of customer activity, new entrants 
and other commonly used competition indicators.
Even though all the three countries have shown some interesting developments during the 
past ten years, there still exists space for further improvements. Future improvements are 
expected to mainly stem from further integration of the retail markets and from installing 
automatic meters, which are both expected to change the situation significantly and to 
increase competition.
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Sähkömarkkinat  ympäri  maailmaa  käyvät  läpi  suuria  muutoksia,  kun  markkinoita 
vapautetaan.  Tuotanto  ja  myynti  avataan  kilpailulle,  kun  siirto  ja  jakelu  säilytetään 
säänneltyinä  niiden  luonnollisen  monopoliominaisuuden  takia.  Kolme  Pohjoismaata, 
Norja, Ruotsi ja Suomi olivat maailman ensimmäisten maiden joukossa, jotka vapauttivat 
sähkömarkkinansa, sekä tukkumarkkinan että vähittäismarkkinan. Kehitys alkoi Norjasta 
vuonna  1991,  Ruotsin  ja  Suomen  seuratessa  perässä  1990-luvun  jälkipuoliskolla. 
Markkinat  ovat  olleet  täysin  avoimia  jo  noin kymmenen  vuoden ajan.  Aikaisemmissa 
tutkimuksissa  Norjan  ja  Ruotsin  vähittäismarkkinat  ovat  osoittautuneet  melko  hyvin 
toimiviksi  ja  kilpailullisiksi  aktiivisine  myyjineen  ja  asiakkaineen,  mutta  Suomen 
markkinalla  kilpailu  on  vähäisempää,  ainakin  yleisesti  käytettyjen  mittareiden,  kuten 
asiakasaktiivisuuden ja uusien tulokkaiden menestyksen perusteella. Tässä diplomityössä 
tarkastellaan  näitä  kolmea  vähittäismarkkinaa  pienkuluttajien  kannalta.  Erityisesti 
keskitytään  löytämään eroavaisuuksia  ja  syitä  miksi  Ruotsin ja Norjan markkinat  ovat 
suhteellisen  kilpailullisia  ja  miksi  tilanne  Suomen  markkinalla  on  toisaalta  melko 
neutraali,  ellei  jopa  huolestuttava.  Työ  perustuu  kirjallisuuskatsaukseen  sekä 
sähkömarkkina-asiantuntijoiden haastatteluihin.
Työssä selviää, että Ruotsin ja Norjan markkinat omaavat hyvät lähtökohdat toimivaan 
kilpailuun  perusrakenteen  (esim.  sääntelyn  ja  markkinarakenteen)  kannalta  ilman 
merkittävimpiä  heikkouksia  ja  lisäksi  poikkeuksellisen  aktiiviset  myyjät  yhdistettynä 
muihin  hieman  erikoisempiin  tekijöihin,  kuten  suuriin  hinnan  vaihteluihin, 
sähkömarkkinan  poliittiseen  ominaisuuteen,  mediahuomioon  ja  sähkösektorin 
maineeseen, ovat yhdessä luoneet melko dynaamiset markkinat. Lisäksi uudet tulokkaat, 
joita on usein sanottu epäonnistuneiksi,  ovat  ajaneet  kilpailua osaltaan,  vaikka ovatkin 
myöhemmin  poistuneet  markkinoilta.  Suomen  markkina  puolestaan  sisältää  joitakin 
tekijöitä,  erityisesti  sääntelyssä,  jotka selvästi  rajoittavat  dynaamista  kilpailua ja luovat 
melko  jäykän  järjestelmän  passiivisine  myyjineen  ja  asiakkaineen.  Lisäksi  olosuhteet 
uusille myyjille ovat Suomen markkinalla hyvin hankalat, jonka takia uusia tulokkaita on 
ollut  vain  muutama,  eivätkä  hekään  ole  pystyneet  synnyttämään  liikehdintää  samassa 
määrin  kuin  Norjassa  ja  Ruotsissa.  Työssä  kuitenkin  huomattiin,  että  Suomenkin 
markkinalla esiintyy kilpailua, vaikkakin eri muodossa kuin Ruotsissa ja Norjassa. Tämä 
on pitänyt loppukuluttajahinnat melko alhaisina ja kilpailukykyisinä dynaamisen kilpailun 
puutteesta huolimatta.
Vaikka  kaikki  kolme  markkinaa  ovat  osoittaneet  mielenkiintoista  kehitystä  viimeisten 
kymmenen  vuoden  aikana,  tilaa  parannuksille  löytyy  yhä.  Tulevaisuuden  muutokset 
liittyvät  lähinnä  Pohjoismaisten  vähittäismarkkinoiden  liittämissuunnitelmiin  ja 
suunnitelmiin  asentaa  automaattiset  etäluettavat  mittarit  myös  kotitalouksille,  joiden 
molempien uskotaan muuttavan tilannetta huomattavasti ja lisäävän kilpailua.
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1  Introduction
This  chapter  gives  a  short  introduction  to  the  research  subject  and describes  the 
objectives and methodology of the thesis  as well  as the scope and limitations.  In 
addition, the structure of the rest of the thesis is presented.
1.1  Background
Electricity  retail  markets  around  the  world  are  in  transition  from  monopoly 
operations to free competitive markets. European Union is strongly supporting the 
development.  All  the  member  states  were  required  to  open  the  retail  markets  to 
commercial customers by 1st July 2004 and to residential customers by 1st July 2007. 
The development has however varied largely between the countries, some countries 
strongly  resisting  the  change  and  others  developing  even  faster  than  the 
requirements. The three Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden and Finland were among 
the pioneers in deregulating their electricity markets along with, for instance, the UK, 
New Zealand and some states in the US. The Nordic electricity market reform started 
in Norway in 1991, followed by Finland in 1995 and Sweden in 1996. As a result, 
the Nordic countries have a common wholesale market, which is widely considered 
successful (Amundsen et Bergman 2006b ; Olsen et al. 2006, Amundsen et al. 2006). 
However, the retail markets have still remained mainly national, although plans and 
research for a common Nordic retail market have already commenced.
Development of the retail markets have been very different in each Nordic country 
and the results of introducing competition into retail  side vary.  The Swedish and 
Norwegian markets  have proved to be rather competitive and dynamic in several 
studies, whereas the Finnish market have remained more neutral, at least measured 
with the common competition indicators (see for instance KTM 2004b ; von der Fehr 
et Hansen 2008 ; Littlechild 2006 ; EEE Ltd 2008). Switching rates are relatively 
high in Norway and Sweden, retailers have shown reasonable activity and several 
new companies have entered the market. Customer mobility has remained lower in 
Finland, there have been estimations that retailers are not interested in competition 
(KTM 2004b ; EEE Ltd 2008) and the conditions for new entrants are very difficult 
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and thus there have not been many new companies. However, retail prices appear 
rather competitive in each of the markets, even in the Finnish market and the range 
of products has been rather wide in all three countries (Littlechild 2005). Therefore, 
each of the three markets have shown some interesting developments and certainly 
give valuable views and lessons of the possible consequences of retail competition.
1.2  Objectives of the thesis
This thesis aims to give a comprehensive image of the three Nordic residential retail 
markets and most importantly to find the reasons that have driven competition in 
Norway and Sweden on the one hand and the reasons why competition and 
customer activity  remains still  moderate in the Finnish retail  market  on the 
other hand.
This main objective was planned to be achieved through several smaller objectives:
– By analysing the dynamics of competition in each of the Nordic markets.
– By  understanding,  which  are  the  factors  affecting  the  dynamics  of 
competition by viewing several important characteristics of the markets, such 
as  regulatory  and  institutional  barriers,  access  to  information,  regulatory 
framework, retailers' strategies, market structure and competition between the 
new  entrants  and  incumbents  on  the  one  hand  and  incumbents  and 
incumbents on the other hand.
– By viewing the segmentation between customers in the markets (passive and 
active) and their reactions to price signals and other incentives and finding 
out is this type of segmentation stagnant.
– By viewing the market development. How the number of switches, offers and 
new entrants vary over time.
1.3  Scope and limitations
Originally the idea for this thesis stemmed from my instructor who had written a 
working paper about the electricity retail markets in general. During his research he 
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had  become  interested  in  the  Nordic  markets,  especially  in  the  Swedish  and 
Norwegian markets as they seem to be special cases with their exceptional success in 
the retail side in addition to the UK market (Defeuilley 2008). The British market is 
rather  widely  studied  and  it  is  quite  well  known  what  has  driven  competition. 
Aggressive entrant from the gas sector, British Gas Centrica, and efficient customer 
acquisition method, dual fuel, have had important roles in the development1. In the 
Nordic countries, electricity is the main energy form and thus, the dual fuel cannot 
explain the consumer mobility and there has not been one significant entrant who 
would had challenged the incumbents to compete.
Thus, the original scope was to find out why the Swedish and Norwegian markets 
work so well. What are the drivers behind these active markets? Why the switching 
rates are much higher than in most of the countries that have opened up their retail 
markets  to  competition?  Finland  was  added  to  the  research  because  it  gives 
interesting comparison points  as it  is  part  of the same wholesale  market  and has 
many similar characteristics with Sweden and Norway.
As said, this thesis aims to describe the development of these three retail markets and 
to view the situation more than ten years after the reforms. The main focus is on the 
development of competition and on the factors that encourage or hinder competition. 
Wider analysis of the results and benefits of the market reform is out of the scope of 
this report. Starting point is, based on the previous literature, that competition in the 
Swedish  and  Norwegian  electricity  retail  markets  is  working  considerably  well, 
whereas competition remains more moderate in the Finnish market. This is partially 
confirmed  also  in  this  thesis  by  viewing  the  markets  with  several  indicators 
commonly used to measure the level of competition in the retail markets. However, it 
is also pointed out that, in fact, there is rather tough competition also in the Finnish 
market, although it occurs in a different form than in Norway and Sweden and which 
cannot  be  clearly  noted  with  these  indicators,  partially  challenging  the  previous 
claims of inefficiency in the Finnish market.
1 See more in Section 2.3.1
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The thesis is limited to three Nordic countries, Norway, Sweden and Finland (see 
Figure 1). Denmark, which is part of the same Nordic wholesale market, is left out of 
the scope because the conditions in the retail market, which was fully opened up to 
competition only in 2003, are very different from these three other Nordic countries 
and as a consequence, competition in the retail market and the customer activity are 
very  limited  (see  for  instance  Olsen  et  al.  2006  & 2007).  Fifth  Nordic  country, 
Iceland is not part of the Nordic electricity market and is therefore excluded from the 
study.
This  report  mainly  discusses  the  retail  markets  on  the  aspect  of  residential 
consumers.  Larger  business and service consumers  are not included in the study. 
This decision was made partially because the information of the bigger consumers is 
more limited and difficult to get, and partially because competition in the residential 
consumer sector has aroused more discussion. It is rather commonly agreed that large 
consumers  have  benefited  from competition  (Littlechild  2002),  but  whether  it  is 
feasible to open up residential market has been under debate.2 Thus, rather successful 
Nordic cases give an interesting aspect to this debate.
2 See for instance Joskow (2000) who casts doubts whether competition in retail electricity markets 
is really feasible and efficient and argues that the main benefits of electricity market reform stem 
from wholesale competition and Littlechild (2000) who answers by arguing that competition can 
lead to benefits also in a such a special market as electricity market.
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Figure 1: Nordic market area. Nordic electricity market consists of four Nordic 
countries, but this study only concentrates on Norway, Sweden and Finland.
Another important limitation in this research is connected to the data presented. The 
collection and availability of various information, e.g. the switching rates and prices, 
differs significantly among countries. Some data is collected systematically, whereas 
some  are  results  of  occasional  surveys  with  varying  coverage  and  reliability. 
Therefore, comparison between the countries should be considered with caution.
In addition, it is important to note that three terms commonly used in the literature 
are  also used in  this  thesis  to  refer  to  the  companies  operating  in  the  electricity 
market as retailers. Thus, retailer, supplier or retail supplier all mean the same.
Furthermore,  it  should be remembered that the markets  are constantly developing 
and large changes are expected already in the following years, whereas this thesis 
only views these markets at one specific time, which affects the obtained results.
1.4  Methodology and the structure of the thesis
This thesis is based on a literature survey and interviews of the electricity market 
professionals  (retailers,  regulators,  researchers)  in  each  three  countries  conducted 
during the autumn of 2008. Literature overview aims to give an overall presentation 
of the three markets by collecting and combining information from several sources. 
Interviews  aim to  give  an  additional  view to  the  previous  studies  as  well  as  to 
confirm  previous  findings,  and  to  map  the  views  of  the  electricity  market 
professionals. The main results from interviews are presented in a separate chapter, 
although the knowledge gained during the interviews have helped during the whole 
writing process and is thus partially used in the whole thesis.
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 gives background for the rest 
of the thesis. Electricity markets, uniqueness of electricity, competition and role of 
retailers  are discussed in general.  Structure of the electricity markets  is described 
shortly with explanations of most common terms, to give the readers a good idea of 
where the retail  market  is situated.  The situation of retail  competition around the 
world  is  viewed  with  a  short  case  example  of  Great  Britain.  In  addition,  most 
commonly used indicators to measure the level of competition in the retail electricity 
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markets are presented in order to confirm the different levels of activity in the Nordic 
markets. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 describe each of the Nordic markets country by country, 
first Norwegian market, then Swedish and to finish the case studies, Finnish market 
is discussed. All of the markets are viewed in similar aspects. First some background 
and basic facts are provided. Then the development of the deregulation and prices are 
presented, followed by the description of the regulatory framework. After, the market 
is viewed from supply and demand sides, in other words from the retailers' side and 
the  customers'  side.  The  market  structure  is  described  in  detail,  the  strategies  of 
retailers are analysed and the customers' behaviour is discussed. Some similarities of 
the countries, such as the structure of the electricity bills and types of contracts, are 
only presented in detail in the chapter of Norway to avoid repetition. The future of 
the Nordic retail  markets  is  discussed in Chapter 6.  Chapter  7 presents the main 
results from the interviews. Chapter 8 discusses the results and concluding comments 
are given in Chapter 9. Chapters 1 to 6 are mainly based on the literature analysis and 
chapters 7 and 8 includes also the empirical findings gathered during the interviews. 
List of interviewees can be found in Appendix I.
2  Electricity retailing in general
This chapter gives general basics of the electricity markets and especially electricity 
retailing in order to create basis for the following chapters. The role of retailers and 
retail  competition  are  shortly  discussed  and  electricity  market  is  discussed  in 
comparison with normal markets in order to highlight the special characteristics of 
the product itself as well as the market. In addition, the situation of electricity retail 
markets  around  the  world  is  shortly  viewed  and  common  indicators  of  retail 
competition are presented.
2.1  Electricity markets – putting retailer in its place
The starting point  for  restructuring  the markets  was fairly  similar  in  each of  the 
Nordic countries. Traditionally the Nordic electricity markets were mostly operated 
by  state  and municipally  owned,  vertically  integrated  utilities,  who had  a  public 
service obligation. Their supply was in general backed by own generation or long-
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term contracts. Monopoly rights and self-sufficiency requirements had led to over 
capacity.  The  aim of  the  electricity  market  reform was mainly  to  even the price 
differences  between the regions and customer  groups,  secure reasonable end-user 
prices and to remove the over capacity and thus to improve the overall efficiency of 
the markets. Common competitive wholesale market was a big step towards right 
direction,  but  to  make  sure  that  the  benefits  would  come  all  the  way  to  end 
customers,  all  three  countries  have  introduced  competition  also  into  their  retail 
markets.
After  the  deregulation,  the  Nordic  electricity  market  is  divided  into  regulated 
monopoly operations,  transmission and distribution, and to competitive operations, 
generation and supply. On the regulated side, high voltage electricity transmission 
from production plants to distribution networks is taken care by transmission system 
operators (TSO). In the Nordic countries, each country have one legally separated 
transmission system operators, Statnett in Norway, Svenska Kraftnät in Sweden and 
Fingrid  in  Finland.  Low voltage  distribution  to  end  consumers  is  taken  care  by 
distribution  system  operators (DSO).  There  are  large  amount  of  DSOs  in  each 
Nordic country and most of them are small,  municipally owned utilities. Network 
tariffs are regulated by national regulators.
Competitive  part  of  the  electricity  market  is  essentially  formed  by  two types  of 
markets, the Nordic wholesale market and the national retail markets. On a Nordic 
wholesale  market,  electricity is  produced in  production plants under competition. 
The wholesale  price,  typically  called  spot  price,  is  formed by the equilibrium of 
demand and supply in the Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool, which is the world's 
first  multinational  exchange  for  trading  electrical  power  and  broadly  considered 
successful.3 Nord Pool consists of two markets, the physical market, Nord Pool Spot 
AS (which consists  of day-ahead market  Elspot and intra-day market  Elbas),  and 
financial market, Nord Pool ASA. Retailers buy their power from Nord Pool or with 
bilateral  contracts  or  produce  their  electricity  themselves  and  sell  it  to  the  end 
consumers. In 2007 more than 70% of all  the electricity consumed was traded in 
3 Nordic power exchange, Nord Pool, originates from Norway. Sweden joined the market in 1996 
and Finland was integrated in 1998.
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Nord Pool (NordREG 2008b). The structure of the Nordic electricity markets after 
the reform is presented in Figure 2.
Thus,  in  a  nutshell,  the  retail  market  consists  of  retailers  and  retail  customers. 
Regulators  create  the  rules  and framework  for  the market.  Electricity  retailing  is 
primarily financial  operations as the actual  delivery of electricity to consumers is 
taken care by DSOs. Retailers act as an intermediate between the wholesale market 
and end consumers. Retailers may have own production and/or distribution or they 
can be totally independent. Deregulated market has created new challenges for the 
retailers and different types of risk management is needed (most importantly price 
and volume risk). Electricity retailing is in general business with small margins and 
high risks (LUT 2008). Retail competition can be defined, shortly, as the ability of a 
customer  to  choose  a  preferred  retail  supplier  (Littlechild  2002).  Consumers  can 
choose from which retailer  to buy their  electricity according to their  preferences. 
Most commonly the motivator to switch is the price and possible savings. Price of 
electricity is composed of three parts, the price of electric energy, taxes (electricity 
tax and VAT) and the network tariff, from which only the price of electric energy is 
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Figure 2: Structure of the Nordic electricity markets after the deregulation.
under  competition.  For residential  consumers  electric  energy accounts  for  around 
30%-50% of the electricity bill, varying somewhat between countries and between 
different customer groups. In addition to price competition, competition in electricity 
retailing is  generally expected,  for example,  to improve customer services,  create 
innovations, bring choice of commercial offers to customers (Eurelectic 2007) and 
improve  security of supply by transmitting  high wholesale  prices  to  end-users  in 
scarcity periods (Pakkanen et al. 2008).
2.2  Retailing  in  electricity  markets  compared  to  retailing  in  “normal” 
markets – uniqueness of electricity
Even though several countries have decided to introduce competition into their retail 
electricity markets, it has been under debate whether competition is really feasible in 
a such a special market as electricity market is, especially in the residential market. 
The role of electricity retailers has been questioned (see for instance Joskow 2000), 
mainly  because  electricity  as  a  product  has  several  special  characteristics,  which 
excludes the traditional tasks of a retailer.
Electricity differs from normal commodities in several aspects. Electricity is invisible 
and homogeneous. Almost all the consumers already have electricity and are rarely 
without  it.  Electricity  is  often  taken  for  granted.  Customers  do  not  need  to  do 
anything to be supplied. It is purchased by almost everybody and all the time. The 
choice  is  rather  new  and  often  unclear  and  not  well  understood.  In  addition, 
electricity cannot be economically stored in large amounts and thus the demand and 
supply has to be in balance all the time.
Due  to  these  characteristics,  electricity  retailing  differs  largely  from  normal 
commodity  markets. Two  main  tasks  of  retailers  fall  outside  electricity  retailers 
control.  Firstly,  electricity retailers do not take care of the actual distribution and 
secondly,  differentiation  and  marketing  opportunities  are  limited  for  a  good  as 
homogeneous  as  electricity  (Defeuilley  2008).  Furthermore,  the  opportunities  for 
electricity  retailers  to  add  value  are  estimated  to  be  rather  limited  compared  to 
traditional retailers  (Joskow 2000). Therefore,  as said, unlike the normal retailers, 
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electricity retailers are primarily financial intermediates as their main task is to buy 
electricity  in  the  competitive  wholesale  market  and  resell  it  to  end  consumers, 
although electricity retailers can add value at least in some amount, for example by 
surrounding services and by providing different types of contracts to fit customers 
preferences.
2.3  Retail markets in the EU and in the world
Even though it has been under academical debate whether introducing competition 
into residential electricity retail market is feasible, several countries have decided to 
open up their retail markets. Also the European Union is requiring its member states 
to  open  up  their  electricity  markets  to  competition.  The  Electricity  Directive 
2003/54/EC provided that large consumers have been able to choose their supplier 
since July 2004 and all the consumers,  including the residential  consumers,  since 
July  2007.  The  goal  is  to  create more  efficient  and  dynamic  energy  sector  by 
extending  competition  and  encouraging  cross  border  transactions  and  to  achieve 
eventually  one  common  internal  electricity  market  (EC  2004).  However,  the 
development varies largely between the member states, some developing faster than 
requirements, e.g. the Nordic countries and some resisting the change, e.g. France 
and Spain, and there is still long way to a truly common internal market. The overall 
situation appears still rather moderate as for example the annual switching rate have 
remained in most of the countries in about 1% or less (EC 2008). According to a 
Commissions  report  (EC  2007)  there  still  exist  several  problems  for  example 
connected to inefficient unbundling of network and supply activities and problems in 
the functioning of the wholesale markets reflecting to the retail side. However the 
report  also  states  that  the  process  of  market  opening  has  already  significantly 
changed the functioning of the markets, provided new market opportunities and led 
to the introduction of new products and services. Thus, although some progress has 
already been made,  the objectives of the market opening have not yet  been fully 
achieved.
Outside the European Union there exist several other electricity retail markets that 
have  been  opened  up  to  competition  and  some  have  succeed  reasonably  well, 
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although the general  image still  remains rather neutral or moderate.  In the World 
Energy Retail Market Ranking (VaasaETT 2007, see Figure 3), Virginia (Australia), 
Great Britain and South Australia (Australia) have been ranked as hot markets and 
Texas  (USA),  Norway,  New  South  Wales  (Australia),  New  Zealand,  Sweden, 
Finland,  Netherlands  and  Flanders  (Belgium)  as  active  markets.  VaasaETT  has 
researched the retail markets very widely covering over 30 competitive energy retail 
markets worldwide. They base their ranking on annual switching rates and classifies 
the markets as hot, active,  slow and dormant with annual switching rates of over 
15%, 5-15%, 1-5% and less than 1% respectively. The research gives fairly positive 
picture of the situation in the retail markets, as it indicates that most of the markets 
opened up to competition have shown an up trend in switching in the recent years, 
although the amount of dormant markets that show very little activity, is still high 
and many other markets are not even listed as the development of retail competition 
has been insignificant or even non-existent.
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Figure 3: World Energy Retail Ranking, 3rd edition. (VaasaETT 2007)
2.3.1  Case example: Great Britain
Together with the Nordic countries,  Great Britain  was one of the pioneers of the 
electricity market  reform as the market  deregulation  commenced already in 1989 
with the introduction of the Electricity Act. British retail market is one of the most 
active retail markets in the world and is a good example of the successful exceptions 
in Europe together with the Norwegian and Swedish markets. As seen in the Figure 
3, Great Britain was ranked as second active market in the world in the 3rd edition of 
the World Retail Market Ranking. Even though the British retail market, its design 
and development,  differs  largely from the Nordic markets,  it  gives  an interesting 
view of the possible results of introducing competition into retail market. The British 
case is more widely studied than the Nordic markets and the drivers of competition 
are rather well identified. Therefore, the British case, as one of the motivators for this 
study and as a good comparison point, is shortly discussed below.
Traditionally  the  British  electricity  supply  was  operated  by  twelve  Regional 
Electricity Companies, which were also in charge of the distribution. Retail market 
was  opened  up  in  stages.  Since  May  1999  all  the  customers,  also  the  smaller 
residential  customers  (often  called  domestic  customers  in  the  UK),  have  been 
allowed to switch supplier, which means that the market has been fully open already 
for  10  years,  around  the  same  time  as  the  Nordic  markets.  By  2006  47  %  of 
consumers had switched their supplier and the annual switching rate was around 18 
% (Ofgem 2008). The electricity market regulator, Ofgem have estimated that there 
have been real benefits from competition,  also in the residential  market,  although 
some concerns have been raised, particularly due to the margins, which still appear to 
be rather high, even higher than in Sweden (Milione et Törnqvist 2007). In 2007, 
Ofgem reported that price competition in the market was vigorous, suppliers were 
innovative, service was improving and customer mobility was still high. All in all, 
the market was estimated to be dynamic and highly competitive (Ofgem 2007).
However, the British retail market differs largely from the Nordic markets and have 
clearly different drivers of competition than the Nordic countries. For instance, the 
British market has been quite heavily regulated also after the market reform, whereas 
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the regulation in the Nordic countries is rather light as will be seen in the following 
chapters. In the UK the retail prices of incumbent retailers were initially regulated in 
order to create headroom for new entrants. The price cap was removed in 2002 when 
the regulators considered that the market was mature enough. In addition, initially 
there was 28-day rule in use, meaning that all the customers were free to terminate 
their energy contracts at 28 days' notice. This rule, which was originally meant as a 
transitional  protection  for  customers,  but  turned  out  to  be  regarded  permanent, 
limited the development of different contract forms, especially fixed price contracts, 
which  have  been  very  common  in  the  Nordic  countries  (Littlechild  2008),  and 
consequently most of the customers are still on the basic contracts. The rule was only 
abolished in 2007. Moreover, privatisation was done during the reform, whereas in 
the Nordic countries it has not been considered necessary.
The most successful method of acquiring customers in the British market has been 
dual fuel offers, which means selling electricity combined with gas. In 2007 90 % of 
switchers consuming both electricity and gas changed to dual fuel contracts (Ofgem 
2008). In the Nordic countries electricity is the main energy form. Usage of natural 
gas is rare, the gas markets are still very immature and the infrastructure is limited. 
Thus  dual  fuel  has  not  been  widely  used  and  cannot  explain  the  amount  of 
competition in the Swedish and Norwegian markets. Moreover, selling from door-to-
door has been most efficient method to reach the customers in the UK, which would 
not work most probably in the Nordic countries due to cultural differences (EEE Ltd 
2008).
Furthermore, the British market is dominated by only six retailers and one significant 
entrant, incumbent supplier from gas sector, British Gas Centrica, which has played a 
central role in the development. It aggressively emerged to the electricity retailing as 
it was required to reduce its market share in the gas sector.
British  case  is  thus  an  interesting  example  together  with  the  Nordic  countries 
showing that dynamic competition can be created from very different initial situation 
and with different ways.
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2.4  Indicators  to  measure  the  level  of  competition  in  the  retail  electricity 
markets
Level of competition in the retail electricity markets can be measured with several 
indicators, which do not necessarily end up to the same results. That is why it is 
better to use several indicators to view each market. Indicators to measure the level 
of competition in electricity retail market found in the literature are:
– Switching rate (cumulative, annual, net, gross)
– Number of all retailers and number of nationwide retailers
– Number of independent retailers and their market shares
– Market share of the largest companies
– Correlation between wholesale and retail prices
– Price differences between retailers
– Price level and margins
– New innovations
– New entrants and barriers to entry
Switching rate is one of the most commonly used indicator to measure the level of 
competition.  However,  switching  rate,  which  measures  the  number  of  supplier 
switches,  has  many shortcomings.  For  instance,  it  does  not  tell  the  real  level  of 
customer activity as it does not include the customers who have renegotiated their 
contract with their current supplier4 or the customers who have compared prices but 
ended up staying  with their  incumbent.  Moreover,  very high continuous  level  of 
switching  would  not  be  healthy,  indicating  that  there  are  some  problems  in  the 
market, but the switching rate should be more of a reasonable level indicating that 
customers exercise their possibility to choose and thus creates the necessary pressure 
for  retailers  to  compete  (Pakkanen et  al.  2008).  In  addition,  switching  rate  only 
measures the number of switches instead of number of switchers, meaning that re-
switches and returns to incumbent supplier are included. 
4 Some estimations of the amount of renegotiated customers are available for the Nordic countries.
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Light  can  be  shed  on  this  issue  by  viewing  net  and  gross  switching  rates5,  but 
unfortunately  these  rates  are  not  collected  in  all  the  countries  inhibiting  closer 
comparison. Moreover, as already notable time has elapsed from the market opening 
in  the  Nordic  countries  and  the  markets  were  opened  up  at  different  times,  the 
importance of cumulative switching rate can be questioned (Pakkanen et al. 2008). 
Maybe more truthful comparison could be obtained by viewing the annual switching 
rates,  which  indicate  better  the  current  situation.  Defining  reasonable  level  for 
switching  rates  might  be  challenging  and probably depends  on each  market,  but 
generally annual rate of 5% - 20% could be considered healthy (Cody et Gray 2004). 
In 3rd benchmarking report, the European Commission estimated annual switching 
rate of 10% reasonable (EC 2004).
For effective competition, sufficient number of electricity retailers is required and 
especially  the  number  of  active  retailers  is  important  in  order  to  guarantee 
availability of choice to customers. Market shares of the retailers can be also viewed. 
Generally very high concentration in the market signifies inefficient competition and 
possible use of market power, although in the electricity sector it has been estimated 
that  there  might  be  benefits  from  economies  of  scale.  Number  of  independent 
retailers can also signal the efficiency of competition. Independent retailers are often 
new and the most active ones. In competitive market there should not be significant 
entry barriers to enable the new companies to enter the market and challenge the 
incumbents.
Price is important in competition. There are several indicators connected to the price 
in the electricity markets. It is often considered that retail prices should correlate with 
the wholesale  prices  in order to transfer the price signals  all  the way to the end 
consumers and thus enabling demand elasticity and improving security of supply. In 
addition,  efficient  competition  should  reduce  the  price  differences  between  the 
retailers and customer groups and squeeze the margins low.
5 Gross  switching  rate  includes  all  the  movements  in  the  market,  whereas  net  switching  rate 
indicates the percentage of customers having left their incumbent retailer and excludes the count of 
multiple switches.
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Correlation  between the retail  and wholesale  prices  is  also little  bit  controversial 
indicator. In terms of competition in general, the correlation is considered as a sign 
of  efficiency,  but  whether  price  signals  are  needed  to  come  all  the  way to  end 
consumers in the residential retail electricity market is somewhat disputed. As said, 
on the one hand, volatile prices signal scarcity of electricity and possibly improves 
the security of  supply by enabling demand response,  but  on the other  hand, end 
consumers have rather limited possibilities to adjust their consumption in the short 
run,  particularly  with the  current  load profiling  systems  that  rewards  the savings 
rarely (depending on the meter reading frequency, usually once a year) and even then 
customers do not receive the monetary savings fully as the reductions are calculated 
based on the yearly average, not taking into account the time of the consumption 
reduction. In addition, as will be seen later in the Finnish case, stable prices are not 
necessarily  a  negative  characteristic  in  the  residential  sector,  especially  in  the 
customers' point of view, as the stable prices often protect the customers from large 
price peaks. In other words, by hedging their sales in the long run, retailers in the 
Finnish market work more as a bumper between the wholesale prices and customers 
than in the Swedish and Norwegian markets, which is sometimes considered as one 
of the essential tasks of retailers. Thus, the situation cannot be evaluated only based 
on  the  correlation  of  the  retail  and  wholesale  prices.  In  some  cases  correlation 
between financial product prices and retail prices might give a better image of the 
situation  as  retailers  secure  their  sales  with  derivative  contracts  rather  far  in  the 
future and do not buy straight from the physical market.
In  addition,  competition  is  expected  to  stimulate  new innovations  and add value 
compared  to  the  regulated  markets.  In  electricity  markets,  this  could  mean,  for 
example, better customer service and new types of products.
Most  of  these  indicators  are  rather  difficult  to  measure,  which  is  probably  why 
consumer  switching  rate  has  remained  the  most  common  indicator  despite  its 
shortcomings. Moreover, defining competitive levels for these indicators is not easy 
and probably depends on the market.  For example,  generally it  is considered that 
more competitors, better competition. However, in the electricity market it does not 
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seem to be always the case. For instance, there are hundreds of small  retailers  in 
Germany (retail market fully open since 1998), but competition is not particularly 
active, with cumulative switching rate of only around 10% (Verivox 2008). On the 
other hand, there are only six big, active retailers with market share of over 99% 
altogether in the UK and 10 in South Australia (retail market fully open since 2003) 
and the customer activity has been reasonably high in both of the countries, 47% and 
34% respectively (Ofgem 2007, NERA 2007). Furthermore, the data required to use 
these indicators is often not available or not even collected systematically.
Even though these indicators aim to give an image of the level of competition in the 
markets and are often used, the usage of these indicators can be questioned and it is 
not fully agreed, which ones are the best for the retail electricity markets. As a rather 
new concept, the retail models and evaluating of them is still being developed, which 
can be noted in some reports by different parties that aim to define the indicators 
most suitable for retail markets.6
Next three chapters describe the Nordic retail markets and also discuss them by using 
these indicators. Exact evaluating or comparing between countries is not possible due 
to  previously mentioned  difficulties  connected  to  these  indicators,  at  least  in  the 
scope of this study, but it can be noted even with a rather superficial overview that 
the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  markets  do  appear  more  dynamic  than  the  Finnish 
market, just like suggested in the previous studies. However, it is also noticed that 
even  if  the  Finnish  market  appears  least  competitive,  there  exists  some  kind  of 
competition, although it occurs in a different form than in Norway and Sweden and 
can be considered somewhat problematic on some aspects.
6 For  example  Finnish  Energy  Market  Authority  aims  to  develop  indicators  to  follow  the 
development  of  the level  of competition (EMV 2005) and in  2008 Nordic Energy Regulators 
informed that they are developing a new set of statistical indicators to measure the functioning and 
status of the wholesale and retail markets as current information does not give a comprehensive 
image of  the situation (NordREG 2008b).  Suggestions  for  possible  indicators  include supplier 
switching ratio,  smart  meter  ratio,  product  diversification on consumer market  and number of 
customers  and  products,  supplier  margins,  number  of  independent  suppliers  and  their  market 
shares, consumer access to market information and assistance. Final indicators are planned to be 
published during 2009.
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3  Electricity retail market in Norway
Norway was one of the first countries in the world to deregulate its electricity market 
and the Norwegian retail market is widely considered as one of the most active and 
successful.  In  this  chapter  Norwegian  electricity  retail  market  is  described.  First 
some background is given to form an image of the Norwegian power sector. After, 
the development of the deregulation and end-user prices are described. Then retail 
electricity market is presented from regulation, retailer and customer points of views.
3.1  Background and basic facts
Norwegian electricity market is the smallest of the three Nordic markets with around 
2,3 million household consumers. The consumption of electricity is high due to cold 
weather,  large  share  of  electricity  heating  and  large  amount  of  energy  intensive 
industry.  The  total  consumption  of  electricity  was  126 TWh in  2007 (NordREG 
2008b). Norwegian household sector's consumption is typically around 35 TWh of 
electricity per year,  but varies somewhat depending mainly on the changes in the 
outside temperature.  Average consumption  of Norwegian household is  very high, 
around 19 000 kWh due to the high amount of electric heating, which stands for 
about 98 % of all the households (Pakkanen et al. 2008).
Norway produces its electricity almost exclusively with hydro power (98 %) and is 
therefore very dependent on the weather conditions. Annual production varies largely 
from year to year according to the hydrological situation. Over the past years, the 
generation has generally ranged from about 104 TWh to 142 TWh. The anticipated 
generation of a normal year is approximately 118 TWh (Johnsen 2003). Generation 
is  moderately  concentrated.  The  three  largest  generators  have  a  market  share  of 
around 40% altogether (Littlechild 2006).
3.2  Norwegian deregulation
Norway  was  one  of  the  first  countries  in  the  world  to  deregulate  its  electricity 
market. The main motivators behind the reform were large price differences between 
25
consumer groups as well as regions, inflexible end-user prices, which did not reflect 
the resource scarcity, and too large and inefficient investments (Johnsen 2003). The 
aim  of  deregulating  the  market  was  thus  to  ensure  an  efficient  utilisation  of 
resources, reduce costs, equalise prices and to secure reliable supply. In addition, the 
simultaneous development in other pioneer countries, like the UK and New Zealand 
had an influence to the Norwegian decision to reform their electricity sector (Bye et 
Hope 2005).
The  electricity  market  was  deregulated  in  the  beginning  of  1990s  with  the 
introduction of the Energy Act, which came into force in January 1991. Exclusive 
supply rights of regional utilities were removed and a third-party access to networks 
on a non-discriminatory terms was introduced. Switching supplier became possible at 
the same time both for industrial customers as well as for residential customers and 
thus, the market has been fully open in principle since then. However, the switching 
costs were high, maximum NOK 50007, in the beginning and switching remained 
very low. The barriers preventing small consumers from exercising their choice were 
progressively removed. The maximum switching charge was reduced to NOK 4000 
in  1994.  In  1995  load  profiling  system  was  introduced,  which  means  that  the 
residential  consumers  could  switch  supplier  without  installing  expensive  hourly 
metering equipments. However, small switching charge of NOK 256 still remained. 
Customers were able to switch every quarter. Competition remained still low as in 
addition  to  the  customer  fee,  each  supplier  had  to  pay  NOK 4000 fee  per  each 
distribution area they were active in. These fees slowed down the development of 
true  retail  competition.  In  1997  all  the  fees  were  removed  and  since  1998  the 
customers have been able to switch supplier every week (NVE 2007).  Ownership 
changes during the reform were minor. The reform was largely implemented without 
privatisation  as  it  was  not  regarded  necessary  and  it  was  considered  politically 
unacceptable (Bye et Hope 2005). Important steps of the development are presented 
in Figure 4.
7 1Euro = 8,892 NOK in early 2009
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3.3  Regulation
3.3.1  Regulatory authorities
Regulation in the Norwegian electricity market has been fairly light but effective. 
Norway is reported to have the best resources in the electricity market regulation and 
supervision out of the three Nordic  countries  (EEE Ltd 2008).  Norwegian Water 
Resources and Energy Directorate (NVE), which is subordinated to the Ministry of 
Petroleum  and  Energy,  is  the  main  authority  responsible  of  controlling  and 
supervising  the  Norwegian  electricity  market.  NVE has  played  an  active  role  in 
developing  and  improving  the  market  and  encouraging  competition.  NVE  also 
collects and publishes information about the switching rates quarterly.
Norwegian Competition Authority is another important  authority in the electricity 
retail market. Since 1998 Norwegian Competition Authority has maintained a web 
based price comparison service8, where all the suppliers are obliged to inform their 
prices,  which  are  offered with the  terms  of  Standard  Agreement.  This  service  is 
considered comprehensive, although the amount of retailers informing their prices to 
8 http://www.konkurransetilsynet.no/no/kraftpriser/sjekk-kraftpriser/
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Figure 4: Development of the Norwegian deregulation.
the page has decreased somewhat.9 In addition, Competition Authority monitors the 
company merges and acquisitions. Consumer affairs, such as individual complaints, 
are taken care by the Consumer Ombudsman.
3.3.2  Retail market regulation 
Regulations  connected  to  the retail  market  are  light  but  effective.  Intervention  is 
indented to remain as small as possible and the competitive market is let to take care 
of the development  with the  minimal  required regulation.  In  addition,  significant 
regulatory measures have been made to increase market transparency and consumer 
switching. Main regulations of the retail market are presented below.
Default supplier, which means the supplier who supplies the consumers that have not 
made an active choice, is the local DSO. In practice it usually means the incumbent 
retailer. Default supply contract is standard variable contract. The default prices are 
not regulated and generally prices for customers who have not been active are higher 
than the prices of retail suppliers, which gives an incentive for customers to switch. 
The  default  supplier  is  obliged  to  inform customers  about  their  opportunities  to 
choose their supplier. The use of default supplier is seen important due to consumer 
protection questions.
Procedure for switching supplier is very important for the functioning of the retail 
markets  (Olsen  et  al.  2007).  In  Norway,  customer  switching  process  works 
efficiently. Switching is free and very easy for customers. Customers only need to 
contact the new supplier, who sends a notification to the distribution company by 
EDIEL (standard communication system for the power market). The DSO checks the 
customer data and collects the customer's meter value. One week before change of 
supplier,  the  distribution  company  notifies  both  the  old  and  the  new  supplier. 
Without any delays due to incorrect data in the notification from the new supplier, 
the  process  might  take  a  few days  but  no  longer  than  two  weeks (NVE 2007). 
Switching is possible every Monday.
9 Mainly the retailers who have high prices use different term as they do not even wish to be listed 
in the service. This is not considered as a significant problem as they are not nationwide retailers.
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None of the end-user prices are regulated, but there are some restrictions connected 
to the price changing. Changes in the prices of variable price contracts can be done 
in two weeks notice and the notification has to be done in a suitable manner, which 
in practise means that personal notification is not required, but an announcement for 
example  in  a  newspaper  is  sufficient.10 These  regulations  enable  the  prices  of 
variable price contracts to follow the wholesale prices closely.
In Norway companies are obliged to have a licence to sell electricity, which differs 
from other Nordic countries. The licence is fairly easy to obtain and thus does not 
restrict competition. In 2007, 264 companies had a licence. 155 of these operate also 
in network or generating business. 74 of these are only involved in selling and 29 
have simplified conditions for small scale operations (Elforsk 2007b). However, not 
all of these companies are active in the retail market.
Separation between DSOs and sales is considered essential for retail competition as 
it provides equal opportunities for independent retailers to operate in the market. In 
addition, effective separation aims to prevent cross subsidization between monopoly 
operations  and  competitive  operations.  In  Norway,  management  and  accounting 
separation of DSOs and supply is required for all the companies. In addition, there 
are special regulations by authorities to secure the neutral behaviour of the DSOs. 
Suppliers are not allowed to have an access to DSOs' customer registers and DSOs 
services should be offered to all the suppliers on equal basis. In 2005, a suggestion of 
legal  splitting  between  retailing  and  network  operations  was  presented  but  was 
finally  not  accepted  (EEE  Ltd  2008),  but  as  of  2007  legal  separation  has  been 
required  for  companies  with  more  than  100  000  customers  according  to  the 
requirements  of  the  European  Commission's  Second  Directive.  Only  seven 
companies meet this requirement (NVE 2008a). Despite these rules, there have been 
some concerns  of  insufficient  separation  and unfair  sharing  of  information  (ESA 
2007).
10 Although  if  the  price  increase  is  more  than  2,5  øre/kWh  the  customers  must  be  informed 
personally.
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The electricity bill is composed of two parts, the network tariff and the electricity 
tariff.  Incumbent  companies  invoice  these  in  one  bill,  but  others  usually  send 
separate bills, which can be considered as competitive advantage for incumbents as 
customers might take two bills as a barrier to switch. A proposal of two separate 
invoices for everybody was considered in 2005, but it was not accepted (von der Fehr 
et Hansen 2008).
3.4  Price development
The  total  cost  of  electricity  to  end  customers  is  formed  by  the  price  of  electric 
energy, taxes (electricity tax and VAT) and the network tariffs. Network tariffs are 
regulated and cannot be affected by switching. The only part under competition is 
thus the price of electricity, which accounts in Norway for about one third of the total 
bill varying slightly depending on the amount of consumption.
Before the switching fees were abolished,  the Norwegian retail  prices were fairly 
stable and did not correlate much with the wholesale price as the prices were usually 
adjusted only annually. Also, the suppliers mainly bought their power with bilateral 
contracts, which gave even less incentives to adjust the prices more often. In 1997 
the  situation  changed  as  the  customers  were  no  more  locked  in  with  their 
incumbents. Suppliers were forced to lower their prices and start to operate more on 
the market price rules and this pattern has continued since and gotten stronger (KTM 
2004b).
Between  1998  and  2000  the  prices  were  fairly  low due  to  a  good  hydrological 
situation in the market, but started to increase somewhat in 2001 when the situation 
became more normal. The dry winter of 2002-2003 caused a huge spot price peak, 
which was reflected also into the retail prices. After the price peak the prices have 
again become more stabilised but at a somewhat higher level.
Another spot price peak was seen in 2006, which again was seen clearly also in the 
retail prices. In 2007 prices started to go down, but again in 2008 the trend has been 
increasing.  The  spot  price  and  retail  price  (standard  variable  price)  development 
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between 1993 and 2007 is shown in Figure 5. The prices are given in Norwegian 
currency,  but the figure clearly shows the price developments and the correlation 
between the prices.
Already from this figure it can be seen that the Norwegian retail prices have started 
to follow the wholesale prices more and more closely and nowadays the correlation 
is rather strong. This correlation has been studied more closely in few reports, such 
as KTM (2004b), Johnsen et Olsen (2008) and von der Fehr et Hansen (2008). All 
the studies  concluded that  the correlation  is  strong,  even during  the price  peaks. 
Retail prices include a small mark up compared to the wholesale price and have a 
tendency to lag. The lag is estimated to be around 2 weeks, which is the time needed 
for announcing price changes. However, the lag is noted to be longer when the prices 
are decreasing than what when the prices are increasing.11
3.5  Market structure
Traditionally  Norwegian  electricity  market  has  been  very  fragmented.  After  the 
deregulation, the concentration in the supply side has increased mainly due to merges 
11 See more in section 3.6.3
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Figure 5: Development of retail electricity prices in Norway in comparison with spot 
price development, øre/kWh. (Johnsen et Olsen 2007)
and company acquisitions although it still remains less concentrated than the Finnish 
and Swedish markets (EEE Ltd 2008). At the moment there are about 158 suppliers, 
whereas before market opening there were around 224 suppliers. The market share of 
the three  largest  suppliers  has  increased  from 37,2% in 1997 to  56,2 % in 2003 
(Littlechild 2006). Rest of the companies are rather small. Only these three largest 
companies have market shares of over 5 %. In recent years several companies have 
been changed from municipal companies to limited companies, accounting now for 
more than 70% of all the companies (Amundsen et Bergman 2006a). In addition, 
larger  regional  power  companies  have  been  established  through  acquisitions  and 
merges (Amundsen et al. 2006).
The amount of suppliers acting nationwide has varied over time between 10 and 35, 
but is  usually around 15 and the amount  of suppliers  operating almost  in all  the 
network areas is around 30 (von der Fehr et Hansen 2008). Most of the 158 suppliers 
do  not  thus  compete  actively,  but  generally  the  number  of  active  retailers  is 
considered sufficient for efficient competition.
In addition to the merges and acquisitions, the amount of retailers has varied over 
time also due to entry and exit of new retailers. Norwegian market has had several 
independent  retailers  entering  the  market,  both  new  entrants  from  other  areas, 
especially petroleum companies (e.g. Statoil, Shell) but also totally new companies 
(e.g. Norges energi). Some new entrants have managed to gain reasonable amount of 
customers and few of them still exists in the market, but many have been bought by a 
bigger company or had troubles, for example with billing systems, and have left the 
market. Some of the new entrants, which have been acquired by larger company, still 
exist as a separate brand in the market.  For example Norges Energi started as an 
independent retailer, but was bought by Hafslund few years later. However, Norges 
Energi still continues to operate as a low cost brand. In 2008 NVE reported that there 
were around 5 independent suppliers in the household market and none of them had a 
market share over 4 % (NVE 2008a).  Foreign entry has been fairly low. Haflsund 
Group  is  partly  (35%)  owned  by  Finnish  Fortum,  but  otherwise  no  big  foreign 
players are in the market.
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3.6  Retailers' strategies and activities
In  general  the  Norwegian  retailers  are  rather  active  and  retailers  really  compete 
against each other, but as described earlier the market structure is very fragmented 
and not all  of the retailers  take part  in competition.  Roughly the retailers  can be 
divided into large companies and independent retailers, who compete nationwide and 
to small municipal utilities who have adopted more passive strategy. The number of 
small municipalities is dominating, but the number of active retailers is considered 
sufficient for dynamic competition.
Large  incumbents  have  aimed  to  grow mainly  through  acquisitions,  but  also  by 
acquiring  consumers  organically.  New  entrants  have  been  active  and  created 
movements in the market. The entry has been continuous, which has kept the market 
dynamic.  For  example,  a  petroleum  company  Statoil  entered  the  Norwegian 
electricity  retail  market  in  1998  challenging  the  incumbent  retailers  with  active 
campaigns  and  have  reportedly  had  notable  role  in  driving  competition  (Fosby 
Livgard 2007).
Smaller municipalities are often more passive and do not try to gain new customers 
actively and often offer cheap prices only locally. Some of them might have different 
objectives  than  making  profit,  for  example  to  support  their  town.  Some 
municipalities who have agreements with Statkraft have particularly low prices for 
the customers in their distribution area.
Common activities of electricity retailers are presented below.
3.6.1  Contracts offered and innovations
Traditionally Norwegian suppliers, as well as the Swedish and Finnish suppliers, had 
only one type  of contract,  standard variable  tariff.  A special  characteristic  of the 
Nordic markets is the increased amount of contract types, which differ in their terms 
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and  risk  profiles.  The  contracts  offered  in  Norway  are  similar  to  other  Nordic 
countries.12 Basic contracts are:
– Standard variable contract  or traditional contract.  Suppliers may adjust the 
price when appropriate (after notification), allowing them to pass on the cost 
increases  to  customers.  Price  usually  contains  fixed  and  variable  parts. 
Standard variable contract is also the default contract.
– Fixed price contract. Price is fixed for an agreed period of time, usually one 
to three years, but some other lengths have occurred too. Fixed price protects 
customers from increasing wholesale prices, but on the other hand sometimes 
customers might end up paying more than the wholesale price level.
– Spot price based contract. The price directly reflects the Nord Pool day-ahead 
spot price plus a margin and/or a possible fixed fee.
In Norway a standardised retail product system, called Standard agreement, has been 
developed by electricity supply industry in cooperation with consumers' agency and 
NVE, and retailers offering products with these terms are required to publish their 
prices on the Competition Authority's  web page. Most of the retailers  offer these 
contracts and most of the customers choose them, so the amount of other types of 
contracts is not very significant. Some retailers have bundled electricity with other 
products, e.g with oil, but it has not been very popular and electricity retailing has 
concentrated mainly on the electricity itself (von der Fehr et Hansen 2008).
3.6.2  Marketing
Marketing has been varied although not very wide-scaled. There have been some 
direct  mailing,  telemarketing,  advertisements  in  newspapers,  radio  and  TV 
advertising and even selling on public places, for instance in shopping centres and 
fares. The margins are small  and thus it  is not even possible to afford expensive 
marketing. Telemarketing seems to be fairly efficient in this sense and it has been 
12 As these are the most typical contracts also in Sweden and Finland, they will not be described in 
detail  again  in  the  following  chapters.  Some  rules  connected  to  the  contracts  e.g.  the  price 
changing regulations differ from country to country and will be discussed more closely separately 
in each chapter.
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quite popular. There has been also very small amount of door-to-door selling, which 
has been the most efficient method in the UK, but in general it is not very suitable for 
Norwegian  culture  nor  other  Nordic  cultures  either.  In  addition,  the  Competition 
Authority's website is used as a marketing tool, which is fairly efficient for retailers 
with low prices as media often refers to this service especially during high prices. 
Also almost  all  the  retailers  have  nowadays  own internet  pages,  which are  good 
sources of information.
3.6.3  Price setting
As  mentioned,  before  the  deregulation  price  differences  were  large  between  the 
customer groups and between different areas. Competitive pressure on prices was 
expected to equalise the prices and squeeze the margins low and thus to guarantee 
supply with reasonable prices to consumers. In addition, competition was hoped to 
bring  flexibility  to  the  prices,  which  is  especially  important  in  a  hydro  power 
dominated system like the Norwegian system is. Annual variations in generation are 
large, but traditionally the prices were adjusted usually only about once a year and 
thus did not reflect the actual scarcity of power.
As said, the end-user prices are not regulated in Norway and thus the price formation 
is solely based on the market and the retailers decisions. Retail electricity prices in 
Norway follow closely the wholesale  price changes although with a  small  lag as 
retailers  are  able  to  alter  prices  of  variable  price  contracts  every  two  weeks. 
Correlation has been strong even during the large price variations, showing that the 
retailers use the wholesale price as an opportunity cost to their production, although 
the lag seems to be longer during sharply decreasing prices (von der Fehr et Hansen 
2008 ; Johnsen et Olsen 2008).
According to estimations, differences between the customer groups and across the 
areas have equalised (Johnsen 2003), although differences still appear. Especially the 
differences between the retail segments, the active and passive retailers, are reported 
to be fairly high (von der Fehr et Hansen 2008).
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Notable differences can be observed also between different contracts. Based on a 
study  on  retail  margins  in  the  Nordic  countries  (Elforsk  2007b)  the  spot  price 
contracts  have been the most  beneficial  based on historical  data  and the variable 
price  contracts,  which  is  the  default  contract,  have  been  the  least  beneficial  in 
Norway.  Some explanations  have been suggested  for  the notably higher  variable 
price contracts. Some suggest that higher prices are a sign of market power (Elforsk 
2007b ; von der Fehr et Hansen 2008). It is suspected that suppliers have noticed that 
the passive segment of customers is fairly stagnant and thus keep their prices higher 
for  these  customers.  Others  estimate  that  as  the  default  supplier  is  the  local 
distribution company, the retail supply is not their core business and thus the prices 
are not very competitive, which creates real incentives for customers to find cheaper 
offers  and switch  to  a  more  competitive  supplier  (KTM 2004b).  In  addition,  the 
variable price contract have become very volatile, almost as volatile as spot price 
contracts, but includes higher risks, and thus the prices are not as competitive.
Price discrimination has been noted to exist in the Norwegian market. For instance, 
the  largest  supplier  in  Norway,  Hafslund,  offers  different  prices  to  different 
customers.  They offer  slightly  higher  prices  for  the customers  in  their  own area, 
which  do  not  give  enough  incentives  to  switch  and  make  better  offers  in  other 
distribution areas in order to gain new customers (von der Fehr et Hansen 2008).
3.7  Customers in the Norwegian market
Customer activity is  essential  for a well  functioning competition.  Fear of loosing 
customers creates the pressure for suppliers to keep the prices as low as possible. 
Norwegian customers have been reasonably active in the electricity market. It has 
been estimated that the net switching rate is about 28% and gross switching rate even 
as high as 89 %, which is remarkably higher than in most other countries that have 
introduced competition into the electricity retailing.
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3.7.1  Switching
Information  about  switching  rates  is  collected  quarterly  from  network  system 
operators by NVE since 1997. Therefore the information is rather comprehensive and 
reliable.13
Switching  remained  very  low  until  1997  (only  about  2500  switches),  but  after 
removing the switching fees, the number of switches started to increase, although 
slowly, as low electricity prices and small differences in prices between suppliers did 
not give big incentives for customers to switch. In the end of 1998, only about 5% of 
customers had switched their supplier. The switching rate only peaked to high level 
during the extraordinary dry year of 2002-2003, which led to low reservoir levels and 
huge increase of prices. Record level of around 441 000 switches were done during 
2003,  which  equals  about  one  fifth  of  the  Norwegian  customers.  After  this,  the 
switching rates decreased somewhat, but have remained reasonable showing that an 
active segment seems to exist and be persistent. Annual switching rate in 2006 was 
11,5% and in 2007 8,5%, which can be considered fairly healthy level. It has been 
estimated  that  at  least  half  of  the  Norwegian  customers  have  switched  their 
electricity  supplier  at  least  once  (Vaasan  yliopisto  2008).  Information  about 
renegotiating  is  not  collected  in  Norway,  but  the  real  activity  of  consumers  is 
assumably much higher than these switching rates indicate.
Customer activity can be also viewed with the amount of customers with incumbents, 
which  has  steadily  declined  in  Norway.  Market  shares  of  incumbents  between 
different areas varies largely, from 30% to nearly 95% of customers (NVE 2008a), 
which is  due to several  reasons.  As mentioned,  some small  companies  offer low 
prices and thus the customers do not have any incentive to switch as saving would 
not be possible by switching. In addition, campaigns are often focused on specific 
areas, and thus the switching rates can differ largely. Altogether 71,1 % of customers 
are supplied by the dominant supplier within the grid area in 2008 (NVE 2008b). 
However, amount of customers with incumbents do not reflect the real amount of 
switching either as some customers might have returned to their incumbent supplier 
13 The survey covers only 82,4 % of the customers, but the results are scaled to cover all the country.
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and  especially  these  numbers  understate  the  customers  activity  as  they  do  not 
indicate the customers who have renegotiated with their current retailer.
Norway have been reported to have the highest rate of re-switching in the world. It is 
estimated that every customer who has once switched, has done it in average three 
times (including the customers who have switched back to their incumbent supplier). 
However, it seems that significant part of this re-switching is switching back to a 
previous retailer (VaasaETT 2007).
Switching activity is not a stable constraint. Annual and seasonal variations can be 
noted, especially in the hydro-based Norwegian market with highly volatile prices. 
Highest customer activity has occurred during the winter months, when the price are 
typically higher than during summers (VaasaETT 2007).
3.7.2  Factors affecting customer mobility
The behaviour of the Norwegian customers has not been surveyed as widely as the 
behaviour of the Swedish customers (see following chapter). However, some factors 
that  encourage  the  switching  can  be  clearly  observed.  High  consumption  per 
household and the resulting share of expenditure used to electricity in the household's 
budget creates incentives for customers to follow the electricity prices closely and 
possibly to switch supplier. In Norway the average consumption is very high, around 
19 000kWh, which is the highest out of the Nordic countries and partially explains 
the high activity.
Volatile prices have also been important driver of customer mobility. Price changes 
correlate with the switching activity quite strongly as can be seen in the Figure 6. 
During high prices customers become more interested in switching and more aware 
of the situation, for example due to media attention. This was clearly seen during the 
price peak of 2002-2003 when about one fifth of the Norwegian customers switched 
their supplier. Similar situation was seen again in 2006, although the price peak was 
not  as  high  and only  9% of  the  customers  ended up  switching  supplier  causing 
smaller peak in the activity than in 2002-2003 (Fosby Livgard 2007).
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In  addition,  switching  seems  to  correlate  with  the  prices  difference  between  the 
retailers. When the price difference is large, there are more possibilities to save and 
switching increases. This is presented in Figure 7. This correlates also with the price 
changes. During quickly changing prices, the retailers prices differ more than during 
more stable prices.
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Figure 6: Number of switches per quarter compared to spot price development.
(von der Fehr et Hansen 2008)
Figure 7: Number of switching compared to the price difference between the 
cheapest and the most expensive supplier. (NVE 2008b)
Norwegian example is interesting also considering the demand response possibilities 
of the residential consumers. Often, it is considered that one of the objectives of the 
market deregulation is to increase the security of supply by signalling the scarcity of 
electricity all the way to end consumers during the high prices. Sometimes the ability 
of residential consumers to take part in the demand elasticity is questioned as the 
possibilities for consumers to reduce electricity consumption are rather weak in the 
short run (see more in Section 2.4). However, during the price peak of 2002-2003 the 
consumption  of  Norwegian  consumers  lowered  significantly  as  the  temperature-
adjusted  demand  of  households  and  part  of  the  industry14 fell  by  7  % over  the 
November-May period compared to the previous year (von der Fehr et al. 2005).15
Customers' lack of knowledge was a problem in the initial period of the deregulation 
also in Norway. It has been estimated that the Norwegian suppliers were not very 
eager  to  inform  the  customers  about  their  possibilities  (Fosby  Livgard,  2007). 
According to Fosby Livgard the situation improved in this aspect after the Statoil's 
entry in 1998. Direct marketing campaigns of Statoil as well as the other retailers' 
campaigns  in  response  to  Statoil's  activities,  improved  customers'  awareness  and 
their two active campaigns caused a peak in switching rate, almost doubling it from 
around 3,5% to 7%. Furthermore,  Norwegian  authorities  have  taken measures  to 
improve the customers'  awareness, for instance Norwegian Competition Authority 
has collected and published price information since 1998, which can be considered to 
improve customers' awareness notably and ease the switching process.
Norwegian  power  market  has  surprisingly  bad  reputation,  even  though  it  is 
considered  to  work fairly  well.  Especially  after  the deregulation  consumers'  trust 
towards the electricity sector has decreased significantly. In a survey by TNS Gallup 
made in 2003 energy industry scored only 31 out of 100, which was the worst out of 
several industries included in the study, for example pharmacy and cosmetics. It has 
been surveyed that the reputation of the electricity industry highly correlates with the 
14 Other industry than boiler industry and energy intensive industry.
15 Von der Fehr et al. (2005) calculated that this corresponds to a price elasticity of 0.23. Other report 
(KTM 2004c) states that the residential sector reduced consumption of electricity 4% and that over 
half of the households reduced the usage of lightning and heating in order to reduce the electricity 
bill. However, the meters in Norway are read four times per year, which enables better demand 
response than for example the Finnish system with the yearly meter reading.
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price (see Figure 8), whereas other factors, such as information and satisfaction have 
only slight impact. This lack of confidence is explained by the fact that Norwegian 
consider their hydro power sources as a richness of the country and as a privilege of 
the inhabitants, and do not see it as a business to make profit (Fosby Livgard 2007).
In addition, Norwegian have long traditions and experience of electricity markets, 
which is estimated to be one of the reasons for their high activity, whereas loyalty 
stemming from traditions could partially explain the remaining passive segment. It 
has  been  surveyed  that  the  loyalty  of  Norwegian  customers  towards  their  local 
supplier is high, which mainly stems from traditions as the suppliers are regarded as 
important social institutions, not from satisfaction (Fosby Livgard 2007). According 
to estimations, over 40% of the customers feel loyalty towards their local supplier.
3.7.3  Choice of contracts
Variable  price  contract  is  still  the  most  common  contract  among  customers, 
accounting nowadays for little less than 50% although the share has been decreasing 
steadily.  From  offer  contracts,  the  spot  price  based  contract  has  been  the  most 
popular.  Retailers  started  to  offer  spot  price  contracts  in  a  very  early  stage  and 
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Figure 8: Development of prices and the reputation of Norwegian power industry 
(the scale for the reputation score is reversed). (Fosby Livgard 2007)
nowadays already more than 40 % of customers have spot price contract. The shares 
of different types of contracts for years 2002-2008 is presented in Figure 9.
There are several reasons for the popularity of spot price contracts or at least many 
speculations have been presented. First, the spot price contracts are easier and less 
expensive for retailers to administer and there is no need for risk hedging and thus 
many retailers have started to offer spot price contracts, some as their main product 
and some, especially new entrants, even as their only product. Second, the price of 
variable contracts is changing very often and is very volatile, and thus the pricing 
reminds closely the pricing of spot price contracts but includes the risk component 
and  is  often  lagging  more  during  the  decreasing  prices,  making  the  spot  price 
contract  more attractive and clear.  Third,  it  has been said that the Norwegians in 
general do not like paying for the stability but prefer the floating rates (Littlechild 
2006), although cultural differences are unlikely to totally explain the differences as 
Nordic nationalities are said to be fairly similar in their mentality as well as in other 
personal  characteristics.  In  addition,  the  share  of  spot  price  contracts  has  been 
increasing in Sweden too, accounting now for about 22% (see Chapter 3), which 
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Figure 9: Shares of different types of contracts in the Norwegian market.
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would be against the differences between national preferences but instead indicate 
that the differences in the popularity of different types of contracts might be more 
due to other factors, for instance due to the development and the structure of the 
market and retailers offers.
3.8  Discussion and conclusions
This chapter aimed to give a comprehensive image of the Norwegian electricity retail 
market. It was noted that Norwegian retail competition is generally considered well 
functioning with high activity from both retailers' and customers' side, even though 
some market imperfections still  exist.  Especially compared to other countries that 
have fully opened their retail markets to competition, Norwegian market seems to 
perform well.
There have already been considerable gains in the Norwegian market. Retail prices 
have started to follow the wholesale prices to a large extent enabling better demand 
response,  which is  important  in  a  hydro based system like Norwegian system is. 
Prices in average have become more volatile, but the price differences have equalised 
and the margins are small. Competition in the retail market has stemmed new types 
of  contract  forms,  processes  have developed and price  information  systems  have 
been developed to  increase customers'  awareness and to lower the switching and 
search  costs.  New organisational  forms  and  new entrants  have  been  seen  in  the 
market. Market has become more transparent and the overall image is that the market 
starts to be fairly mature. High consumption of electricity, aware consumers, volatile 
prices,  reputation  of  the  power  sector,  long  traditions  and  political  role  of  the 
electricity sector combined with active retailers have altogether resulted in a rather 
dynamic  market.  Some  concerns  have  been  raised  due  to  increased  market 
concentration, the situation of passive customers and the lack of sustainable entry, 
but overall the Norwegian market has shown some interesting developments and is a 
good example that competition can be rather dynamic also in the residential retail 
market.
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4  Electricity retail market in Sweden
Swedish electricity retail market has also shown reasonable customer activity and the 
market  is  often defined as competitive and mature,  even though the deregulation 
commenced few years later than in Norway. This chapter presents the outline of the 
Swedish market  from the similar  point of views as the Norwegian market  in  the 
previous chapter.
4.1  Background and basic facts
Swedish  electricity  retail  market  is  the  largest  market  out  of  the  three  Nordic 
countries with approximately 5,2 million electricity customers (EMI 2006b). Like in 
Norway and Finland the total consumption of electricity is high, approximately 146 
TWh in 2006 (EMI 2007b). The level has remained fairly stable during the past years 
with  only  slight  variations  from  year  to  year  depending  mainly  on  the  outside 
temperature.  Altogether  the consumption  increased 3,9% between 1990 and 2003 
and the slow increase is estimated to continue with a rate of 0,3% annually (SOU 
2005).  Housing and services  stand for  around half  of  the  total  consumption  and 
industry  approximately  40%.  Private  households  consume  around  42  TWh. 
Consumption per capita was 4 416kWh in 2006 (NordREG 2007). Average annual 
consumption of households is about 10 000kWh, which is in between the Finnish and 
Norwegian  households'  consumption.  Amount  of  electricity  heating  accounts  for 
30% of all the heating used in the residential sector (Pakkanen et al, 2008).
Generation is mainly nuclear and hydro power, accounting together for over 90%. 
The remaining 10% is generated using fossil- and biofuel fired plants and a small 
part  of  wind  power.  The  total  amount  of  electricity  generated  in  2007  was 
approximately  144,6TWh.  Importing/exporting  of  electricity  depends  on  the 
hydrological  situation.  In  2007  net  imports  amounted  to  1,3TWh  (EMI  2007a). 
Generation of electricity is very concentrated. The three largest companies have a 
market share of almost 90% (NordREG 2005).
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4.2  Swedish deregulation
Swedish electricity market was opened up to competition in the latter  half  of the 
1990s. The goal of the reform was mainly to achieve more efficient use of production 
and distribution  resources  through increased  competition  and to  guarantee  secure 
supply to the customers  with lowest possible  price (EMI 2006a).  In addition,  the 
opening up of the Norwegian electricity market in the beginning of 1990s supported 
the decision.
From 1st January 1996 all the customers were allowed to choose their retailer, but 
expensive hourly metering equipment was required.  Maximum cost of the meters 
was around 7000-9000 SEK16, which negated the possible benefits from switching 
and therefore the switching was very rare. In 1997 maximum price for the equipment 
was set to 2500 SEK and finally in 1st November 1999 load profiling system was 
adopted  removing  all  the  fees  connected  to  switching  and  thereby  facilitating 
switching  notably.  The  main  steps  of  the  Swedish  deregulation  are  presented  in 
Figure 10.
16 1 Euro = 10,669 SEK in the early 2009
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Figure 10: Development of the Swedish deregulation.
4.3  Regulation
4.3.1  Regulatory authorities
Swedish  electricity  market  is  under  supervision  of  several  regulatory  authorities, 
which  each  have  their  own  area  of  responsibility.  These  authorities  include  the 
Energy  Markets  Inspectorate,  the  Swedish  Competition  Authority, the  Swedish 
Financial  Supervisory  Authority,  Svenska  Kraftnät  and  the  Swedish  Consumer 
Agency (SOU 2005).
Energy Markets Inspectorate (EMI) is the main regulator of the Swedish electricity 
market.  EMI was established  on 1st January 2005 as part  of the Swedish Energy 
Agency (SEA) by the government and it became an independent authority within 
SEA on 1st January 2008. Efficiency and functioning of the energy markets was seen 
as  very important  issue  and thus  EMI was  formed  to  supervise  and monitor  the 
energy markets. Their tasks also include to inform public and stakeholders about the 
markets and other customer related issues (EMI 2007a).
In  January  2008  EMI  started  to  maintain  a  price  comparison  web  service, 
Elpriskollen17 (The electricity price guide). The purpose of Elpriskollen is to provide 
electricity customers an access to up-to-date and consistent information. This service 
is expected to make it easier for consumers to make active choices in the electricity 
market  and  thus  to  help  to  strengthen  competition.  The  web  page  is  very 
comprehensive as suppliers have an obligation to inform their prices and terms (EMI 
2007a).  Before Elpriskollen, Swedish Consumer Agency maintained similar service 
since 2001, which was not obligatory for suppliers but was however considered fairly 
comprehensive as, by rough estimation, 80-90% of offers were posted there (EEE 
Ltd 2008).
The Swedish Consumer Electricity Advice Bureau is an independent bureau formed 
in  spring  2002  by  Swedish  Consumer  agency,  Swedish  Energy  Agency  and  the 
branch  organisation  Swedenergy.  Bureau  provides  information  and  guidance  to 
17 www.elpriskollen.se
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consumers on various matters connected to electricity market free of charge. Straight 
after the market opening, authorities did not pay much attention to the supply side 
and informing of customers was rather minimal. The Swedish Consumer Electricity 
Bureau  was  created  when  this  was  noticed.  It  has  been  reported  that  the 
establishment  of  this  bureau  have  had  positive  impact  on  the  level  of  customer 
mobility and competitive activity (KTM 2004b).
4.3.2  Regulation of the retail market
Regulation of retail electricity market in Sweden is light, although fairly effective. 
As  described  above,  there  are  several  authorities,  which  all  aim  to  improve  the 
market in their own area of responsibility, but the actual regulations concerning the 
retail  market  are  light,  aiming  just  to  create  the  basis  for  competition  without 
unnecessary  rules  and  restrictions.  There  is  no  end-user  price  regulation  nor 
supervision of these prices. Competition between suppliers acting on a free market is 
expected to keep the prices reasonable. Network tariffs are supervised by EMI as the 
network distribution companies are still acting in a monopoly position.
 
Regulation concerning the default supplier is organised in a quite similar way as in 
Norway but lighter than in Finland.  Obligation to supply,  which is still  in use in 
Finland, was abolished in 1999 when the load profiling system was introduced (EEE 
Ltd  2008). Nowadays  customers  who  have  not  switched  are  assigned  a  retailer, 
called default supplier, by the local network operator. This default supplier is usually 
the large, historical retailer in the area. The default contract for the passive customers 
is variable price contract, often in Sweden called contract with conditional tenure, 
which is usually more expensive than the offer prices, creating more incentives for 
customers to switch.
Separation  between  distribution  operators  and  retailers is  effective  as  legal 
separation has been required by law already since 1996 and the rules were further 
tightened in 2005 for companies with over 100 000 customers. Ownership separation 
is not required. This unbundling requirement, which is stricter than in Norway, has 
efficiently restricted cross subsidization between distribution and supply, but on the 
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other hand it has been estimated to increase the integration between retailing and 
generation (Johnsen et Olsen 2007). Separation between generation and supply has 
been widely discussed during past few years, as the independent retailers have raised 
doubts  that  this  type  of  vertical  integration  harms  competition  and  sets  the 
independent  retailers  in  an  unequal  position. Suppliers  with  own  generation  are 
suspected to reduce their margins to anti-competitive level and to compensate that by 
increasing the margins in generation, or, these vertically integrated companies could 
complicate the procurement of independent retailers.  Unbundling of generation and 
supply was researched by EMI in 2007, but they concluded that the separation would 
have more negative impacts than positive impacts, if taken in use only in Sweden 
(EMI 2007c).
Switching procedure is considered quite well functioning, but as in Norway, there are 
some limitations connected to the process. Switching is only possible on the first day 
of each month and the notification must be done at least one month in advance and 
therefore,  the  process  takes  usually  fairly  long,  from one  to  two  months.  Some 
complaints  have  been  raised  about  network  operators  favouring  local  suppliers, 
especially in the beginning of competition. In addition, problems in communication 
and metering were common in the early years, but the situation has improved notably 
since.
Regulations concerning changing of prices are also similar to the Norwegian system 
but lighter than in Finland. Standard variable price changes must be announced 15 
days  in  advance  and  a  public  notification,  for  example  in  a  local  magazine,  is 
sufficient.
4.4  Price development
One of the expected result of opening up the market to competition was decreased 
electricity prices for the end customers. Electricity prices as well as the margins have 
continuously been higher in Sweden than in Norway and Finland. Taxes especially 
are  exceptionally  high.  Taxes  have  increased  since  1996  almost  by  170% (EMI 
2006b).  The  total  price  of  electricity  has  increased  during  the  past  ten  years 
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significantly due to increase in electricity costs, electricity certificates and taxes. All 
in all,  the total nominal price of electricity to a typical end-user in apartment has 
increased about 56% between 1996 and 2005 and for customers living in a house 
with electricity heating even more. The price of electric energy itself has increased 
for customers with low consumption about 71% (EMI 2006a).
Swedish household's total cost of electricity consists of four same parts as Norwegian 
and Finnish household's price, that is, electrical energy, network tariff, electricity tax 
and VAT, but in addition Swedish customers have paid for electricity certificates 
since May 2003 (EMI 2006a). In 2007 the electricity certificates were transferred 
from electricity users to electricity suppliers and are nowadays included in the price 
of electricity in the bills, instead of separately marking them in the bill. The shares of 
different parts have varied quite largely due to the big differences in taxes and as can 
be seen in  the Figure 11.  Currently  the share under  competition,  i.e  the price of 
electrical energy stands for over 40% of the total bill for a customer with an annual 
consumption of 20 000kWh. Network tariffs have remained fairly stable.
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Figure 11: Composition of the electricity bill for a household customer with 
annual consumption of 20 000 kWh.(EMI 2007a)
Before 2000 the retail price variations were only slight as the correlation between 
retail and wholesale prices was weak. End-customer price decreased slightly after 
competition started, but after the wet year of 2000, the prices started to increase.
During the exceptionally dry year of 2002-2003 the retail prices peaked sharply also 
in Sweden, although not as much as in Norway. After the peak, the prices seem to 
have stayed in a higher level.
Retail  prices increased again for all  customer categories between 2005 and 2006. 
This increase was partially due to the low water flows in the spring and due to the 
dry summer,  which forced the prices  up in  the spot market  in  the early autumn. 
Increases in the price of emission permits also affected the retail prices. The average 
increase for household customers was around 13%.
In  2007  the  prices  decreased  again  when  the  situation  in  the  wholesale  market 
improved, but have risen again in the first half of 2008. The development of the retail 
electricity prices is presented in Figure 12.
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Figure 12: Development of retail electricity prices in Sweden in comparison with 
spot price development, øre/kWh. (Johnsen et Olsen 2007)
As can be seen in the Figure 12, the correlation between spot price and retail price in 
Sweden is much weaker than in Norway but stronger than in Finland (KTM 2004b ; 
Johnsen  et  Olsen  2007).  Figure  12  also  shows  clearly  the  large  margins,  which 
appeared to increase notably after the price peak of 2002-2003. This increase can be 
partially explained by the introduction of the electricity certificates and some other 
reasons18, but still they remain surprisingly high.
4.5  Market structure
After the deregulation the Swedish market has experienced a rapid restructuring of 
the electricity supply industry mainly through merges and acquisitions. Like in the 
other Nordic countries the concentration has increased but remains still lower than in 
the wholesale market (EMI 2006b). Traditionally the major generating companies 
had rather small shares in the retail market, but after the market opening some of 
them started actively growing their market shares also in the retail side by acquiring 
smaller utilities, mainly municipalities. In 1996 there were around 220 suppliers and 
by  2007  the  number  had  decreased  to  around  115  (EMI  2007a).  Especially  the 
number  of  independent  retailers  and  municipalities  has  decreased,  from  100  to 
around 15 and from 143 to 56 respectively (SOU 2004). The biggest three companies 
have increased their market share from about 30% in 1996 to around 50% in 2006 
(EMI 2007). However, the concentration remains still lower than in the wholesale 
market.  Out  of  the  115  current  electricity  retailers,  about  96  operate  throughout 
Sweden (NordREG 2008b).
There are no straight barriers to entry in the Swedish market. No licence is required 
to act as a retailer. Companies are just required to pay taxes and to have a balancing 
agreement.  There  has  been  some  new  entry,  especially  foreign  ownership  has 
increased  in  the  market,  from  around  10%  in  1996  to  almost  40%.  Foreign 
companies can be divided into two main groups. The major incumbent companies 
have in principle reached to the Swedish market by acquiring existing companies and 
now two of the big three suppliers  in the market  are foreign companies (Finnish 
Fortum and German E.On). There have also been foreign companies that have tried 
18 See more in 4.6.3.
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to establish themselves organically.  This has proved to be a relatively demanding 
approach and as a consequence some of these companies have later left the market 
(SOU 2005).
In addition to these foreign companies, some independent retailers have entered the 
market,  although it has turned out quite difficult for independent retailers without 
own network and production to compete with the vertically integrated companies and 
thus, many retailers  have already left  the market,  for example the two petroleum 
companies OK and Statoil. Some entrants, however, still exist in the market and have 
been  fairly  successful.  One  good  example  is  Kraft  &  Kultur,  a  subsidiary  of 
Norwegian utility,  which started their  operations  in  the Swedish market  in  2002. 
Kraft and Kultur sells only renewable energy and targets customers through cultural 
organisations and happenings. Another successful entrant has been GodEl, who has 
also different type of approach as they give their profit to charity. On the contrary to 
these new retailers aiming to find additional methods to compete, some new entrants 
highlight the simplicity – only electricity, nothing else. For instance Energibolaget i 
Sverige highlights that they are not one of the “giants” nor a special retailer. They 
focus their marketing for small consumers living in apartments. They have managed 
to  expand  rather  rapidly  and  was  estimated  to  get  around  5  000  –  6  000  new 
customers monthly in 2006 (NordREG 2006b). Another example of simple approach 
is German entrant Yello Strom, which entered the Swedish market in autumn 2007 
with high expectations. They base their marketing on the easiness and simplicity and 
try to create a strong brand like they have in Germany.
4.6  Retailers' strategies and activities
Majority of the Swedish electricity suppliers are rather small municipal companies. 
As described earlier, the three largest companies have achieved a dominant market 
share in the retail market by acquiring small municipalities. Only these three have 
market  share greater  than  5%. Most  of  the  still  existing  municipal  retailers  have 
adopted rather passive strategy. They do not even try to grow or gain new customers, 
but instead they concentrate keeping the customers of their own distribution area. 
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This has turned out to be fairly successful strategy especially for very small suppliers 
with loyal customers.
However, even though many of the municipalities sold up their sales operations to 
bigger  companies  and  many  of  the  remaining  have  not  adopted  competitive 
strategies, there are some municipalities who want to grow and compete. They have 
aimed to grow through acquisitions like the large companies, but they have also been 
notably innovative and managed to gain new customers by offering good contracts.
Initially competition was mainly driven by this type of smaller municipal companies 
and to some extent by new entrants. In the early years of market opening the bigger 
companies  were fairly passive and did not start  to make offers as eagerly as the 
smaller  ones  and  they  were  reported  to  have  highest  prices  still  during  2003 
(Littlechild 2006). Later on, the large suppliers have changed their strategies. Partly 
they started to cut their prices as a response to increased competition, but mainly it 
seems that  the pushing factor  was  the bad reputation  that  these  large  companies 
suffered from. Customers were dissatisfied with their high prices and bad service and 
in  addition,  the  outages  in  supply  increased  their  bad  reputation.  Wide  media 
attention and competitors' straight campaigns with their expenses boosted their bad 
reputation even more.  The smaller  retailers  efficiently used the bad image of the 
three “giants” even in marketing campaigns.19 As a response, they were forced to 
change their  strategies,  improve their  customers  service and lower prices.  In mid 
2005 they were reported to  have about  average  prices  instead of  being the most 
expensive (Littlechild 2006) and later on they have been even the most competitive. 
For instance, at the moment Vattenfall  promises to be the cheapest for three year 
fixed price contracts and are ready to match any retailer's offer.
First active retailer in the Swedish market is reported to be municipal utility, Telge 
Energi, who started to offer fixed price contracts already before the hourly meter 
requirements  were  abolished  (Littlechild  2006).  They  offered  meters  for  the 
customers who switched. It has been estimated that the margins were so generous in 
19 For example one campaign of a smaller retailer illustrated the three large retailers as giants living 
at the top of a hill and dominating the little people in the valley below.
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the Swedish  market  making  this  possible  while  still  undercutting  the  incumbents 
prices (EEE Ltd 2008). After the metering requirements were abolished competition 
started more widely, but Tegle Energi has continued to be very active and is often 
considered to be the most active supplier in the market along with the three big ones 
(Littlchild 2006 ; EEE Ltd 2008).
4.6.1  Types of contracts and innovations
Nordic countries have had fairly wide range of different types of contracts after the 
market  opening.  In  Sweden  there  are  also  three  types  of  basic  contracts  like  in 
Norway (see chapter 2); variable price contracts (with conditional tenure), flexible 
(spot) price contract and the fixed price contracts. In addition to these three, one new 
type  of  contract  has  started  to  become more  common,  mixed  contract.  In  mixed 
contract part of the consumption is tied to a fixed price and the rest to a floating 
price.
Environmental  aspect  is  quite  important  in  Sweden.  There  are  several  types  of 
environmental contracts already available and the popularity is still increasing. Some 
of the retailers, for instance Kraft and Kultur offer only green electricity,  and the 
market has enlarged and developed fast during past few years. For example Telge, 
one of the most innovative retailer as described, has started to only offer renewable 
energy.
4.6.2  Marketing
Several types of marketing have been seen in the market, although nothing has been 
very  systematic  and  wide  scaled.  After  competition  became  feasible  for  smaller 
customers,  several  campaigns  were  done,  some  advertising  in  the  newspapers, 
posters in metro and even some TV campaigns. Later on, telemarketing has become 
fairly popular. Also, different types of co-operations with different organisations are 
common, which aims to target more focused customer groups, for instance Kraft & 
Kultur approaches their customers through cultural organisations.
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4.6.3  Price setting
Margins in Sweden have remained fairly high (KTM. 2004b ; VTT 2008), higher 
than in Norway and Finland. Various explanations have been presented. It has been 
estimated  that  the  cost  of  retailing  business was  underestimated  in  the beginning 
(Amundsen et Bergman 2006). Between 1999 and 2001 margins were lower and the 
retail  segment  was  not  profitable,  which  caused  several  new entrants  to  exit  the 
market. Especially it seems that the volume and price risk have been more costly 
than expected and thus later on, the retailers have been able to increase the margins 
without  a  threat  of  new  entrants.  EMI  on  the  other  hand  estimates  that  the 
consistently higher margins in Sweden could be due to differentiating costs in terms 
of the respective markets or differences in the competitive pressure. They bring up 
two significant cost differences between the markets, the balancing system and the 
administrative  handling  of  the  companies'  end-users  and  expansion  of  customer 
service functions (EMI 2006b). Moreover, difficulties of new companies to enter the 
market can partly explain the higher margins and has led to suspicions of exploiting 
the market power. In a perfectly competitive market, higher margins would work as 
an  incentive  for  new entrants  to  enter  the  market,  which  is  supposed to  lead  to 
increased  competition  and  decreasing  margins  under  competition.  The  higher 
margins compared to other Nordic countries and especially the sudden increase in the 
margins after the price peak of 2002-2003 can in addition be partially explained by 
the introduction of electricity certificates.20 On the other hand EEE report (EEE Ltd 
2008) estimates that as in the 1990s the retail margins were very generous, even so 
large that Telge could afford to offer metering equipments to new customers and still 
to  undercut  the  incumbents'  prices,  there  must  have  been  some  benefits  from 
competition  to  customers  after  introduction  of  profiling  in  terms  of  decreased 
margins.
Prices vary between customer types and between contract types. In general, small 
customers  have  higher  prices  compared  to  larger  customers  and  customers  with 
default contracts  pay often significantly more than customers who have switched. 
20 Certificates  have  cost  around  150-250  SEK  between  2003  and  2007  and  the  required  quota 
(required proportion of sales) have been around 7,4-16,3 % of sales (SEA 2008), which thus stands 
for about 30 SEK, meaning that the certificates could explain about one third of the margins.
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This has led to suspicions that Swedish retailers are exploiting market power towards 
their passive customers as the prices of variable price contracts, which is the default 
contract  for passive customers, have been consistently higher than prices of other 
contracts  (Amundsen et  Bergman 2007).  However,  it  has been estimated  that  the 
price  difference  between active  and passive  customers  have  somewhat  decreased 
over time (Elforsk 2007b).
4.7  Customers in the Swedish market
Swedish customers have been rather active compared to customers in many other 
deregulated markets as it is estimated that well more than half of the customers have 
switched supplier or contract type. Customers' behaviour in the Swedish electricity 
markets  has  been  researched  by  several  studies  rather  extensively.  For  example 
(TEMO 2004 & 2005), (Gamble et al 2007) and (EMI 2006a) have tried to analyse 
the customers' behaviour based on several factors.
4.7.1  Switching
In  Sweden  the  switching  rate  data  has  been  collected  straight  from  DSOs  by 
Statistics Sweden since 2004 and through occasional surveys and questionnaires by 
branch organisation Sweden Energy. Some estimations of the number of renegotiated 
customers is also available.
Switching supplier remained fairly low until the switching fees were abolished in 
1998 but has increased steadily since then. In 2000 already 10% of customers had 
switched  supplier.  In  November  2005  it  was  reported  that  just  over  half  of  the 
customers had at some point switched supplier or renegotiated their contracts and in 
the end of 2007 the gross switching rate was estimated to be at  least  40%. Also 
annual switching rates have been in a reasonable level, 7,7% in 2006 and 9,5% in 
2007.
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Whereas Norwegian active customers are estimated to switch in average 3 times, 
Swedish customers  have mainly switched only once.  In  2004 62% had switched 
once, 26% twice and 9% three times or more (TEMO 2004).
Switching  activity  seems  to  follow  similar  cyclical  form as  in  Norway,  highest 
switching being in January as during the wintertime the prices and the consumption 
of  electricity  are  generally  higher,  thus  giving  more  incentives  for  customers  to 
switch. Also, many of the contracts expire in the end of the year, causing partially an 
increase  in  the  switching  rate,  which  is  due  to  the  timing  of  the  deregulation. 
Requirements for hourly meters were abolished in the end of the year, after which 
most of the customers have chosen fixed price contracts, which still might cause a 
peak in the switching rates in January (EMI 2006a).
4.7.2  Factors affecting customer mobility
In Sweden, there have been attempts to survey the customer behaviour more detailed 
and to define the characteristics that affect the customers' mobility. Surveys made by 
TEMO survey (2005) revealed for example that customers in the big cities are more 
likely to switch supplier than in other areas. On the other hand, customers in the rural 
areas are more likely to renegotiate with their current supplier. Another observation 
was that consumers with higher consumption are more active than customers with 
low  consumption.  Thus,  especially  households  with  electricity  heating  are  more 
likely to switch as expenses connected to electricity are higher. About 63% of single-
family  house  customers  have  switched  supplier  or  renegotiated  their  contract, 
whereas corresponding figure is only 42 % for customers living in apartments.
Increased activity usually stems from high electricity prices and increased activity 
among electricity retailers. Switching rates in Sweden show little bit similar trends as 
in Norway,  for instance during the price peak of 2002-2003 switching increased, 
although not as much as in Norway. Thus it seems that Swedish customers are not as 
price sensitive as Norwegian, which might in part stem from the weaker correlation 
between the retail and the wholesale prices. In addition, some more particular factors 
have caused switching peaks. For example, a peak in the switching rate in April 2005 
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was estimated to be due to a big storm, which caused several outages and increased 
customer satisfaction and cause increased activity among customers (EMI 2006a).
Swedish  electricity  customers  have  also  rather  low  confidence  in  the  electricity 
industry according to some studies. In 2004 the electricity sector got 57,5 points out 
of  100  in  the  Swedish  quality  index  survey,  which  measures  the  popularity  of 
different goods and services. A survey of TEMO in 2005 confirmed the low level of 
customer satisfaction as according to their questionnaire, 41% of the consumers were 
negative to the electricity industry. Furthermore, the situation still remained worrying 
in 2006, when according to a poll customers continued to be less satisfied with their 
electricity retailers  than with most other products and services that  are studied in 
Swedish quality index. Especially the large companies still  continued to have bad 
reputation. TEMO's survey from 2006 showed that the amount of negative customers 
had  even increased,  to  about  50% (EMI 2006).  This  reputation  of  retailers  have 
clearly  driven  competition.  Especially  large  companies  have  suffered  from  bad 
reputation and at the same time active smaller ones have managed to gain sympathy 
of consumers.
4.7.3  Choice of contracts
The contracts for passive customers, the standard variable contracts with conditional 
tenure, are generally more expensive than the other contracts. The most popular offer 
contracts have been fixed price contracts, which were also the retailers' first method 
to  compete.  There  are  some  differences  in  the  popularity  of  different  type  of 
contracts  over  the  time.  It  can  be  noticed  that  when  the  prices  are  high,  longer 
contracts  are more popular and when the prices are low and are still  expected to 
decrease the shorter contracts are more popular. The range of contract lengths offered 
is wider than in Finland, varying between three months and five years. In addition to 
these  three  common  contract  types,  new contractual  forms  are  increasing  in  the 
market, especially mixed price contracts, where a certain percentage of customer's 
consumption  is  tied  to  a  fixed  price  and the remainder  to  a  variable  price  (EMI 
2007a).
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The  number  of  customers  on  default  contract  has  decreased  steadily  and  still 
continues to decline. In summer 2008 approximately 36% of Swedish customers had 
such  contracts.  Thus  default  contracts  still  remains  the  most  common  form  of 
contract. One and three year contracts have been the most popular offer contracts, 
although the spot price base contracts have become increasingly popular during the 
past couple years. In summer 2008 already over 20% of customers had spot price 
contracts,  whereas  about  15% had one  year  fixed  contracts  and  18% had 3-year 
contracts or longer. Thus, the spot price contract is the most popular contract at the 
moment and most  probably is going to continue increasing its share based on its 
steadily increasing trend. The distribution of contract types in the Swedish market is 
presented in Figure 13.
4.8  Discussion and conclusions
The Swedish retail market performs relatively well with rather active retailers and 
consumers. The switching rates are reasonably high, several new companies have 
entered the market and the retailers have made efforts to acquire new customers. As 
in  Norway,  competition  has  been  driven  by  several  factors.  Combination  of  bad 
reputation  of  the  big  retailers  and  the  activity  of  smaller  ones,  rather  high 
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Figure 13: Shares of different types of contracts in the Swedish market.
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consumption of electricity, improved customer information, price changes and price 
differences between the suppliers have created movements in the market.
However, even if the Swedish market is often considered as a competitive and active 
market, the margins have remained surprisingly high. This could cast some doubts, 
whether competition is truly efficient, although, as the margins in retail electricity are 
nevertheless rather small, bigger concerns have not been raised. On the other hand, 
these higher margins and dynamic competition makes the Swedish market appear 
rather tempting for new entrants, which keeps the market in move and can maybe 
prevent very high increases in the price.
5  Electricity retail market in Finland
Based on the previous literature, the Finnish electricity retail market has turned out to 
be  the  least  competitive  out  of  the  three  Nordic  countries  with  rather  passive 
customers as well  as retailers.  This chapter  discusses the Finnish retail  electricity 
market from the same point of views as the Norwegian and Swedish markets in the 
previous chapters.
5.1  Background and basic facts
The Finnish electricity market contains around 3,1 million electricity customers: 2,8 
million  households  and  farms,  200 000  service  customers  and  30  000  industrial 
customers  (KTM 2004a).  Consumption  of  electricity  has  increased  steadily  since 
2000  and  was  slightly  more  than  90  TWh  in  2007.  Consumption  per  capita  is 
internationally compared high due to the cold weather and large energy intensive 
industry.  Industrial  sector  uses  around  half  of  the  electricity,  household  and 
agriculture one fourth (~22TWh) and services and the public sector around 20 %. In 
average  households  consume around 7 000 kWh per  year,  which is  significantly 
above the international average but less than in Sweden and especially in Norway 
mainly due to  different  share of  electric  heating,  which stands for  about  22% in 
Finland (Pakkanen et al.  2008). Flats consume typically 2 000 kWh per year and 
electrically heated houses between 18 000 and 20 000 kWh annually.
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Production of electricity is varied. In 2007 approximately 25 % were produced by 
nuclear power, 29% by combined heat and power production (CHP), 15% by hydro 
power  and approximately  16% by coal  based  and other  conventional  condensate 
power.  Finland  is  also  relatively  dependent  on  electricity  imports  mainly  from 
Norway,  Sweden and Russia. In 2006 imports  accounted for approximately 14 % 
(EMV 2008a).
5.2  Finnish deregulation
The deregulation of the Finnish electricity supply market started in the latter half of 
the  1990s.  The  reform  was  motivated  by  similar  objectives  as  in  other  Nordic 
markets, reliable supply with low prices to end customers and more efficient power 
system. Development was strongly encouraged by the simultaneous development in 
the other Nordic countries.
Electricity Market Act was introduced in Finland in 1st June 1995 and it was applied 
since 1st November 1995. After this date, large customers with consumption over 500 
kW were free to choose their retailer. During next three years the deregulation took 
place in stages. Since 1st January 1997, all electricity users were able to freely select 
their  electricity  supplier,  but  hourly  metering  equipment  was  required,  which 
hindered the real  competition.  1st September 1998, the expensive hourly metering 
requirements  were  replaced  with  load  profiling  system  and  competition  became 
feasible also for the household customers. However, the switching was totally free 
only for the first time switchers. Customers switching again had to pay for the extra 
metering reading.  Since September  2003 the customers  have been able  to switch 
supplier once a year without this extra metering fee, which was an improvement for 
the customers'  situation,  but  it  still  remains  more  restrictive  than  in  Sweden and 
Norway. Development of the Finnish electricity market is shown in Figure 14.
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5.3  Regulation
5.3.1  Regulatory authorities
An important role in the regulation and supervision of the Finnish retail market has 
the  Energy  Market  Authority  (EMA,  formed  in  1995),  which  is  an  independent 
agency under the Ministry of Employment and Economy. As EMA is a very small 
regulation  body in  the European scale  and they have several  tasks related  to  the 
energy markets, they have limited resources to concentrate on the retail side of the 
electricity market. During the first years after the market opening their role was quite 
minimal.  Competition  was  let  to  develop  by  itself  and  as  it  turned  out  that 
competition  did  not  develop  as  expected,  some  concerns  were  raised  about  the 
limited role of regulation and especially the availability of information. Since then 
EMA has been paying more attention also to the retail side and have done various 
steps  to  encourage  competition.  The  tasks  of  EMA  include  supervising  and 
encouraging competition and especially supervising the obligation to supply prices.
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Figure 14: Development of the Finnish deregulation.
In February 2006 EMA launched an internet-based price calculator.21 This was a big 
step towards  better  customers’  awareness.  In  this  service  customers  can also see 
statistics of retail prices. It has been very popular since the opening with more than 
3,2 million searches  by 2008, but the effect  on customers’  activity is  difficult  to 
estimate.  Before  this  official  web  service,  there  were  some  commercial  price 
comparing services, but as suppliers had no obligation to inform prices, they were 
not very comprehensive. Other recent actions of EMA include better collection of 
information. EMA started to collect the offer price data in 2006 and switching rate 
information in 2007.
In addition to EMA, Competition Authority and Consumer Authority have an active 
role in  the retail  market.  Competition  Authority for example  supervises company 
merges and Consumer Authority takes care of customers' benefits.
5.3.2  Regulations of the retail market
Like in the other Nordic countries, the regulation of retail market in Finland is rather 
light.  However,  the  Finnish  market  has  some  regulatory  arrangements,  such  as 
obligation  to  supply,  extra  metering  fee  and the regulations  concerning  the price 
changes, which makes the market stiffer than in Sweden and Norway.
According to the Electricity Act, the supplier who has the biggest market share in the 
distribution area, has an obligation to supply, which means that these suppliers have 
to  provide  electricity  to  customers  who  have  not  switched  their  supplier. These 
publicly  available  obligation  to  supply  prices  are  not  regulated,  but  have  to  be 
reasonable  and  can  be  inspected  ex  post  by  EMA.  Obligation  to  supply  was 
originally meant for the transition phase, to protect the supply of electricity to the 
customers.  At this point of the market development,  after ten years since the full 
market opening, it can be questioned whether it is useful anymore. In fact, obligation 
to  supply has  more  of a moderating  effect  on competition  at  its  current  form.  It 
creates passivity as customers are not obliged to make any effort to get electricity in 
reasonable price. Obligation to supply also sets the retailers in an unequal position. 
21 www.sahkonhinta.fi  
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Problems might be created when suppliers are obliged to take customers back with 
fairly short notice. This obligation to take customers back combined with the strict 
price changing rules (described below) is particularly difficult for retailers. In 2005 
the  rules  were  changed  to  apply  only  consumers  whose  main  fuse  is  maximum 
3x63A  and  annual  consumption  is  maximum  100  000  kWh.  There  has  been 
discussion  about  abolishing  or  changing  this  rule,  but  at  present  no  change  has 
happened.
In addition, the obligation to supply might be difficult for the suppliers due to the 
current load profiling method. On the one hand, load profiles were indented to be 
designed to favour the retailers with obligation to supply in order to make sure they 
would not cause disadvantages for incumbents and the profiles have been criticised 
to be too difficult for new entrants. On the other hand it has turned out that, in fact, 
the system can be unprofitable and harmful for the ones with an obligation to supply 
as the current load profiles can transfer a major part of procurement during the high 
prices on incumbent supplier, whereas the competitor ends up paying less.22
Another regulatory rule that in part hinders competition, is the rules concerning the 
price changes. Price increases have to be informed to customers one month before 
personally. This makes the changing of prices expensive and unnecessarily difficult 
and  as  a  result  weakens  the  correlation  between  wholesale  prices  and  end-user 
prices.23 Later, EMA has specified that the rule applies only to price increases. Price 
decreases can be done without informing customers personally as it does not harm 
them (EMV 2007).
Customer switching process is simple just like in Norway and Sweden. Customers 
only  need  to  contact  the  new  supplier.  However,  the  switching  rules  are  more 
22 This probably depends on the area, customer base and other factors, but according to a survey, a 
retailer in the area of south Finland with an obligation to supply experienced losses due to the load 
profiling system (Peltonen 2008).
23 This on the one hand is often considered as a sign of inefficiency, but on the other hand, as will be 
seen  later,  these  rather  strict  rules  have  resulted in  a  different  type  of  product  in  the  Finnish 
market, which is in fact rather good for consumers. Thus the correlation between the retail and 
wholesale prices cannot be used as the only indicator to measure the level of competition.
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restrictive. Customers can only switch for free once a year.24 If last supplier switch 
took place less than one year ago, DSOs can charge an extra metering fee, which can 
work as a barrier to switch. However, it seems that this fee is not always collected 
(Olsen et al. 2006). Switching itself takes usually around one month.
Since the beginning of 2007 legal  unbundling of supply and generation operations  
from network operations has been required for DSOs with annual transmission of 
more than 200 GWh25, but some smaller companies are also legally unbundled. In 
June 2008, altogether 50 companies were legally unbundled (EMV 2008a). Other 
unbundling requirements are presented in Figure 15.
In addition, some problems are connected to the billing. The customers who switch 
supplier will receive two bills instead of one. Some customers might consider this as 
a barrier to switch, but as it is the same in all the three countries, it cannot explain the 
differences in the customer activity and in addition, according to a customer survey 
24 This rule only took place in 2003. Before that, switching was free only for first time switchers, 
which might have hindered the activity in the early years.
25 This threshold value corresponds to about 20 000 customers, which is significantly lower than 
what the directive requires.
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Figure 15: Requirements for unbundling of electricity business activities.
(EMV 2008a)
made in 2005 most of the customers do not see double billing as a significant barrier 
for  switching  (ET  2005).  Moreover,  the  electricity  bills  in  Finland  are  very 
complicated and are required to include lots of different information (Selikare 2004), 
which  might  confuse  the  consumers  and  make  electricity  markets  and  switching 
supplier seem difficult and complicated. In the other Nordic countries there are not as 
strict regulations concerning the content of the electricity bills (NordREG 2006a).
5.4  Price development
In Finland, electricity prices have traditionally been quite low in comparison with 
other European countries. One of the most significant objective of the retail market 
opening was to guarantee cheap prices to end-customers. However, after the market 
opening  the  average  price  development  has  been  mainly  increasing  instead  of 
decreasing due to several reasons, such as increasing generation costs and during the 
past years the costs of emission permits. The retail price development for variable 
price contracts compared to the spot price development is presented in Figure 16.
After  competition  became feasible  also for the household customers  the end-user 
prices decreased significantly. The hydrological situation in the Nordic market was 
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Figure 16: Development of retail electricity prices in Finland in comparison with 
spot price development, øre/kWh. (Johnsen et Olsen 2007)
good at that time, which in part impacted the decrease, but more importantly,  the 
retailers prepared for competition by lowering their prices to minimize the customer 
losses and few suppliers did so even to gain more customers. The decrease in 1998 
was about 10-17 % depending on the load profile group.26
This decreasing trend, although more moderate, continued until 2001 partly due to 
competitive pressure and partly due to continuing good power situation in the Nordic 
market. In 2001 retailers started to increase their prices pressured by the worse than 
normal hydrological situation.
Dry years continued in the Nordic area and as a consequence prices increased each 
year reaching the peak in 2003. At this point, the list prices for residential customers 
had increased in average as much as 28 % since 1998.
In 2004 and 2005 the situation improved and the prices decreased, but again in the 
late  2005  the  prices  started  to  increase.  This  time  several  factors  affected  the 
increase.  The  water  situation  was  again  rather  weak  in  the  Nordic  market.  In 
addition, the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), which commenced in 
2005, put pressure for retailers to raise prices. In 2006 electricity retail prices rose 
again sharply, about 14%, but calmed down in 2007 when the hydrological situation 
improved. However, the retail prices continued to increase and all in all the prices 
rose around 2,9 % in 2007 as retailers  were waiting for the Kyoto period to start 
(EMV 2008a). In 2008 the prices have continued to increase and by September the 
overall increase has been around 12%.
As  can  be  seen  in  the  Figure  16,  the  end-user  list  prices  in  Finland  follow the 
wholesale prices also to some extent, even though the correlation is much weaker 
26 An interesting and much discussed aspect connected to the opening of the Finnish retail market, is 
the simultaneous  increase  in the network tariffs.  During 1998 the network tariffs  increased  in 
average 6-8%. It has been speculated whether the energy companies compensated the decreases in 
the price of electric energy by increasing the network tariffs, whereas based on the principles of 
market opening, there should be no connection between the evolution of electric energy prices and 
network tariffs due to the unbundling requirements and the regulated characteristic  of network 
operations.  Partially  the  increase  was  affected  by  the  change  in  taxing  as  taxes  on  network 
operations increased by 24% in September 1998, but  still  concerns  have been raised of unfair 
behaviour from the electricity companies part. (KTM 2004a)
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than in Sweden and Norway and the lag is large, according to some estimations as 
long as four months. The background for the development of this type of correlation 
is further discussed in section 5.6.3.
5.4.1  List price evolution compared to offer price evolution
There have been concerns that  the offer prices increase faster  and more than list 
prices. VaasaEMG has collected information about offer prices since January 2001. 
The average increase from this date to the end of 2007 has been 110%.27 During the 
same period of time the increase of list prices has been in average 63% (VaasaEMG 
2007).  This situation, however, changes continuously as list prices and offer prices 
react to the wholesale market situation very differently and with different pace, and 
thus, judgements should not be done solely based on a snapshot of the situation. The 
development of list prices and offer prices for customers consuming 18 000 kWh per 
year is presented in Figure 17.
27 It has to be noted that between 1998 and 2001 the retail prices had decreased somewhat and in 
2001, the retail prices were at their lowest, which affects these results. More suitable comparison 
would be between the market  opening in 1998 and the current  date,  but  information on offer 
contracts have not been collected systematically before 2001.
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Figure 17: Development of list prices and offer prices between 2001 and 2007 for 
customers consuming 18 000 kWh. (VaasaEMG 2007)
In addition to the difference in the overall price increase, there are other interesting 
characteristics connected to the relationship between the list and offer prices. Unlike 
in Norway and Sweden, where the offer prices compete well with the list price and 
are  generally  more  profitable,  the  list  prices  in  Finland  have  been  in  fact  rather 
competitive.  A  special  characteristics  of  the  Finnish  prices  have  been  the  slow 
changes in the list prices but faster changes in the offer prices, which has resulted 
that often during the increasing spot prices, the offer prices are more expensive than 
the list prices.
From a  customers'  point  of  view,  this  is  not  especially  worrying,  as  the  slowly 
increasing list prices efficiently cut the price peaks and the customers profit from the 
lagging and stable prices.  Worrying in this  type of price development  is  that  the 
customers'  awareness  usually  increases  during  the  increasing  prices,  but  in  the 
Finnish  market  it  is  very  difficult  to  find  good offers  during  these  times.  Many 
suppliers even announce straight that they do not give offers outside their distribution 
area and the offers of other suppliers are not generally very competitive, which might 
further  lower  the  customers'  interest  in  competition  and switching.  Customers  in 
general do not have a good knowledge of the markets  and this type of system is 
difficult to understand. Customers might get a bad image of competition and judge 
market inefficient based on negative experiences. For example, during the increasing 
prices, suppliers often do not even respond at all to customers’ requests. The reasons 
for this type of price development will be further discussed in the section 5.6.3.
For example, according to a survey done in winter 2003 and repeated in summer 
2004, about half of the suppliers did not give offers outside their area and only part 
of the offers given were competitive. Only one fourth of the offers were lower than 
list  prices  (Kinnunen 2004).  This  same survey also noted that  in  general  the list 
prices were cheaper than the offer prices at this time, which naturally have a big 
effect  on  customer  switching.  The  dominating  strategy in  this  period,  as  usually 
during the high prices, was to hold on to existing customers as making profitable 
offers for new consumers is not possible.
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5.5  Market structure
According to EMA, there are 75 retailers in the Finnish retail market. 69 of them 
have an obligation to supply at least in one distribution area and the remaining six are 
independent  retailers.  As  in  Sweden  and  Norway,  the  amount  of  retailers  has 
decreased significantly during the past ten years. Before the market opening there 
were  approximately  120  retailers.  Furthermore,  only  around  40 suppliers  are 
estimated  to  compete  nationwide,  although  the  number  varies  largely  over  time. 
During the increasing prices less companies make offers in the whole country, but 
during the decreasing prices the activity generally grows.28 However, the number of 
retailers  is  generally  considered  to  be sufficient  for  competition  and concerns  of 
exploiting market power have not been raised.
Most electricity suppliers are local companies with their own distribution areas and 
own production, and with fairly small customer base of about 12 000 to 160 000. The 
few larger companies have typically 300 000 to 400 000 customers (KTM 2004a). 
Four of the companies have market share of over 5% and the three major retailers 
together hold market share of approximately 35 to 40% (EMV 2008a). Bundling is 
very  common  among  Finnish  energy  companies  as  most  of  them are  integrated 
producers, distributors and suppliers, although the amount is decreasing. Having own 
production,  or substantial  investments  in shared generation has been benefited by 
several  companies.  In  addition,  some  municipalities  have  very  efficient  CHP 
systems.  Co-operation  is  also  very  typical  in  the  Finnish  electricity  industry, 
especially in the form of marketing companies and associations.
There are no formal barriers to enter the retail business. Anyone who is interested 
can act as a retailer. Some large foreign entrants (Swedish Vattenfall and German 
E.On29) have entered the Finnish retail supply market by acquiring local electricity 
companies,  accounting now for about 20-25 % of market  share altogether.  These 
28 Which is also largely due to the pricing method described more closely in section 5.6.3. Shortly, 
the pricing in the Finnish market has resulted in a situation, where list prices react slower to spot 
price changes than offer prices, making them rather profitable during the increasing prices. Due to 
this, the only possible time to make good offers is during the decreasing prices.
29 Later on E.On Finland was bought by Fortum, but after that E.On has returned to the Finnish 
market as an independent supplier (Annala 2008).
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companies are foreign electricity incumbents and generally aim to act in the Finnish 
market as most of the Finnish companies; both in generation and supply. There have 
been very few companies entering only in the competitive retail supply market due to 
the difficult conditions for new entrants and their market shares have remained low. 
First independent  retailer  without own production or network business,  Station 1, 
entered the market  as late  as 2005 and managed to gain about  10 000 – 20 000 
customers during the first year (NordREG 2006b). After St1, few other independent 
retailers have entered the market, such as department store Halpa Halli, Ekosähkö 
Oy, a retailer selling only green energy, and most recently Suomen Energiayhtiö in 
2005.  Suomen  Energiayhtiö  (SEY)  is  a  subsidiary  of  Swedish  company 
Energibolaget  i  Sverige  and  operates  with  similar  strategy,  they  target  mainly 
consumers  living  in  apartments  through  aggressive  telemarketing.  They  have 
managed to get around 2 000 new customers per month, which is considerably less 
than their Swedish parent company. However, the share of SEY from all the switches 
done in the autumn of 2005 was around 70%-80%, and thus it can be considered as a 
rather significant player in the market (NordREG 2006b). During the writing of this 
thesis, also Swedish Kraft & Kultur was planning to enter the Finnish market, first to 
the industrial side and after also to the residential side.
5.6  Retailers' strategies and activities
Serious doubts have been raised about the companies’  interest  to  compete in the 
Finnish market (KTM 2004b, EEE Ltd 2008). Hardly any companies seem to try to 
attract new customers and some of the retailers do not even make offers outside their 
own  area,  which  leads  to  even  greater  passivity  among  customers.  It  has  been 
suspected that retailers are aware that customers have not shown much interest in 
switching and the passive segment seems to stay high, which allows retailers to keep 
a  comfortable  price level  and to benefit  from the customers’  passivity (EEE Ltd 
2008). On the other hand, some suppliers also keep the obligation to supply tariffs 
low enough that there is insufficient motivation for consumers to switch. In addition, 
price matching has been reported to occur. Incumbent suppliers make sufficiently 
low  offers  that  matches  the  competitors’  offers  to  keep  the  customers  who  are 
planning to leave.
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However, the biggest reason for retailers passivity stems from the dominating pricing 
system  that  has  developed  very  differently  from  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian 
systems. Due to the system, where retailers base their pricing heavily on the prices of 
derivative contracts instead of spot price, making good offers during the increasing 
prices is impossible without making loss as the new offers are based on the current 
price trend, whereas the existing contracts are hedged against the price increase. On 
the other hand, the only possible time to make good offers is during the decreasing 
prices,  which  is  also  the  opportunity  for  new  companies  to  attack.  Thus,  as  a 
consequence of this pricing method, the Finnish retailers appear worryingly passive 
in terms of customer acquisition, especially during the increasing prices, which has 
been the dominating trend during past couple years.
However, even during the decreasing prices there has not been significant customer 
activity  keeping  the  customer  acquisition  costs  rather  high,  which  might  have 
partially  decreased retailers  interest  even during these times and thus creating an 
overall passive image of the Finnish retailers.
In addition, most Finnish retailers are small municipalities, who do not have much 
interest in competing and maybe not even ability to compete. These small companies 
have particularly taken passive role. They have mainly followed the development of 
the market and have not done efforts to gain new customers. This passive strategy 
has turned out to be fairly successful due to the passivity of customers. Municipal 
suppliers might also have other objectives than making profit, such as guaranteeing 
cheap  electricity  prices  for  the  town’s  inhabitants  and  industry  and  thereby 
supporting the economy of their town.
Some suppliers  have however made bigger efforts  and acted actively nationwide. 
Larger suppliers with own production have realised notable marketing campaigns, 
especially in the beginning of competition, but these campaigns have turned out to be 
not  that  successful,  again  due  to  the  customers  passivity.  The  cost  of  customer 
acquisition has thus been high, whereas the retail margins are very low, and this has 
hindered the interest of companies for marketing even more.
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However, there have still been some signs of competition in few past years, as many 
suppliers have started to offer new contract types, for example more retailers have 
started to offer the spot price based contracts.  The marketing strategies have also 
transformed the form, from visible media campaigns to more focused marketing. For 
example, suppliers are suspected to follow the competitors’ prices through internet 
and act when some local supplier raises prices by approaching their customers with a 
lower offer.
Customers’  passivity  is  especially  difficult  for  new,  independent  retailers  who 
assumably have the highest motivation to gain new customers.  As it seems to be 
difficult  and costly to gain a customer base, the entry has remained very low. In 
addition, new entrants are dependent on the wholesale market, which increases the 
risk level and complicates their situation in comparison to the companies with own 
generation.  As most of the suppliers  have own production in the Finnish market, 
there exists a threat that these vertically integrated companies might try to act in a 
way that makes it difficult  for independent retailers to operate and survive in the 
market (KTM 2004b). Incumbents might use the profits from generation to sell with 
low or  even negative  retail  margins,  while  pure retailers  are  forced to  buy from 
volatile  wholesale  market,  which  might  become  costly  and  even  unprofitable. 
Moreover, due to the pricing method, the only favourable timing for new companies 
to enter the market is during the decreasing wholesale prices. Further challenges are 
created  because  even  if  the  retailer  would  manage  to  enter  the  market  in  an 
auspicious  market  situation,  during  the  next  cycle  of  decreasing  prices,  these 
companies are in the position of old companies who can be again challenged by other 
entrants or active retailers. As a consequence of these problems and the fact that the 
retailing in Finland has not been profitable, there have been only few new companies 
and  the  situation  is  not  expected  to  change  much.  Old  suppliers  with  other 
operations, distribution and generation, have better possibilities to tolerate the small 
or even negative incomes of sales operations as the main incomes are coming from 
these  two  other  business  areas.  Thus,  even  if  the  current  retailers  would  not  be 
satisfied with the situation and find it challenging to operate in, they are not aiming 
to  make  changes  very  eagerly  as  the  changes  in  the  market  have  been  noted  to 
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happen very slowly and especially nowadays the atmosphere is rather anticipatory as 
the most probable changes are expected to stem from the metering renewal already in 
the next few years.30
As  a  result  of  passive  strategy  of  smaller  suppliers  and  the  difficulties  of  new 
entrants, competition in the Finnish retail market happens mainly between the larger 
incumbent companies, although the few entrants that have entered the market have 
probably confused the situation into some extent during the decreasing prices.
This situation, hard pricing system and the following unprofitable sales operations, is 
difficult for retailers but in fact rather beneficial for consumers, at least for the time 
being,  as  the  prices  have  not  increased  to  very  high  levels.31 Considering  this 
situation and the level of suppliers’ passivity in the Finnish market, it is interesting 
that according to a survey done by EMA in 2005, more than half of the suppliers 
considered themselves  as active players  in  the market  and 92 % of the suppliers 
considered that competition was working well, even though some shortcomings still 
exists (EMA 2005), whereas according to another survey from 2004, only 17% of the 
household  customers  found  competition  efficient  (KTM  2004a).  These  results 
indicate well the contradictory views of different market participants and the overall 
controversial situation in the market.
5.6.1  Types of contracts and innovations
Most of the retailers have offer prices, even if they are in some cases offered only to 
their own customers. The typical offer contracts are same as in Norway and Sweden 
(see Chapter 2.); standard variable contracts, spot price based contracts, 1- and 2- 
30 Although, as will be discussed in the section describing the price setting of retailers (5.6.3), the 
biggest  Finnish retailer,  Fortum, has just  changed  the pricing of their  variable price contracts, 
which indicates that they are making efforts to change one of the most problematic features of the 
Finnish retail market.
31 Whether the situation can remain at its current form, keeping the prices rather competitive for 
consumers remains to be seen. In a situation like this, without strong pressure from competitors or 
customers,  the  threat  of  monopolistic  or  oligopolistic  behaviour  and  increasing  prices  exists. 
However, there have been no signs of too worrying situation so far and no suspicions have been 
presented, unlike towards the wholesale market. In addition, the concentration has remained even 
lower than in Norway and Sweden and it is predicted that the future metering renewal will change 
the situation significantly before alarming situation could form in the market.
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year fixed price contracts. 3-years contracts and longer are not allowed in Finland. 
However, in summer 2006 only 7 % of the retailers offered all of these contracts 
(TEM 2007). Especially the spot price contract has not been widely offered, although 
increasing recently, as retailers do not expect customers to be interested in such an 
unstable and risky product and because compared to the variable price contract the 
spot price might generally become more expensive. The first one to offer spot price 
contracts in 2004 was fairly active and innovative municipal retailer, Turku Energia, 
followed by the new entrant St1 next year.
Even though in principle  these three contract  types  are similar as in Norway and 
Sweden, the variable price contract has developed rather differently and differs from 
the volatile Norwegian and Swedish variable price contracts. The Finnish variable 
price contract has turned out to be a rather stable contract as retailers have developed 
an operating way suitable for the strict price changing regulations and therefore it 
could be considered almost as a different product than the Swedish and Norwegian 
one.
Suppliers have not been especially innovative in the Finnish market.  Most of the 
companies  offer  these  basic  types  of  contracts  or  part  of  them,  but  not  many 
additional, value-adding services have occurred. Environmental aspect is relatively 
important, so to some extent there have been developments in this area, for instance 
one new entrant, Ekosähkö, offers only green electricity.
5.6.2  Marketing
Finnish  retailers'  marketing  methods  have  been  quite  similar  as  in  Norway  and 
Sweden. There has appeared little bit every type of methods to acquire customers, 
such as TV advertisements, newspapers, leaflets and telemarketing. Most successful 
means of acquisition of new customers have been affinity selling and bonus point 
schemes  (KTM  2004b),  although  lately  telemarketing  have  become  increasingly 
popular,  assumably due to a fairly aggressive new entrant,  Suomen Energiayhtiö, 
who sells  only through telemarketing.  As in  other  Nordic  countries,  door-to-door 
selling does not fit to the Finnish culture.
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5.6.3  Price setting
There have been concerns that the pricing strategy of many suppliers is raising prices 
continuously. Retailers often justify the continuous increases with the situation in the 
wholesale market and recently with the emission trading scheme. In addition, as a 
majority of customers seem to remain passive, there have been claims that suppliers 
are quite free to follow any pricing strategies. (KTM2004a)
It has been feared on the one hand that when Finnish suppliers raise their prices, they 
raise it little more than needed, so that they do not need to change it again when 
small increase happens in wholesale market and on the other hand that the decreases 
are not fast enough as, again, retailers want to avoid frequent price changes. Frequent 
price changes can be costly for suppliers and cannot even be done more often than 
once a month due to the regulation. Loosening the regulation would make the market 
more  flexible  and  enable  the  end-user  price  to  follow the  wholesale  price  more 
closely, which is more the situation in the Norwegian and Swedish markets.
However, the pricing of retailers has developed very differently from the Norwegian 
and Swedish methods due to the regulations  set  to create  the framework and the 
situations should be compared with caution,  as based on the regulations, it  would 
appear that the objectives of competition might have been different. The pricing of 
Finnish retailers is not that simple and claims of continuous increases might be partly 
exaggerated. The Finnish regulations have resulted in a stable pricing system. The 
retailers have adapted a method suitable for the Finnish regulations, but in addition, 
the  price  changes  have  been  even  slower  than  the  regulations  would  require. 
Retailers hedge their sales in a rather long run, and thus the pricing of variable price 
contract  is more based on the prices of financial  products than on the spot price, 
which explains the different and stable evolution of the retail prices. When spot price 
increases, the Finnish retail prices lag notably behind as they increase based on the 
changes  in  the prices  of derivatives.  During the decreasing prices  there could be 
concerns that the prices do not decrease as fast as they rise, but so far it seems that 
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there are some factors that force the retailers to lower the prices also in reasonably 
fast pace, such as media attention and the new entrants.32
Whether the Finnish retail pricing system is better or worse than the Swedish and 
Norwegian systems depends on the point of view. From the customer point of view, 
the  situation  is  in  fact  rather  good  as  the  prices  are  stable,  have  not  increased 
significantly and are often even lower than the spot price. From the supplier point of 
view, the situation is more difficult as the raising of prices is very slow compared to 
the increase of spot prices, but during the decreasing prices they are forced to lower 
prices rather quickly due to the threat of possible attacks of new entrants and active 
companies and sometimes also due to the media attention. It could even be estimated 
that  in  this  aspect  competition  is,  in  fact,  even  too  fierce  as  the  margins  have 
remained very low, or even negative (even compared to the derivative prices) and the 
retailers  are  continuously  making  losses  in  the  sales  and  thus,  the  previous 
judgements of the lack of competition seem too hard. In addition, hedging sales in 
rather long term requires resources and good knowledge of risk management, which 
might be difficult especially for the smaller suppliers and the new supplier without 
own production. Moreover, this pricing method is difficult for retailers also because 
at the moment they have to hedge the sales of variable price contracts rather far in 
the future, but the customers can switch away from variable price contracts any time 
they want with rather short notification, creating insecurity and risk for retailers.
The biggest Finnish retailer, Fortum, informed in the end of 2008 that from April 
2009, they will update the prices of variable price contracts regularly four times a 
year. This partially demonstrates the difficulties that retailers face with the current 
pricing system and that they want to change it. If other retailers will follow Fortum's 
lead, the Finnish retail prices will most probably become more volatile. Whether this 
is good or bad for the overall competition and whether the prices will increase is 
somewhat a question and remains to be seen.
32 As discussed there have been rather few new entrants, but maybe these entrants have been enough 
to  challenge  the  incumbents  to  some  extent  during  the  decreasing  prices,  which  is  the  most 
important in the Finnish market situation.
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Often it is considered that one of the objective of the market reform was that retail 
prices would signal the scarcity of electricity through the high prices all the way to 
customers, and thus to improve the security of supply. Whether this was the case in 
Finland appears to be somewhat questionable. Based on the regulations set, it could 
in fact appear that the intention was to prevent large price changes and to guarantee 
stable prices for consumers. In Finland the customer protection questions are often 
brought up in the discussions and might be one reason why the development has 
been so slow. As electricity is a necessity, the rules have remained strict despite the 
continuous  discussion  of  renewing  or  loosening  the  rules,  which  supports  the 
conscious goals of a stable system. If this was really the case, then the objective was 
fairly well achieved.
5.7  Consumers
Customers  are  an  important  part  of  the  retail  market.  For  a  well-functioning 
competition, it is important that customers are aware of their possibilities to switch 
supplier, renegotiate their current contract and possibilities for better prices. Whereas 
Swedish and Norwegian customers have been reasonably active, Finnish customers' 
activity has remained rather low.
5.7.1  Switching
Customers have not switched supplier in Finland as much as in Norway and Sweden. 
Data  on  customer  switching  has  not  been  collected  in  a  systematic  way,  but 
according to information gathered for special reports and researches, the switching 
numbers have been low. By the year 2000 only 2% of electricity users had switched 
their supplier. In 2002 the figure had increased to about 5% and in 2004 to around 
11% of  household  customers.  In 2007 EMA started to  collect  supplier  switching 
information33 and according to their results, in 2006 approximately 3% of small and 
8% of the large Finnish customers switched supplier and in 2007 the switching rate 
was 4% for small customers.
33 EMA collects the information from DSOs three times a year.
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If customers who have renegotiated their contract with their incumbent supplier are 
counted in, the activity have been little bit higher, although, in 2007 according to 
estimations, still approximately 70% of the Finnish households buy electricity within 
obligation to supply. From the rest, about 15% have switched supplier and 15% have 
renegotiated their contract with their old supplier (TEM 2007).
Switching seems to follow the same annual cycle as in Norway and Sweden at least 
to some extent. Switching has been usually highest on the first and fourth quarter, 
although the differences are not very significant (VaasaETT 2007).
5.7.2  Factors affecting customer mobility
Like in other Nordic countries, consumers with higher consumption have been the 
most active also in the Finnish market, which is natural as the electricity bills are 
bigger  for  these  customers  and thus  the saving potential  is  more  significant.  For 
consumers  living  in  a  flat,  the  possible  savings  are  much  smaller  and  thus  the 
incentives to switch are smaller. As the share of electrically heated households is the 
lowest in Finland, this partly explains the lower switching rates.
Lack of marketing from suppliers side has an effect on customers’ switching. In a 
customer  survey conducted  in  2007 for  a  hundred people,  significant  part  of  the 
customers,  69 %, who had switched supplier  said that  they took the initiative by 
themselves. In addition, many of the passive customers said that they would consider 
switching if supplier would approach them with an offer (Hernesniemi 2007).
Finnish customers do not seem to react to high prices in the amount that Norwegian 
or even the Swedish customers do. During the large increase of prices in 2003, most 
of the customers remained passive. This can be mainly explained by the fact that, as 
described, the pricing method differs significantly from the Norwegian and Swedish 
methods.  The  end-user  prices  are  rather  stable  and  do  not  correlate  with  the 
wholesale  prices  strongly,  thus  decreasing  the  customers’  incentives  to  switch 
suppliers  due to high prices. The biggest price peaks are rather efficiently cut by 
hedging sales  in longer  term.  Thus the variable  price  contracts  are  in  fact  rather 
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profitable during the increasing prices, whereas offer prices react faster resulting in a 
situation where offer prices are higher than list prices. This system has resulted in a 
situation where it is almost impossible to find competitive offers during high prices, 
which  explains  the  low  switching  activity.  During  the  decreasing  prices  the 
customers have more possibilities to find a competitive offer and to make even rather 
significant savings, but generally customers' interest towards switching is lower as 
the prices are already decreasing and media is not as active either. In addition, this 
pricing  method  makes  the  possible  savings  often  rather  short-term,  which  can 
partially decrease the customers' interest in switching.
Publicity shocks and media attention seem to have some kind of impact in otherwise 
fairly passive Finnish customers. Fortum's announcement of price increase and large 
payouts  to  the  company's  directors  in  2006 led  to  at  least  some kind  of  notable 
increase in the the switching activity. This pushed Fortum to cancel price rises and 
make efforts to improve their image.
Previously,  there  have  been  estimates  that  transparency  of  prices  has  been  a 
significant barrier to competition. A big step for improving the awareness of Finnish 
customers was done in February 2006 when EMA launched an internet based price 
comparison  tool.  As  one  of  the  biggest  reasons  for  not  switching  according  to 
surveys had been the difficulty to compare the offers and to obtain information and 
according  to  estimates  less  than half  of  the  customers  have  ever  even compared 
prices, this service should have a positive effect on the customers’ activity. Before 
there  had  been  some  commercial  web  pages  providing  price  information  to 
consumers, but these were not very comprehensive. The web page of EMA is clear 
and well functioning. This service enables customers to compare the offer prices and 
list prices and also to see price statistic.  The service has been very popular, with 
more than 3 million visits, but it is hard to estimate the impacts on the customers’ 
switching behaviour.
However, due to the previously described price setting of retailers, which is largely 
based on the prices of financial products, comparing prices is still very difficult for 
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consumers. As the timetables of price setting vary a lot between suppliers depending 
on their hedging, the comparison of prices might be very challenging. Consumers 
often have rather low knowledge of electricity markets and thus this type of price 
setting might be confusing. In addition, as there is not much competition during the 
increasing prices, which is the time when consumers are most aware due to media 
attention, the consumers often do not find competitive offers. Failing to find a good 
offer once might significantly decrease the interest to try again later.
5.7.3  Choice of contract 
There is  no information  available  on the shares  of contract  types  among Finnish 
customers. However, as said, it has been estimated that in 2007, still around 70% of 
the customers bought electricity under obligation to supply and thus, only about 30% 
have some kind of offer contract  (TEM 2007). More exact data on the shares of 
different types of contracts has not been collected, but apparently spot price contracts 
have not been very popular. A couple years ago it was estimated that about 20% of 
customers were on fixed price contracts and the spot price contract was nearly zero 
(Littlechild 2006). Only few retailers even offer spot price contracts (although the 
amount is slightly increasing) and during couple past years spot price has been often 
higher  than  the  average  retail  price,  which  makes  spot  price  contracts  very 
unattractive.  In  addition,  as  described,  the  variable  price  contract  is  rather 
competitive,  which partially explains the large share of customers on this type of 
contract.
5.8  Discussion and conclusions
This  chapter  presented  the  important  points  of  the  Finnish retail  market.  Finnish 
market  has  not  been  as  dynamic  as  the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  markets.  The 
switching rates have remained rather low and there have been concerns that retailers 
have  lost  their  interest  in  competition.  Measured  with  the  common  competition 
indicators, competition in the Finnish market appears to be rather moderate. Some 
regulations, such as price changing rules, obligation to supply and extra metering fee 
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have  restricted  the  development  of  dynamic  competition  and  created  a  rather 
different system than in the neighbour countries, which has its benefits and problems.
Retailers have learnt to operate with these rules and as a consequence, the pricing 
method differs  significantly  from the Swedish and Norwegian  methods.  This  has 
resulted in a rather stable prices and especially variable price contract has remained 
more  competitive  than  in  Norway and Sweden,  which  on  the  one  hand restricts 
customer mobility, but on the other hand might be rather beneficial for consumers. 
Some concerns have been raised due to the prices,  which have increased notably 
since the market opening, but on the other hand, the prices have never increased in a 
very high level  and are still  competitive  even in  the Nordic scale  indicating  that 
retailers experience some kind of pressure to keep their prices in a reasonable level. 
Thus, there exists some competition even in the Finnish market despite the lack of 
dynamic competition in terms of new entrants, customer mobility etc.
Based on the price level, this type of competition appears to be sufficient to keep the 
prices low and competitive. Therefore, even if the consumers have not switched, the 
situation does not seem to be too worrying. In fact, as the consumers already benefit 
from competition through their existing contracts, high activity and switching could 
even create unnecessary transaction costs. On the other hand, this type of competitive 
situation could lead into oligopolistic or monopolistic behaviour, but so far there is 
no proves from this type of development. More problematic could be the lack of new 
entrants,  which  are  supposed  to  be  innovative  and  develop  better  and  cheaper 
services, but at the moment the range of contracts available is rather similar as in 
Norway and Sweden indicating that there has been some development in this area 
also.
6  Future of the Nordic retail markets
The Nordic electricity markets have gone through big changes during the past ten 
years, but the development is still continuing as there are already several plans for 
further  improvements  of the markets.  Biggest  changes  affecting  the Nordic  retail 
markets  in the following years  will  be connected  to the installation  of automatic 
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meters and to the further integration of the retail markets as the goal is to achieve a 
common,  integrated  Nordic  market  and  eventually  a  pan-European  market.  This 
chapter discusses the plans, possible benefits and challenges of automatic meters and 
common Nordic retail market.
6.1  Automatic metering
Initially, when the retail markets were opened up to competition, the requirements 
for costly hourly metering equipments hindered the real competition. One by one, 
Nordic  countries  adopted  load  profiling  systems  negating  the  need  of  expensive 
metering equipments and making retail competition feasible also for the residential 
consumers.  Now, ten years  after  the full  market  opening,  the Nordic markets  are 
getting prepared for another big, challenging change connected to the meters as all 
the three countries are planning to install automatic meters.
In Sweden DSOs are obliged to install  automatic meters by July 2009. However, 
only monthly metering is required, at least in the beginning. In Norway automatic 
meters are planned to be installed by 2010 (von der Fehr et Hansen 2008), and in 
Finland the branch organisation,  Finnish Energy Industries recommends installing 
automatic meters from 2009, but official requirements have not been set, at least for 
the time being. Finnish Energy Industries' goal is that by 2014, 80% of the meters 
would  be  automatic  meters.  Several  distribution  companies,  e.g.  Vattenfall  and 
Helsingin Energia have already installed or made decisions of installing new meters 
(Annala 2008).
Transition to automatic meters is definitely challenging for all the parties, but it has 
also  lots  of  potential  and  opportunities.  Automatic  meters  have  several  possible 
benefits.  Consumers  are billed based on their  real  consumption and they become 
more  aware  of  their  own  consumption,  which  increases  possibilities  for  better 
demand response. In addition consumers' electricity bills will become more simple 
and clear and consumer do not need to read their electricity meters by themselves 
(Annala  2008).  Moreover,  switching  supplier  will  become  easier  and  customer 
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service may improve. Nordic Competition Authorities even estimate that installing 
online meters would decrease the electricity prices in the long run (NCA 2007).
For  retailers  automatic  meters  create  possibilities  to  improve  their  service  and 
develop new products.  Retailers  risks will  decrease and retailers  will  be in  more 
equal position considering for example the balancing settlements.
DSOs will  probably benefit  the most from automatic  meters.  For example,  better 
availability  of  customers'  consumption  will  enable  DSOs  to  forecast  better  the 
demand,  to  reduce  administrative  costs  and  to  improve  liquidity  (NCA  2007). 
However, installing automatic meters is a big and expensive project for the DSOs, 
although the development of the technology has been quick and is still continuing 
and thus the meters have become much cheaper. Still, the installing costs are rather 
high and will be partially transferred to the customers.
In addition to the handling of metering values, automatic meters have potential for 
several  other  tasks,  depending  on  the  chosen  technology,  due  to  its  two  way 
communication  characteristics,  such  as  different  control  operations,  automatic 
recognition  of  power  breakage  or  broken  electric  device  and  other  value  added 
services.
In Finland automatic meters will solve some regulation problems that are suspected 
to hinder competition. They will, for example, remove the need for a metering fee if 
consumer switches more often than once a year, and remove problems connected to 
the balancing methods, which is currently estimated to set the retailers in an unequal 
position. In addition, the metering renewal might result in more volatile prices with 
stronger correlation with the spot price also in the Finnish market.
On the other hand, automatic meters could also decrease competition as they leave 
rather small possibilities to compete on prices. The actual pricing of electricity could 
become very straightforward and the major methods to compete appear only through 
the additional services or new product forms. It could even lead to a situation, where 
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the pricing could be transferred to the distribution companies. At least the role of 
distribution companies will increase along this renewal.
All in all, installation of automatic meters will change the retail markets significantly 
and most probably improve the overall functioning. How the change will affect retail 
competition is difficult to predict, but the development is expected to continue fast 
during the coming years, making the improving of current system partially useless.
6.2  Common, integrated Nordic retail market
European Union's goal is to achieve a pan European internal electricity market. This 
is aimed to be achieved in stages (see Figure 18). Currently all the European retail 
markets are still national. Even the Nordic countries that form a common, successful 
wholesale market have mainly national retail markets.34 First step in achieving the 
European internal electricity market is to form regional markets, like the Nordic area, 
Western European area etc., and after to unify these areas into one European market. 
Larger market is expected to have several benefits. Further integration of the Nordic 
markets  is  for  instance  hoped  to  increase  the  choice  for  consumers,  increase 
competition and product innovation, lower retail margins and thus lower prices, and 
also to improve the security of supply. Integration of the Nordic markets will change 
the  current  situation  significantly  and  will  affect  several  parties  of  the  market. 
Customers,  suppliers,  grid  companies,  TSOs  and  regulators  are  all  facing  new 
challenges during this process (NordREG 2006a).
34 See Amundsen et Bergman (2006a) for an analysis of the degree of Nordic wholesale and retail 
market integration.
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Plans  for  integration  of  the  Nordic  retail  markets  have  already  commenced  and 
several studies on the methods of implementation, possible costs and benefits have 
been done. Especially the Nordic Energy Regulators have been active in this field. In 
2006 they decided a timetable for the project, presented in Figure 19, which indicates 
that a harmonised platform for the common end-user market is aimed to be achieved 
by 2010. However, lots of harmonisation still needs to be done, which is why the 
schedule might be little bit over-ambitious.
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Figure 18: European Union's goal of internal electricity market is planned to be 
achieved in stages. (www.fortum.com)
Figure 19: Projected timetable for integrated Nordic retail market. 
(NordREG 2006a)
In theory it is already possible for a Nordic retailer to enter other Nordic market, but 
in practise it has turned out to be difficult due to several technical, regulatory and 
commercial differences, which create barriers to entry. Operating in another country 
requires, for example, making separate balancing agreement and creating new data 
systems.  Only very few companies  operate  in  more  than  one market  (exceptions 
being mainly Vattenfall in Finland and Fortum in Sweden) and several attempts to 
enter have failed (e.g. Vattenfall in Norway, Statoil and Fjordkraft in Sweden). The 
key areas that should be harmonised are for example:
– Supplier switching practices
– Metering
– Balancing
– Load profiling systems
– Data systems
– Regulations connected to unbundling of DSOs
It is also important that the ongoing development of metering renewal, discussed in 
the  previous  section,  is  developed  in  co-operation  between  the  countries  and 
sufficiently harmonised.
As discussed, the electricity prices of end consumers vary a lot between the Nordic 
countries, which indicates the inefficiency of competition. Further integration of the 
markets should lead to more harmonised prices and margins (NordREG 2007).
Cost-benefit analysis of the market integration made by VTT (2008) concluded that 
the retail margins are generally low, but there still exist differences in the theoretical 
retail margins between the Nordic countries, indicating that market integration and 
increased competition could indeed result in decreased retail prices. However, as the 
margins in the Finnish market were mainly negative, based on the VTT calculations, 
and the Swedish margins  were clearly the highest,  the integration could result  in 
increasing prices in Finland and maybe in Norway and decreasing prices in Sweden. 
Thus,  the integration  might  not  be beneficial  for  all  the consumers,  even though 
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competition would increase in theory.  In addition,  as the VTT report mentions,  it 
may be that the retail market integration affects the retail prices mainly indirectly by 
enabling the development of new retail market products.
Concentration is expected to reduce in the one integrated market compared to the 
national  markets,  which  are  currently  dominated  by  few large  companies  (NCA 
2007).  Reduced  concentration  and  increased  number  of  retailers  is  expected  to 
increase competition. Furthermore, increased number of players creates opportunities 
for individual  companies  to grow and benefit  from economies  of scale  without a 
threat of jeopardising the objective of effective competition (NCA 2007).
However, whether there will be real benefits from the integration of retail markets 
have  been  also  questioned.  Elforsk  (2007b)  studied  the  effects  of  the  market 
integration  on  the  margins  and  concluded  that  the  integration  will  not  have  a 
substantial  effect  on  the  retail  margins  as  they  are  already so  small  and  as  they 
believe that the competitive pressure is not likely to increase significantly. Also, as 
will be discussed more closely in the next chapter, some of the electricity market 
professional doubt whether retailers would start operating in other countries in larger 
extent than currently. If not, the situation is not expected to change much. Moreover, 
customers might experience higher barriers to choose a foreign retailer (NordREG 
2006a).
Elforsk (2007a)  also  questions  the expected  benefits  from the  decreased level  of 
concentration  as  they  think  that  the  current  concentration  levels  in  the  national 
markets are not particularly high. Also NordREG (2006a) points out that merges and 
acquisitions could in fact reduce the number of participants and reduce competition.
Thus, whether the integration will increase competition is somewhat disputed, but 
mostly the expectations are positive. In addition, the process is considered necessary 
in the process of achieving the European internal electricity market. Therefore, the 
integration process is continuing all the time and is going to affect all Nordic markets 
largely.
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7  Interviews – the views of the professionals
Previous chapters were based on a wide literature survey. To deepen these views, to 
gain better understanding of the situation up close and to map the views of different 
participants  of  the  markets,  an  interview  survey  was  carried  out.  This  chapter 
presents the main results.
7.1  Method
As a part of the research study, number of interviews were made among electricity 
market professionals in all the three countries. Interviewees represented a wide range 
of electricity market  professionals;  regulators,  retailers  (both incumbents and new 
entrants), researchers and experts. Due to lack of time, the interviews focused only 
on the persons working with the electricity markets.  Consumer interviews,  which 
would also give interesting views of the situation, but which would require much 
larger sample and lots of time, were not done.35
Altogether 15 interviews were carried out, most of them by visiting the interviewees 
in their offices. Interviews were conducted in the autumn of 2008. Interviews were 
done in an open way by discussing various subjects loosely following a topic list, 
which was given to the interviewees in advance, and mainly concentrating on the 
subjects that each respondent knew the best.  The topics were quite similar  to the 
structure of the country chapters. Regulation, suppliers' and customers' sides were all 
discussed as well as the current situation of the markets. The concentration was given 
to the drivers of competition on the one hand and to the problems of the markets on 
the other hand. The expectation was that interviewees mainly discuss the market of 
their own country as it is the most familiar. Some interviewees, however, had a good 
knowledge of the other Nordic markets as well and were happy to give views and 
opinions of those also, which gives an interesting aspect to the results. Full list of the 
respondents can be found in the Appendix I. This chapter discusses anonymously the 
main results and observations from the interviews, although the knowledge gained 
during the interviews is present in the whole thesis. As the interviews were not well 
35 See for instance EMV (2008b), ET (2005), TEMO (2004 & 2005) for interesting surveys among 
electricity consumers. 
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structured questionnaires but more like discussions and lasted from one hour to four 
hours, not all of the points can be handled in this report, but concentration is given to 
the  most  important  aspects  concerning  the  research  problem,  even  if  the  whole 
discussions were very interesting and scope of the subject could be easily broadened. 
The  results  are  not  to  be  taken  as  final  truth  or  as  facts  as  they  only  represent 
personal opinions of the interviewees  and also, as the sample is rather small,  the 
results  cannot  be  generalised.  In  addition,  some  respondents  highlighted  that  the 
results are only their  personal views, not an official  opinion of their  company or 
organisation.
7.2  Results
The topic list given to the respondents followed the structure of the country chapters, 
but as the interviews were conducted as open discussions, the actual structure of the 
discussions varied widely. Based on the analysis of the results after all the interviews 
were conducted, the most important points are classified under the following eight 
subheadings.
Developments 
An important aspect affecting the different results in the Nordic countries that was 
brought  up  by  several  interviewees,  is  the  development  of  the  markets  and 
competition, which have been rather different between the countries. The stage of 
development  affects  several  aspects,  for  instance  retailers'  strategies,  customer 
behaviour and the overall functioning of the market.
In Finland retailers were excited and active in the beginning of the market opening. 
Retailers  were  advertising  and  marketing  actively.  Prices  were  lowered  notably. 
However, customers remained surprisingly passive. Informing of customers was not 
taken care well. Retailers reduced their activity and even lost their interest towards 
competing. Some had in addition made losses especially due to long procurement 
contracts  done  before  the  market  opening.  Customers  on  the  other  hand  learned 
slowly. Customer awareness increased notably during the price peak of 2002-2003 
90
when the retailers  were not that  active anymore and it was difficult  to find good 
offers. After bad experiences, many consumers probably lost their interest also. Thus, 
the problem appears to be that the activity of consumers and retailers have not met in 
the Finnish market  and the competition between retailers  have not been activated 
again.
In Sweden on the other  hand,  competition  started quite  actively after  the market 
opening and calmed down couple years later but got again tougher, which did not 
happen  in  Finland.  This  increase  of  competition  was  mainly  caused  by  the  bad 
reputation  of  large  companies  and  activity  of  smaller  ones.  Also  in  Norway 
competition has managed to be triggered again due to several pushing factors.
In addition, the pace of development has been different. Some respondents estimated 
that  the Norwegian and Swedish markets  have developed faster  than the Finnish 
market, although it was also stated that the overall development is rather slow in all 
three markets.
Retailers and the dynamics of competition
Nordic  markets  are  rather  fragmented,  although  the  concentration  has  increased. 
Respondents  generally  estimated  that  there  are  enough retailers,  even  nationwide 
retailers, for efficient competition, but it was not named as an important factor for 
success.
Marketing methods in all  the three countries have been diverse.  Lots of different 
ways  have  been  tried,  but  none  of  them have  turned  out  to  be  very  successful. 
Telemarketing  was  mentioned  as  the  most  popular  and  probably  most  effective 
method to gain customers. In Finland telemarketing has become more popular only 
recently,  whereas  it  has  been  used  for  longer  time  in  Norway  and  Sweden. 
Telemarketing  has  aroused  lots  of  interest  but  has  also  had  negative  impacts. 
Generally marketing is quite expensive, customer acquisition costly and the margins 
are  small.  Thus  marketing  should  be  cheap  and  effective  to  be  worth  it.  In  the 
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beginning marketing was more wide and active. Large campaigns were done on TV 
and newspapers etc. Nowadays marketing has become more focused. Campaigns are 
often  aimed  to  specific  areas  through  direct  mails  or  telemarketing.  Remaining 
marketing is  mainly image marketing.  It  was also pointed out,  that  perhaps there 
were not enough marketing professionals in the beginning, but later the situation has 
improved.
Differentiation of electricity is  known to be difficult.  In the Nordic countries the 
environmental aspect is rather important. In Sweden this appeared to start earlier than 
in  Finland.  Most  of  the  respondents  in  all  three  countries  estimated  that  the 
importance of environmental questions are going to increase in the future.
Retailers procurement possibilities in these three countries are the same. Retailers 
can have own production,  buy from wholesale  market  or with bilateral  contracts. 
However, the retailers strategies appear to differ, or at least the amount of different 
types of retailers. In Finland some interviewees estimated that the amount of small 
municipalities selling their own production cheap to customers in their own area is 
rather high and has an effect on the whole competitive environment by distorting the 
price signal and making it difficult for new entrants to enter the market. In Sweden 
and Norway the amount of independent retailers is higher and the retailers with own 
production have realised the opportunity cost of their own production. That is, you 
can  always  sell  to  the  wholesale  market  and  thus  the  spot  price  represents  the 
opportunity cost for the production. Retailers only make maximum profit if they sell 
with this price. These different pricing methods have affected largely the different 
development of the prices and competition and have resulted in a rather dynamic 
markets in Sweden and Norway, whereas the Finnish market is more stable and the 
competition appears rather moderate.
Some interviewees even estimated that one of the biggest  problem in the Finnish 
market is the pricing methods. Prices are very stable due to the strict price changing 
rules and the list prices have often been lower than offer prices and even lower than 
spot price. This situation is strange for free market and clearly affects competition. 
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This was estimated to be possible due to integration between production and supply, 
which makes the situation for independent retailers  very difficult,  some estimated 
that  even  almost  impossible.  Retailing  is  not  profitable  at  the  moment,  but  it  is 
tolerated  as  the  profits  come  from  distribution  and  generation.  The  pricing  was 
criticised  to  be unhealthy in  the  Finnish market.  As an  example,  a  large  retailer 
operating in Finland and Sweden is making profit in Sweden but not in Finland.
New entrants have played significant role in Sweden and Norway but not in Finland. 
There have been few entrants in the Finnish market also, but they have not managed 
to be as successful as in the other Nordic countries. For example, an independent 
retailer Energibolaget i Sverige have managed to gain notably more customers in the 
Swedish market than their Finnish daughter company Suomen Energiayhtiö in the 
Finnish  market.  Some  respondents  also  highlighted  that  the  new entrants  in  the 
Swedish and Norwegian market  are important  for competition,  even if  several  of 
them have  left  the  market  after  few years  and  their  entry  cannot  be  considered 
sustainable. Whether new entry will appear also in the future and continue to have an 
effect on competition is unpredictable. Some said that the markets start to be rather 
mature and for example, year 2008 was calm in the Norwegian market mostly as the 
margins have been so small making the entry not that tempting and profitable. On the 
other  hand some new entrants  can change the situation  again  radically  and most 
probably new entrants would come if prices were increased a lot.
Some interviewees also pointed out that as most of the energy companies in each 
country are integrated companies,  retailing is only one part  of the operations and 
often not even the main one. Even if the margins would be low in retail,  there is 
guaranteed  profit  in  distribution  and  profits  have  been  rather  generous  in  the 
generation during the past years. However, retailing is seen as an important part of 
the operations as otherwise media and public would question company's motives.
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Customers 
Price was clearly named as the most important driver for consumers to switch retailer 
and on opposite, small savings as the biggest reason for consumers' passivity. Several 
other  reasons  to  switch  were mentioned,  such  as  potential  savings,  reputation  of 
retailers, awareness etc., but most respondents estimated these to have only minor 
impact.  From  these  reasons,  reputation  of  retailers  was  estimated  to  be  quite 
important, especially in Sweden but also in Finland and Norway. Generally bigger 
companies seem to have rather bad reputation and often media attention is negative. 
Whereas price is the most important reason to switch, service is a method to keep the 
consumers.
Several interviewees found it actually little bit mysterious why consumers are rather 
lazy to switch, although it was also stated that it is understandable that electricity is 
quite  boring  subject  and  people  in  general  are  not  very  interested  in  it.  Also, 
electricity  markets  are  quite  complicated  and consumers'  knowledge  is  generally 
quite low. Difficult comparison of prices and unclear electricity bills confuse people 
even more.
Large consumers were clearly stated to be the most active and also most interesting 
on the retailers' point of view, but some also considered small consumers important 
as the fixed price gained from small consumers is relatively bigger than from large 
consumers.  Risk connected to big consumers  is  larger.  Customer segmentation to 
passive and active consumers were recognised by many, but it was also mentioned 
that this segmentation is getting more difficult when more time has elapsed from the 
market opening.
In Norway it would seem that it is more important to choose a competitive retailer 
rather  than  the  best  type  of  contract  as  retailers  can  be  divided  quite  clearly  to 
competitive and passive ones. In Sweden on the other hand, it was stated that the 
most important is to switch away from default contract as they are systematically 
more expensive than other contracts. Interestingly, in Finland the offer prices have 
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lately  been  more  expensive  than  default  contracts  and  switching  might  not  be 
profitable at all.
Regulations
The  most  obvious  problems  in  the  Finnish  market  were  found  in  regulation. 
Especially the rules connected to the price changing and obligation to supply was 
considered as hindrances of competition, but both of them are difficult subjects to 
change  due  to  customer  protection  principles.  Price  changing  rule  weakens  the 
correlation between wholesale and retail prices and affects the pricing decisions of 
the  retailers,  which  have  led  to  suspicions  of  continuously  increasing  prices. 
Obligation to supply allows consumers to be passive but also puts the retailers in an 
unequal positions.
Swedish and Norwegian respondents appeared to be rather satisfied to the regulations 
and  some  even  mentioned  this  as  one  of  the  reasons  behind  the  success.  The 
regulations are rather light but still effective. Entry to the market was considered to 
be  easy  as  well  as  the  switching  process,  which  are  both  very  important  to  the 
functioning  of  competition.  Some  problems  were  seen  in  the  unbundling 
requirements, balancing systems and metering. Bundling raised worries both between 
retail  and  generation  and  between  retail  and  production.  Inefficient  separation 
between retail and distribution often creates problems due to unfair communication 
and inefficient separation between generation and retail can hinder the competition 
due to procurement difficulties of new entrants or through anti-competitive pricing. 
Especially Swedish respondents were worried about the inefficient unbundling.
Most  of  the  respondents  thought  that  public  offer  prices  and  price  comparison 
services  have  a  positive  effect  on  competition  through  increased  consumer 
awareness.  Even  retailers  said  that  the  worries  that  this  kind  of  services  would 
increase or even prices36 are not needed as retailers  who were interested in other 
retailers' prices could find them out quite easily already before.
36 See TEM (2007)
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Some difference were mentioned in the balancing systems.  Especially Norwegian 
estimated that balancing system in Sweden is more complicated than in Norway and 
it  was  mentioned  as  a  reason why several  Norwegian  companies  trying  to  enter 
Swedish market have given up. Also some Swedish criticised their balancing system 
and named it as one reason for higher margins.
Prices
It has been suspected that opening up the retail  market has actually increased the 
prices rather than decreased, which was one of the objectives of the market reform. 
However, most of the respondents were not especially worried about the price level 
and particularly in Norway prices were found competitive and in a suitable level.
Price  trend  in  Finland  was  estimated  to  stay  stable  and  Swedish  and  especially 
Norwegian to continue following the wholesale price changes. Current prices under 
competition have been often criticised, but some respondents noted that the prices 
did fall after the market was opened and the increase is not due to free market, but 
other  factors  affect  it,  like European emission trading  scheme and increased fuel 
price.
Price level in Finland is interesting as it is sometimes lower than the spot price level, 
which is clearly strange for competitive market. Some respondents estimated that this 
is partly due to the pricing strategies of small municipalities, especially the ones with 
efficient CHP production, as they sell electricity notably under market price, which 
distorts the price signals. On the other hand it was estimated that that the low price 
level  is  a  consequence  of  the pricing  method that  bases  mostly  on the  prices  of 
financial products and partly also on own production. This pricing method is difficult 
for retailers as they are often making losses, but on the other hand might become 
beneficial for consumers. Interesting point is will the situation remain same or will 
the prices increase to the spot price level and higher and whether competition would 
activate then.
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Margins in Sweden have remained higher than in other Nordic countries. There were 
no specific  reasons  given for  this,  but  instead  it  was  stated  that  the margins  are 
anyhow very small and the situation is not that worrying. For example, in the UK, 
where competition is considered also well functioning the margins are even larger. 
The larger margins also attract new retailers in the market and create thus movements 
in the market.
Benefits
Although  the  functioning  of  competition  have  been  sometimes  questioned, 
respondents  found  also  some  positive  consequences.  Obvious  benefits  is  that 
consumers now have choice. They can switch supplier if they are not satisfied and 
can  choose  retailer  and  product  according  to  their  preferences.  Other  benefits 
mentioned were for example improved customer service,  more customer  oriented 
focus and wide availability of new contractual forms. In addition, some respondents 
mentioned that the over capacity in production has decreased, which was one of the 
objectives of the reform.
Drivers and barriers of competition
Respondents  had  several  opinions  which  are  in  fact  the  most  important  factors 
behind the success of the Norwegian and Swedish markets and the problems of the 
Finnish market and none of them came up as one important factor, but instead all of 
the interviewees named several smaller possible reasons. As this was one of the most 
important points of the research, different answers are collected into Table 1. The 
answers are not in order of importance. The drivers have been indicated with plus 
sign  and  hindrances  with  minus  sign.  In  addition,  the  extent  of  the  drivers  and 
barriers might be different. For example, respondents pointed out that media have 
had driving impact in each of the countries but less in Finland than in Norway and 
Sweden.
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Table 1: Drivers and barriers of dynamic competition in the Nordic retail markets  
based on the opinions of the interviewees.
Country:
Norway Sweden Finland
+ Media attention
+ Political pressure / support
+ Efficient authorities and regulation
+ New entrants (easy to enter, no 
significant entry barriers)
+ Active retailers
+ Reputation of the sector
+ Price peaks
+ Long traditions in electricity 
sector (both retailers and consumers)
+ Processes working well 
(especially easy to switch)
+ Mature and transparent market
+ Active customers mainly due to 
high consumption and good 
informing of consumers (price 
comparison service already in the 
early stage)
- Most of the entrants have left the 
market (might be worrying)
- Possible use of market power 
especially towards passive 
customers
+ Media
+ Political will / pressure
+ Reputation (bad reputation of 
the “giants” and good 
reputation of smaller ones)
+ Image and brand
+ Efficient authorities 
(especially informing of 
consumers)
+ New entrants
+ Improved processes
+ Rather high consumption
+ Mature market
+ Active municipal retailers
+ / - Higher margins signal 
inefficiency on the one hand, 
but motivates new companies 
to enter the market on the other 
hand
- Integration between retailing 
and production (creates barriers 
to entry)
- Entry has not been 
sustainable
- Possible use of market power 
(towards passive customers 
through higher default prices or 
through anti-competitive price 
level)
+ Media does have some 
effect
+ Price increases
+ Well working processes
+ Reputation of retailers
- Lowest consumption out of 
the Nordic countries
- Mistakes made in the 
beginning (bad informing, 
bad marketing, publishing 
list prices etc.)
- Restrictive regulations 
(price changing, obligation to 
supply, switching fee etc.)
- Pricing strategy of 
municipalities (under the 
market price) and the pricing 
of variable price contract 
(stable and lagging)
- Entry barriers (low price 
level and procurement 
difficulties, difficult to 
survive in the long run 
without own production, 
passive customers, high 
customer acquisition costs 
etc.)
- Not a mature market
As can be seen, in the opinion of professionals there are several points that  have 
driven  the  dynamic  competition  in  Sweden and Norway and  the  success  can  be 
considered as a combination of different factors. There have not been one or two 
clear drivers of competition, but it could be generalised that effective regulation and 
suitable market structure combined with some more particular factors, such as media 
attention,  reputation  and  price  changes,  have  resulted  in  a  rather  dynamic 
competition. Points mentioned by Swedish and Norwegian respondents are partially 
similar, which was quite predictable. Interesting is that even if the situation in the 
Finnish market is not as dynamic at the moment and most of the respondents mainly 
discussed about the problems of the Finnish market, some drivers of competition in 
Finland were also brought up and these drivers mentioned are also in some points 
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similar  as  the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  ones,  such  as  price  increases  and  media 
attention.  It would appear that  these factors have not managed to create as much 
movements  in  the  market  as  in  other  Nordic  markets,  even  if  they  have  pushed 
competition to some extent. Partially media attention, price peaks etc. have not been 
as strong as in Norway and Sweden, but partially problems mentioned previously, 
such  as  stiff  regulation  (obligation  to  supply,  price  changing  method  etc.)  and 
retailers pricing strategies can be considered to hinder competition to that extent that 
even possible drivers of competition have not managed to trigger competition.
Current situation and the future of the retail markets
As was expected the Norwegian and Swedish markets were generally considered to 
function rather effectively at the moment. The views concerning the Finnish market 
were  more  varied.  Some  of  the  interviewees  said  that  the  current  situation  is 
concerning  and big  changes  are  needed to  improve  competition.  However,  some 
were  not  especially  worried  and  highlighted  that  compared  to  other  European 
countries the situation is not that bad and especially the prices are still competitive, 
even  in  the  Nordic  scale  despite  the  lack  of  dynamic  competition  in  terms  of 
customer activity, success of new entrants etc. Interesting is also that some Swedish 
respondents  thought  that  the  Finnish  market  is  just  couple  years  behind  the 
development of Sweden and Norway and will become more dynamic in the future, 
but  Finnish respondents  did not  agree.  More common view was that  the Finnish 
market appears to be little bit stuck in its current situation and no improvements are 
to  be  expected  without  big  changes,  although  it  was  also  highlighted  that  the 
electricity  markets  are  quite  unpredictable  and  surprising.  Maybe  even  one  very 
successful entrant could totally mix the situation in the Finnish market.
Most of the respondents believed that both, automatic meters and common Nordic 
market will increase competition, at least to some extent, and change the situation 
significantly.  Installing automatic meters is planned in each country although with 
little different timetables. Automatic meters are expected to bring new products and 
make  switching  easier.  They  are  excepted  to  ease  the  retailers'  operations  and 
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especially lower retailers' risk. Common market divided little bit more the opinions. 
Some considered it  as a good step and practice as the markets  are planned to be 
integrated eventually in the European level. However, whether it will make retailers 
to compete in other countries more actively was questioned. Even now retailers have 
opportunity to operate nationwide, but many have, however, remained only in their 
own area, so why would they start expanding later. Maybe largest companies would 
be more active, but part of them, like Fortum and Vattenfall, are already operating in 
several  countries.  Consequences  of  common  market  could  be  different  between 
countries.  Finnish  market  could  get  some  kind  of  boost  to  more  dynamic 
competition,  but maybe the effect  would not be that big in Sweden and Norway. 
Some  estimated  that  prices  would  become  more  even  eventually,  which  would 
probably mean increased prices in Finland and Norway but possible lower prices in 
Sweden. However, prices would not become totally even as they are not always even 
in  the  fully  integrated  wholesale  market  due  to  limited  transmission  capacities. 
However, most interviewees highlighted that a truly common market is still far in the 
future and lots of harmonisation needs to be still  done, which is not that easy as 
everybody already have their  systems and generally are not that  eager to change. 
This  harmonisation  might  also  become  expensive.  In  addition,  comparing  prices 
might be difficult in the beginning, but the market is probably going to develop and 
common operating methods to be set and learned. Overall,  the future changes are 
expected to be rather slow as the development has been so far.
7.3  Conclusions
As noted earlier,  the electricity market  is  rather special  and complex  market  and 
raises several  different  opinions and thoughts.  This interview survey interestingly 
showed  some  differentiating  opinions  of  different  actors  in  the  market  and  also 
helped  in  understanding  the  real  problems  and  drivers  of  retail  competition, 
especially on the Nordic aspect. Some points of the literature survey were confirmed, 
but also additional points of views were brought up. The sample was rather small and 
there were only few representatives of each side of the market. Thus it was expected 
that the points of views vary and the results cannot be generalised, but as the aim was 
to gain better understanding of each market close up and partially map the views of 
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market  actors,  the  survey contributed  an  important  aspect  to  the  whole  research. 
Especially it was interesting to see how the views of different actors varied, which 
signals  the complexity and heterogeneity  of the market.  It  could be said that  the 
incumbent retailers appeared to be most satisfied with the situation.  New retailers 
and  regulators  viewed  the  situation  with  little  bit  more  caution  and  found more 
problems and researchers  were perhaps  the most  critical.  The interviews handled 
widely the retail sectors as the aim was to get a comprehensive overall picture of the 
markets, but as the most important research questions of this thesis were the drivers 
of the Swedish and Norwegian markets on the one hand and the restrictions of the 
Finnish  market  on  the  other  hand,  the  emphasis  was  given  to  these  points.  The 
answers were varied. Several possible reasons behind the Swedish and Norwegian 
success  were  brought  up as  well  as  several  problems,  particularly  in  the  Finnish 
market but also in the Swedish and Norwegian markets. This makes identifying the 
most important facts little bit challenging and difficult and there is reason to believe 
that success or moderate results are a combination of several small factors, which 
varies from market to market. However, Figure 20 aims to map the situation in the 
Swedish  and  Norwegian  markets  based  on  these  interviews  but  also  taking  into 
account the literature findings. This figure aims to summarize the success of these 
two Nordic markets.
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The results of the interviews are further discussed in the following chapter together 
with the results of the literature survey.
8  Discussion of the results
This chapter discusses shortly the important points of the three Nordic markets side 
by side, enabling better comparison of the markets and aiming to answer the research 
questions  in  detail.  The  reasons  for  different  outcomes  of  retail  competition  are 
discussed,  including  differences  in  regulation,  market  structure  and  retailers'  and 
customers'  activity.  Some more  particular  drivers  of  the Norwegian and Swedish 
markets presented in the country chapters are gathered together and discussed shortly 
in the closing section and viewed also in the light of the Finnish experience.37 In 
addition, the results are considered in some parts in more general point of view as, 
37 This section (8.5) is thus partially repetition from the country chapters and can be skipped if the 
chapters 2-5 have been read.
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Figure 20: An outline of dynamic competition formed based on the opinions of  
interviewees
EFFICIENT REGULATION
- Necessary rules (e.g. unbundling, well 
functioning processes, default supplier etc.) and 
informing of customers
ACTIVE RETAILERS
- Low barriers to entry and new entrants, 
active customer acquisition, marketing, 
innovations, improving service etc.
ACTIVE CUSTOMERS
- Price is the most important reason to switch, 
high consumption & potential savings gives 
incentives
PARTICULAR DRIVERS, e.g.:
- Volatile prices, media attention, reputation of the 
retailers and the sector, political pressure and will etc.
DYNAMIC 
COMPETITION
although the Nordic countries have their own characteristics, lessons learned from 
these pioneer markets might be useful when viewing other electricity retail markets. 
This chapter begins with a short overview of the markets viewed with the common 
competition indicators, confirming the different outcomes of retail competition in the 
three countries, but also partly challenging the claims of inefficiency in the Finnish 
market.
8.1  Level of competition viewed with the indicators
In the beginning  of this research it was assumed, based on the previous literature, 
that  the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  markets  are  more  competitive  than  the  Finnish 
market and this, in fact, was the base for the actual research question, which was to 
find  out  the  drivers  of  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian  markets  and  to  identify  the 
problems  of  the  Finnish  market.  However,  as  another  aim  was  to  give  a 
comprehensive  description  of  these  three  markets,  it  was  natural  to  discuss  the 
markets in the light of common competition indicators described in the Section 2.4. 
As discussed, it is not easy to evaluate the functioning of the markets based on these 
indicators, but as can be seen from the Table 2, which summarizes the indicators for 
all three Nordic countries38, it would appear, based on couple of the indicators, that 
the Swedish and Norwegian markets are rather competitive, whereas competition in 
the Finnish market is more moderate.
38 The indicators are rough estimations mainly based on the previous studies. For example, analysis 
of  the  prices  (correlation  between  wholesale  and  retail  prices  and  price  differences  between 
suppliers) has not been done for this research, but the results are collected from several sources, 
with different accuracy and even little bit different times.
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More dynamic markets in Sweden and Norway than in Finland based on the 
common competition indicators, but competition occurs also in Finland.
Table 2: Nordic markets viewed with the common competition indicators.39
Indicator:
Country:
Norway Sweden Finland
Cumulative net 
switching rate40 28%
32% ( + renegotiated 
23%)
15% ( + renegotiated 
15%)
Annual switching rate 
2006 11.5% 7.7% 4.2%
Annual switching rate 
2007 8.5% 9.5% 4%
Number of retailers 
(before / after reform) 224/158 220/115 120/75
Number of nation 
wide retailers 30 80 40
Number of 
independent retailers 5 20 5
Market share of three 
largest suppliers 50 – 60 % 70% 30 – 35 %
Correlation between 
wholesale and retail 
prices
Strong Medium Weak
Margins41 Low Higher Low
Based on the overall price level, all the markets appear rather competitive, at least in 
the European level, although the prices have increased in all three countries after the 
reform. Often market opening is criticised because of this price increase. However it 
should be remembered that,  even if one of the objectives of market  opening was 
indeed to guarantee secure supply to end consumers with reasonable prices, another 
objective was to reduce the overcapacity. This on the other hand means that, as the 
overcapacity  is  reduced,  the  prices  might  increase  (Johnsen  2003).  In  addition, 
stricter environmental regulations, such as introduction of EU ETS, might increase 
the prices (Olsen et al. 2007).
39 Source: several reports referred in the country chapters.
40 Time of estimate vary somewhat, but these rates indicate the situation around 2006.
41 In VTT (2008) theoretical margins were calculated between 2003 and 2006. The average margins 
in  Norway,  Sweden and Finland for  these  years  were  0.565 cent/kWh, 1.2925 cent/kWh, and 
-0.1575 cent/kWh respectively
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Therefore, the overall price level is not the best indicator, but it is often considered 
that as a result of the market opening the retail prices should follow the wholesale 
prices  more  closely  and  the  margins  should  be  pushed  down.42 Based  on  the 
correlation between retail and wholesale prices, the Norwegian market is working the 
best. In Sweden the correlation is little bit weaker and in Finland it is very weak. 
Margins in each country are small but clearly the highest in Sweden, which casts 
some doubts on the efficiency of the Swedish market. The price developments in all 
three  countries  are  presented  in  Figure  21,  which  clearly  shows  the  different 
evolution of the prices.
Interestingly the Finnish prices have been often the lowest and based on the Figure 
21, it appears that the Finnish prices have been most profitable for customers also in 
the long run with a rough ocular estimate. The pricing method of Finnish retailers, 
which  is  almost  entirely  based  on  the  prices  of  derivative  contracts,  efficiently 
eliminates the price peaks. The margins in the Finnish market have been very low, 
42 Although on the other hand, even if the margins are expected to be pushed down as a result of 
competition, their level is crucial for attracting new suppliers into the business (Glachant 2006). 
This is why the low or negative margins in Finland could be problematic as new companies do not 
enter the market and this could restrict for example product innovation. Whether this is a problem 
is a matter of opinion, but as long as the companies do not start exploiting their market power and 
prices do not increase too much, there is no reason for bigger concerns. If  the prices started to 
increase and still no new companies entered the market the situation would be more worrying and 
competition could not be considered efficient.
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Figure 21: Nordic electricity retail prices for households, øre/kWh.
(Olsen et Johnsen 2008)
often even negative. Thus, based on this point of view, the Finnish market performs 
rather well, even if the prices do not correlate with the wholesale price. Therefore, 
low consumer switching rates and weak wholesale and retail price correlation do not 
necessarily indicate high prices and high margins. Even on the contrary, if customer 
activity is high, it increases retailers risks and increases the transaction costs, which 
might  partially explain the higher margins  in the Swedish market.  In the Finnish 
case, as most of the sales is hedged with financial contracts and not bought from the 
spot market,  better  indicator could be correlation between retail  prices and future 
prices. This correlation has been noted to be stronger than the correlation between 
retail prices and spot price (Annala 2008), but still the margins are very small, or 
even  negative,  which  indicates  well  the  profitability  of  Finnish  variable  price 
contract.
Based on the market structure indicators, the markets appear rather similar. All of 
them have significant  number  of suppliers,  although the markets  are  increasingly 
concentrated. However, the concentration is still in a reasonable level and the retail 
markets remain less concentrated than the wholesale markets and most importantly, 
customers are estimated to have enough retailers to choose from. Biggest differences 
can be seen in the number of independent retailers, which is clearly the highest in 
Sweden. Unfortunately data on number of new companies entering and exiting the 
markets  could  not  be  found,  but  based  on  the  professional  interviews,  it  can  be 
assumed that there have been notably many entrants in the Swedish and Norwegian 
markets, but only very few in the Finnish market.
The most common indicator, switching rate, indicates the differences most clearly. 
The  Swedish  and  Norwegian  markets  are  notably  more  active  than  the  Finnish 
market based on both cumulative and annual switching rates.
New innovations is difficult to measure also, but all three countries have new types 
of contracts after the market opening, which have become increasingly popular over 
time. Maybe the level of competition could be measured with the popularity of these 
new contracts. In Norway and Sweden the percentage of consumers on the new types 
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of contracts is high, around 50 % in both of the countries, but in Finland based on 
estimations, only around 30 % have offer contracts indicating again the lower level 
of competition. Although, as was seen, the nature of the default contract,  variable 
price contract, differs a lot between countries. In Sweden and Norway the price of 
variable  price  contract  changes  often  and  is  not  generally  very  profitable  for 
consumers, whereas the Finnish variable price contract have remained competitive 
compared to the offer contracts.
To summarise, based on these indicators it appears, as expected, that the Norwegian 
and Swedish markets are more dynamic than the Finnish market. However, in some 
aspects  the  Finnish  market  does  not  work  especially  bad  either  and  during  this 
research,  it  was  noted  that,  in  fact,  there  is  rather  fierce  competition  also  in  the 
Finnish market, which cannot be evaluated with these indicators.
In addition, the functioning of the markets depends on the point of view and on the 
desired  objectives  of  introducing  competition.  Based  on  these  commonly  used 
competition indicators the Swedish and Norwegian markets appear more competitive 
than the Finnish market, but from the customer point of view the Finnish markets has 
worked reasonably well. On the one hand, if competition is hoped to create dynamic 
market with active customers, volatile prices and competition between retailers  in 
terms  of  new  entrants  and  notable  retailer  activity,  the  Norwegian  and  Swedish 
markets  can  be  considered  rather  successful.  On the  other  hand,  if  the  objective 
would be stable and low prices the Finnish market has succeeded better.
Therefore,  to  avoid  misinterpretation  and  judging  of  markets  too  quickly,  the 
indicators for retail  market competition should be further developed to be able to 
better  evaluate  the  situations  and  to  identify  also  different  types  of  competition. 
Maybe in the future better methods to evaluate the markets will be available as for 
example Nordic energy regulators are developing a new set of statistical indicators 
(NordREG 2008b).
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8.2  Regulations
Some basic regulations and some minimum public effort are necessary for a well 
functioning retail market. Regulations differ somewhat between the Nordic countries 
and have partially affected the different outcomes of introducing competition into the 
retail markets. Table 3 summarizes the main retail regulations in the Nordic countries 
presented in the country chapters.
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Table 3: Main retail market regulations in the Nordic countries.
Regulation:
Country:
Norway Sweden Finland
Default supplier Local DSO Local DSO
Dominant retailer in 
the area (Obligation to 
supply)
License required Yes No No
Separation between 
DSOs and supply
Legal (for companies 
with more than 100000 
customers)
Legal
Legal (for DSOs with 
annual transmission 
>200GWh)
Price regulation No No
No, but the obligation 
to supply prices have 
to be reasonable
Price changing 
regulations
Notification 2 weeks in 
advance in a suitable 
manner (e.g. in a 
newspaper)
Notification 2 weeks in 
advance. Public 
notification sufficient.
Notification 4 weeks in 
advance personally to 
every customer.
Switching possible Every Monday First day of the month Any day
Duration of switching 
process Max. two weeks ~1 – 2 months ~1 – 2 months
Switching fees None None
Possible metering fee 
if last switch less than 
one year ago
Efficient regulation creates the framework for competition. Necessary regulations  
are needed to create common rules, but encouraging competition and
 informing of customers should not be forgotten.
Light but efficient regulatory framework in Norway and Sweden, restrictions 
and stiffer system in Finland.
As noted, regulation of the Nordic retail markets is rather light. There is no price 
regulation in order to create headroom for new entrants nor other special regulations 
to encourage competition, which appears to be a good decisions. Several studies have 
highlighted the negative impacts of the price regulation, which might for example 
have negative effect on new entry, on existing competition and on market integration 
(Eurelectic 2006 ; ERGEG 2007).
However, some differences were found in the legislations, which have affected the 
development  of  the  markets.  Considerable  differences  are  connected  to  the 
unbundling requirements,  price changing regulations and supplier  switching rules, 
which all have an impact on the retailers' and customers' behaviour and hence on the 
overall  functioning  of  the  market  and  can  at  least  partially  explain  the  different 
outcomes of retail competition. Especially the regulations in the Finnish market have 
some restrictive  rules,  which  have  clearly  hindered  the  development  of  dynamic 
competition, but also, as described, this was partially concious decision, which has 
created a stable and rather profitable system on the customer point of view. On the 
other hand, the Swedish and Norwegian regulations were noted to be effective and 
encouraging to dynamic competition with volatile prices and active retailers as well 
as customers.
8.3  Retailers 
Active  retailers  is  one of  the most  important  prerequisites  for  retail  competition. 
Retailers'  strategies  vary  significantly  based  on  different  factors,  such  as  size, 
ownership and power procurement, and also over time depending on the competitive 
pressure and market situation.43 For instance, municipally owned companies might 
43 Based on the Finnish experience, VaasaEMG has developed a model with different stages aiming 
to describe the general development of companies strategic thinking and behaviour over the time. 
These  stages  include  non  deregulation,  pre-full  deregulation,  early-full  deregulation,  mid-full 
deregulation  and  mature-full  deregulation.  Each  stage  is  characterised  by  different  types  of 
retailers' actions (KTM 2004b).
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In a well-functioning retail market, suppliers play a central role.
Exceptionally active retailers and new entrants in Norway and Sweden, Finnish 
retailers more passive and entering the Finnish market remains unattractive.
have different objectives than the private ones, new entrants have more incentives to 
be active than incumbents and larger companies might have better abilities or more 
interest  to  compete  than  small  ones.  In  the  Nordic  market  it  appears  that  the 
Norwegian  and  Swedish  retailers  are  rather  active  and  have  clearly  driven 
competition,  whereas Finnish retailers have become more passive, especially after 
the excitement in the early years.
Typical characteristic of the Nordic countries is the high number of small municipal 
retailers  associated with network operations and often also with generation.  Their 
strategies vary also, from very passive to rather aggressive. Most have adopted rather 
passive strategies, mainly concentrating to hold on to their existing customers. Some 
might have different objectives from the local municipal governments, for instance to 
sell their own production cheap to support the town's economy. Some concentrates 
on the monopoly operation, distribution, to guarantee stable income and some might 
not even have ability to compete due to small resources or are not interested to sell 
more than own production, which would require to start buying from the wholesale 
market, which in turn would mean more risk management etc. Some municipalities, 
however, accept new customers and have managed to grow their customer base more 
passively (without aggressive marketing)  by offering cheap prices.  In addition,  at 
least  some Swedish  municipalities  have  shown greater  interest  in  competing  and 
have actively aimed to grow and have been, in fact, in an important role in driving 
competition  by  challenging  the  larger  incumbent  retailers. In  Norway  few 
municipalities  sell  cheap  electricity  to  consumers  in  their  own distribution  areas, 
backed by water concession, but most of the municipalities charge around or even 
above the competitive level (von der Fehr and Hansen, 2008).
None of the Nordic markets have formal barriers to entry44 and entry and exit to the 
market have been described rather easy and there has been some amount of entry in 
44 Although a licence is needed in Norway, but as mentioned it is not especially difficult to get. In 
fact,  the Nordic market  offers  rather good conditions for the development of competition.  For 
example one of the most important prerequisite for a well functioning retail market and a common 
barrier for efficient competition, sufficiently liquid wholesale market (Eurelectic 2007), has been 
implemented and developed rather well in the Nordic countries, as the amount of electricity traded 
in Nord Pool has increased all the time and stands already for more than 70% of all the electricity 
consumed.
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each country, which can be divided mainly into three types, foreign entry, entrants 
from other areas and totally independent entrants.
Foreign entrants have mostly been incumbent electricity retailers, who aim to grow 
by merges and acquisitions, but in addition have adopted rather aggressive strategies 
aiming to gain customers also from other distribution areas. These companies are 
typical in the early years of the market opening as the markets are still not mature 
and there is lots of space and opportunities. The entrants from other sectors, such as 
petroleum, generally aim to compete through their existing reputation and brand and 
often bundle electricity with their old products. Totally new entrants aiming to grow 
organically, in turn, have often aimed to compete with efficiency by small resources 
and also by outsourcing operations.  Two typical approaches have occurred in the 
Nordic countries, either the ones that aim to play with simplicity and easiness (e.g. 
Yello in Sweden, Norges Energi in Norway) and others that  could be considered 
more as niche players, aiming to target specific groups (e.g. Kraft & Kultur targets 
cultural  customers,  Swedish Energibolaget  i  Sverige and their  subsidiary Suomen 
Energiayhtiö in Finland targets small consumers living in apartments).
In Finland, retailers' pricing method has developed very differently than in Norway 
and Sweden, and is based more on the prices of financial  contracts  than the spot 
price, which has resulted in a low price level. This in turn has prevented entry as 
independent retailers have very difficult to compete in this type of market, especially 
as price is the most important method to compete. Only possible time to make good 
offers for new customers is during the decreasing prices and some companies have 
managed to enter the market like this and managed to operate rather well for few 
years. However, during the next price decrease these companies are in the position of 
old  companies  and as  they  are  still  rather  weak,  they  might  face  difficulties.  In 
addition, it might be difficult to find efficient sources for procurement. Due to these 
reasons,  and  as  the  experiences  have  shown,  in  the  long  run  it  might  be  even 
impossible to survive or do well in the Finnish market. In addition, none of the few 
entrants have managed to create significant movements in the market, not even as 
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much as in the Swedish and Norwegian markets.45 However, despite of the small 
amount  of  new entrants,  the  retailers  in  the  Finnish  market  do  experience  some 
pressure  to  keep  the  prices  low  and  thus  there  exits  competition,  even  though 
different from the Norwegian and Swedish one.
In Norway and Sweden there have been more new entrants. On the one hand, the 
attempts of new entrants, especially the entries of petroleum companies, have often 
been described as failures as they have left the markets after few years or have been 
bought by an incumbent (Glachant 2006, EEE Ltd 2008), but on the other hand, they 
have reportedly managed to create some movements  in the markets  and push the 
incumbent companies to answer to competition, for instance to start campaigning, 
lower prices and improve services and image.46 In addition, some of these entrants 
that have been later acquired by larger company still operate under separate brand 
and thereby still contribute to competition. For example, Norges Energi acquired by 
Hafslund,  and  which  was  later  strengthened  by  acquisitions  of  Shell  and  Hydro 
Texaco, still continues to operate as nationwide “low cost” retailer. However, none 
individual  new entrant  has played as big role  as British Gas Centrica in the UK 
market, but it appears that they partially can explain the activity in the markets, even 
though the entry has not been sustainable, which have been seen in the British market 
also. In addition to British Gas, there have been several smaller entrants in the British 
market  that  have been bought by bigger companies after  a while,  just like in the 
Nordic  markets.  Littlechild  (2005)  stresses  the  importance  of  these  smaller  new 
entrants as, despite their short period in the market, they are valuable for competition 
in terms of price, quality of service and innovation.
45 For  instance,  rather  aggressive  new  entrant  in  the  Swedish  market,  Energibolaget  i  Sverige, 
managed to gain around 5 000 – 6 000 new customers per month according to information in 2006, 
whereas a subsidiary of this Swedish company, Suomen Energiayhtiö, which has been one of the 
most aggressive new entrants in the Finnish market and operates in a similar strategy as the mother 
company,  only  managed  to  get  around  2  000  customers  per  month  in  the  Finnish  market 
(NordREG, 2006b).
46 For  example,  a  well  known  petroleum  company,  Statoil  in  Norway  made  very  aggressive 
campaigns  and  managed  to  gain  reasonable  amount  of  customers.  Switching  rate  during  the 
Statoils'  campaigns  doubled  from  3,5%to  around  7%  and  more  importantly,  the  incumbents 
appeared to answer the attacks with their own campaigns (Fosby Livgard, 2007)
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Thus, these new entrants in the Swedish and Norwegian market have clearly driven 
competition to some extent. Whether it is a problem that the markets appear to be 
rather stable and mature (no new entrants in the Norwegian market in 2008) remains 
to be seen. At least some market professionals, interviewed for this research, strongly 
believed that if incumbents show uncompetitive actions and increase their margins, 
new entrants will again appear, which would be a sign of truly efficient competition. 
Also,  whether  the Finnish situation will  remain  in its  current  form with low and 
stable  prices,  with this  low level  of new entrants,  is  an interesting question.  The 
current situation is rather difficult for retailers, and thus there are expectations that 
retailers  try  to  change  the  pricing  system,  even  if  the  regulations  would  not  be 
changed.47
To conclude, in Finland competition happens mainly between incumbents, combined 
with only couple new entrants who have not succeed to create much movements in 
the  market.  In  Norway  and  Sweden  competition  has  been  more  driven  by  new 
entrants,  whose actions have forced the incumbents to respond and become more 
competitive and in Sweden, in addition, by exceptionally active municipalities.
8.4  Consumers
Consumers' awareness and activity are important for well functioning competition. 
Aware consumers create pressure for retailers to maintain prices low and also create 
incentives for companies to offer attractive terms of agreement and good service. The 
Norwegian  and Swedish consumers  have  shown rather  high  activity  with  annual 
switching rates of 8,5% and 9,5% respectively in 2007, whereas Finnish customers 
have remained more passive with switching rate of only 4% in the same year.
47 For example, as mentioned, it appears that the large company, Fortum, is trying to transform their 
pricing towards more easy and profitable system for a retailer (price of variable price contract is 
adjusted every quarter), which could have an impact on other retailers' pricing also.
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Price sensitive Norwegian consumers, well-informed Swedish consumers and 
rather passive Finnish consumers.
Activity goes in line with the amount of consumption.
Segmentation between the passive and active electricity customers is recognised by 
some studies (Defeuilley 2008 ; von der Fehr et Hansen 2008), and indeed, it would 
appear that also the Nordic markets have been characterised by this segmentation. In 
each country there still  appears  to  be rather  large passive segment,  who are  still 
supplied by their incumbents. Smaller amount of customers appear to be active and 
more price reactive.
However, as time has already passed since the market opening, maybe more specific 
segmentation  could  be  used.  Active  segment  could  be  divided  into  two separate 
segments,  proactive  and  reactive  customers  (see  also  Ofgem  2008).  Proactive 
customers are the most price sensitive,  seek for offers actively and follow prices, 
whereas reactive customers only react when retailer approaches them. In the early 
years the customers who switched were mainly the ones that were interested, thus 
proactive.  Later on, as the marketing has become more efficient and focused, the 
reactive segment  can be presumed to have grown. From the previously described 
marketing  methods,  direct  methods,  such  as  telemarketing  and  direct  mails,  are 
effective  in  reaching  the  reactive  customers,  whereas  web  pages  and  price 
comparison  services  reach  the  proactive  customers.  Segmenting  customers  into 
passive and active enables the retailers to price discriminate the passive customers 
and  furthermore,  dividing  active  customers  into  proactive  and  reactive  allows 
retailers  to  make  very  attractive  offers  for  proactive  customers,  but  still  gain 
customers with reasonable margins from the reactive segment.
Several studies have aimed to investigate the reasons to switch and not to switch 
electricity supplier. Reasons to switch seem to be rather few, whereas reasons not to 
switch appear to be much more diverse (Pakkanen et al.  2008). Clearly the most 
important reasons to switch are the price and potential savings. Therefore, Nordic 
consumers naturally have large incentives to switch, compared to many European 
countries, due to the high consumption of electricity stemming from high share of 
electricity heating (which accounts for around 98 % in Norway, 33% in Sweden and 
22% in Finland of all the household heatings) and the following high expenditure 
spent  on  electricity.  Moreover,  the  Norwegian  households  consume  the  most 
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(average of 19 000kWh per year), then Swedish (10 000kWh per year) and Finnish 
the  least  (5  000kWh per  year),  which  goes  in  line  with  the  customer  mobility. 
However, as the part under competition, i.e. the price of electric energy presents only 
a  part  of  the electricity  bill  (about  one  third,  varying  somewhat  from country to 
country and between customer groups), the possible savings might appear small for 
customers. Reasons not to switch and other reasons to switch are rather similar in the 
three countries, generally connected to the decision making in the electricity markets, 
not depending largely on the specific market. Reasons to switch in addition to price 
savings are for instance desire for experiment, dissatisfaction, value adding services 
and  offers  (such  as  environmental  friendliness),  but  they  only  work  as  minor 
motivators to switch. Reasons not to switch are several, varying from small possible 
savings and loyalty to consumers inertia. (Pakkanen et al. 2008) Whereas customer 
inertia is a global problem in the electricity markets, loyalty might have particularly 
strong impact in the Nordic countries, where many retailers are small and the local 
utilities  often  have  an  important  role  in  the  society.  For  instance,  in  Norway, 
according to a survey, over 40% of customers feel strong loyalty towards their local 
retailer (Fosby Livgard, 2007).
Information and difficulty of comparing prices has been long standing problem in the 
retail markets. All three countries have nowadays well functioning price comparing 
services, which are estimated to improve the customer awareness significantly and to 
facilitate price comparing. These services have in part surely improved the situation, 
but still the comparing might be challenging, especially in the Finnish market due to 
the  slow changes  in  prices  and different  timetable  of  retailers'  pricing  strategies, 
which make it very difficult for consumer to recognise the best products as customers 
typically compare the prices only at a one specific time.
Choice of contract gives an interesting aspect on customers' behaviour in addition to 
the supplier switching. As discussed, Nordic consumers have rather wide range of 
different types of contracts to choose from. Even though the most typical contract 
forms offered are similar in all the three countries, the popularity of contracts differ 
significantly.
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In all the three countries the standard variable contract still remains the most popular 
contract, although the shares have been steadily declining, accounting nowadays for 
about 46% in Norway, 36% in Sweden and 70% in Finland. The popularity of offer 
contracts cast some interesting light on the situation. In Norway fixed price contracts 
were slightly more popular in the early years and especially increased their share 
during the price pike of 2002-2003. Still  in 2004 it  was noted that  there was no 
interest towards spot price contracts among household customers (von der Fehr et al. 
2005).  Later,  the popularity of spot price based contracts  have increased rapidly, 
whereas the share of fixed price contracts have varied without clear trend. In the third 
quarter of 2008 already around 46% of consumers had spot price contract. In Sweden 
in turn, the fixed price contracts have been the most popular since long time. Some 
studies have aimed to explain this difference. For instance it has been estimated that 
Swedes are more risk averse than Norwegians (Littlechild 2006). However, as was 
noted, the spot price contracts have become rapidly more popular also in Sweden 
during the past couple years and accounts at the moment for more than 20%, partly 
cancelling the previous hypotheses, especially if the trend is to be continuing in the 
same direction. Instead, the choice of contract could be due to other factors, such as 
market  situation  and  the  availability  of  contracts.48 Collection  of  the  shares  of 
contracts in Finland is not as extensive making the comparison difficult. However, 
according to estimations around 30% have an offer contract and the amount of spot 
price based contracts is very low, hence most of the offer contracts are presumably 
fixed price contracts. Due to the market situation, list prices being cheaper than spot 
prices, it is natural that spot price contracts are not very popular.49 In addition, as 
described the Finnish variable price contract has turned out to be very different than 
the Norwegian and Swedish contracts. Finnish contract is very stable and cheap and 
48 Indeed, based on a partial overview of the nationwide retailers' web pages, which are important 
information sources and advertising channels, the retailers offer different types of contracts, or at 
least recommend or focus their strategy on some contracts, making them more competitive and 
attractive for customers. For instance, in 2006 only 9% of the Finnish retailers offered spot price 
based contracts and 7% all the common contracts (TEM 2007). In addition, campaigns often focus 
on  some  specific  type  of  contract  and  as  customer  surveys  have  indicated,  large  part  of  the 
customers switch supplier as a result of retailer's contact. Thus, customers preference might have 
been overestimated in this sense.
49 Again,  the  small  amount  of  spot  price  contracts  seems to  be  explained  partly  due  to  lack  of 
availability. First retailers in Finland started to offer spot price contracts only in 2004-05 and still 
nowadays  only around 9% of retailers  offer  these  contracts.  In  addition,  the spot  price  based 
contracts have been less profitable than other contracts types and thus it is natural that customers 
do not choose it and retailers do not offer it.
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the retailers hedge efficiently the price peaks in the part of consumers. In Sweden 
and Norway the pricing of variable price contract has become very close to the spot 
based contracts but often more expensive than the spot price contracts. This type of 
very  volatile  variable  price  contact  has  not  been  very  profitable  for  customers, 
whereas the Finnish product is,  in fact,  very good for customers,  both stable and 
cheap,  which  explains  the  large  differences  between  the  popularity  of  contracts. 
Which type of distribution of contracts  signal more efficient  competition is again 
matter  of  opinion  and  matter  of  point  of  view.  From customers'  point  of  view, 
Finnish  type  of  variable  price  contract  is  rather  efficient  but  on  the  other  hand 
difficult for retailers. The Swedish and Norwegian type of contract fulfils the criteria 
of efficient competition if viewed with the correlation between retail and wholesale 
prices, but might not be the best for the customers. Although have to note, that even 
the Norwegian and Swedish customers do have an opportunity to protect themselves 
from the volatile prices rather efficiently by choosing a fixed price contract, which 
have been often more competitive.
Based  on  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian  experience,  the  trends  among  customer 
behaviour during time appear to be i.) rather slow but steady move from incumbent 
retailer  to  another  retailer  and  ii.)  also  slow but  steady move  away from default 
contract  to offer contracts.  In addition,  the spot price contracts  appear to become 
more  and  more  popular  over  time.  These  developments  are  largely  due  to  the 
unprofitable characteristic of default  contract.  Finnish market  has shown different 
development due to the different characteristic of the default contract, although there 
are  estimations  that  the  spot  price  contracts  would  increase  popularity  also  in 
Finland. However, before significant changes happen with the current system, it is 
more probable that the metering renewal will change the situation significantly and 
also affect the popularity of contact types.
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8.5  More particular drivers of the Swedish and Norwegian markets
Previous sections  viewed the three  Nordic  retail  markets  and discussed the main 
differences between the markets in terms of regulation and retailers' and customers' 
activity, which can all partially explain the differences between the countries. These 
factors explain largely the low level of customer activity in the Finnish market and 
indicate  the  importance  of  the  basic  features,  such  as  effective  regulations  and 
customer awareness. In Norway and Sweden, the basic structure creates rather good 
basis  for  the  development  of  dynamic  competition  without  more  significant 
restrictions. However, none of these factors cannot totally explain the exceptionally 
high levels  of customer mobility.  The market  structure,  regulations,  exceptionally 
active retailers and the basic characteristics of the Norwegian and Swedish markets 
do create good framework for the development of active competition, but in addition 
there have been some other, more particular factors that have furthermore triggered 
competition and has strong impact on the customers' activity and the dynamism of 
the market.
In  Norway,  where  the  retail  prices  follow  most  closely  the  wholesale  price  as 
described,  the  price  seems  to  have  very  large  impact  on  the  customer  switching 
(especially in the active customer segment), both increasing prices and large price 
differences between the suppliers, which was clearly seen during the price peak of 
2002-2003  and  in  some  extent  also  in  2006.  Also,  according  to  a  survey,  the 
switching behaviour  correlates  to a large extent  with the reputation  of the power 
sector (Fosby Livgard, 2007).
In addition, as discussed, there are some small municipal retailers who offer cheap 
prices  to  their  own customers,  based on cheap hydro  power concessions and are 
uninterested  in  maximizing  their  profits,  although  the  amount  is  estimated  to  be 
decreasing. On the one hand this phenomenon is stated to be relatively rare, and of 
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Efficient regulatory framework and suitable market structure create good 
basis for dynamic competition, but in addition some more particular 
drivers are needed.
limited importance for the overall market (von der Fehr et Hansen 2008), but on the 
other hand this has been estimated to cause downward pressure to the prices and 
even to be one of the drivers of competition (EEE Ltd 2008). EEE report even names 
these  small  companies  as  one  of  the  most  significant  factor  increasing  the  price 
competitiveness in the market. Furthermore the report states that although the market 
share  of  these  companies  is  not  significant,  the  media  uses  them  as  a  shaming 
mechanisms against the more expensive companies.
Moreover, Norwegian have been estimated to have more interest and experience of 
electricity markets, both retailers and consumers, due to Norway's long traditions in 
the electricity sector. For instance, Norway had own wholesale market already before 
Nord Pool and the volatile hydro-based electricity market has been a common topic 
of  discussion  already  before  the  market  reform  and  thus  Norwegian  are  often 
considered to be more aware of these issues. In addition, media regularly talk about 
electricity markets,  especially during the high prices and has an important role in 
consumers' awareness.
In Sweden the unpopularity have had even larger impact than in Norway, especially 
the bad reputation of the large companies. Unlike in Finland, the large companies 
were rather passive in the early years and in general were the most expensive ones. 
Large  companies  suffered  from the  lack  of  confidence  due  to  high  prices,  poor 
service and several power outages. Only media criticism combined with activity of 
smaller  retailers,  who even used the  bad reputation  of the three  “giants”  in  their 
marketing  campaigns,  forced  the  large  companies  to  become  more  competitive. 
These problems also partly woke up the regulators, who have paid more attention to 
retail issues since.
In  addition,  both  in  Norway and Sweden,  electricity  is  considered  very  political 
issue, which in part may have affected the development.  For instance,  one of the 
main reasons for passing the supply shock of 2002-2003 successfully, is estimated to 
be the strong political support (Amundsen et Bergman 2006b). The political pressure 
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and  will  have  kept  the  development  going  and  resulted  in  rather  mature  and 
transparent markets.
To highlight the role of these triggers as well as the importance of basic conditions 
for dynamic competition, comparison with the Finnish market gives an interesting 
view.  Finnish  electricity  sector  and  especially  the  large  companies  haven't  had 
particularly good reputation, notable price increases50 have been done and media talk 
regularly about the electricity market, especially during the high prices. However, it 
appears  that  these  factors,  which  in  part  are  similar  to  previously  discussed 
developments  in  the Swedish and Norwegian markets  have not triggered  notably 
customer activity. Several events and facts in the Finnish market clearly demonstrate 
this.
In 2006 the biggest Finnish supplier, Fortum, announced large price increase in their 
electricity prices (HS 2007b), which created lots of negative media coverage. This 
was  expected  to  lead  to  a  large  escape  of  Fortum's  customers  and  media  even 
reported this, but it appears, based on the interview survey, that even though Fortum 
lost some customers and lots of consumers compared actively the electricity prices 
(HS 2007a), they avoided notable customers losses. This most probably was due to 
the lack of competitive offers, i.e. even if the customers wanted to switch, they could 
not find competitive offers, which has been a typical feature of the Finnish market 
during the increasing prices due to the retailers'  pricing method,  which is mainly 
based on the prices  of derivative contracts.  However,  Fortum cancelled  the price 
increase in the following week indicating that the media have some effect on the 
markets (HS 2007b).
Furthermore, due to continuous price increases combined with other negative factors, 
such as large option pay outs, some companies, generally large ones, have suffered 
from bad reputation, but even this has not created movements in the market, again 
mainly due lack of competitive offers.
50 Even though the prices are not as volatile as in Norway and Sweden, the price increases have 
sometimes been rather high, even 10% - 15%. This is suspected to be a consequence of the strict 
price changing rules, i.e. the retailers do not want to rise prices often as is rather expensive. Hence, 
the price changes are done more rarely, but when done, they are often significant.
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Moreover,  as noted there are several  municipal companies selling electricity with 
very  low  price  (mainly  locally),  which  reminds  the  situation  in  the  Norwegian 
market. However, these companies have not been reported to have put competitive 
pressure on the prices and the role of these companies is somewhat disputed. On the 
one hand, instead of price pressure, they seem to create some distortion in the market 
price and even to some extent to create barriers to entry, but on the other hand the 
market share of these companies is very small and thus they cannot be considered 
significant for the overall situation and their role is very minimal.
These  factors  clearly  demonstrate  the  impact  of  the  basic  market  design  and 
regulations.  On the one hand,  the Finnish market  design has  resulted in  a  rather 
stable market,  with low and stable prices and therefore,  the factors that generally 
have  potential  to  trigger  dynamic  competition  do  not  manage  to  create  enough 
momentum and trigger the customer activity. On the other hand, demonstrated with 
the case of Norway and Sweden, even if the basic market  design is suitable  and 
creates good conditions for the development of dynamic competition, some special 
triggers are needed to truly activate competition.
9  Conclusions
The  three  Nordic  countries,  Norway,  Sweden  and  Finland  were  among  the  first 
countries in the world to introduce competition into their residential electricity retail 
markets.  The Norwegian and Swedish markets  have proved to be rather active in 
several studies, whereas Finnish market has shown more moderate results, at least 
measured  with  the  common  competition  indicators.  This  thesis  aimed  to  give  a 
comprehensive image of these three markets and especially to define the factors that 
have resulted in the different outcomes of retail competition.
Quickly  glanced  the  situation  in  the  retail  electricity  market  does  not  seem 
particularly worrying in any of the three Nordic countries. The price level is fairly 
competitive  in  each  country,  especially  in  the  European  scale,  the  retail  prices 
correlate with the wholesale prices to some extent, the margins are small and the 
market  structures  are  very  fragmented  creating  good  prerequisites  for  efficient 
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competition.  This  deeper  review  of  each  market  have  however  shown  that  the 
situation is not that simple and there still exists space for further improvements in all 
the three markets.
Several improvements have been already done and in more than ten years of full 
market opening some promising developments have been seen. All three countries 
have nowadays comprehensive price comparing services and effective independent 
market  regulators.  Customers  have  usually  reasonable  availability  of  choice,  and 
especially the amount of different types of contracts is wide compared to many other 
markets. Separation between DSOs and supply is fairly efficient and the processes 
have improved notably. Retailers have become more customer oriented and services 
have generally improved.
The restrictions of the Finnish market were identified and a variety of reasons were 
found, mainly stemming from regulations (restrictive rules and lack of encouraging 
and stimulating competition) and immaturity stemming from the lack of activity both 
from retailers' and customers' side, altogether creating a somewhat stiff system. In 
addition, the prices are in average low, sometimes even lower than the spot price, 
mainly due to the current pricing system, which differs notably from the Swedish and 
Norwegian methods. Retailing has been unprofitable business during long periods of 
time. This has prevented new companies to enter the market or at least to survive in 
longer run. Moreover, Finnish market suffered from several mistakes made in the 
beginning, for instance lack of professional knowledge among the retailers and bad 
informing of the consumers, and the overall development towards dynamic market 
has not been as fast as in the neighbour countries.
However, it was also noticed that even though the Finnish market does not fulfil the 
criteria of dynamic competition in the sense of several indicators commonly used to 
measure the level  of competition,  there anyway exists  competition and especially 
from the customers' point of view the situation is not that worrying as the prices have 
remained low, usually the lowest out of the Nordic countries. Competition is, in fact, 
rather fierce and the pricing of retailers has stemmed a product that is rather good for 
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customers. Variable price contract, which in Sweden and Norway has become very 
volatile and even very close to the spot price based pricing, has remained stable and 
in  a  low level  as  it  is  priced mainly based on the financial  contract  prices.  The 
situation is more difficult for retailers as they need to hedge their sales in a rather 
long term and in addition, the sales have been often loss making. Thus, competition 
occurring in Finland is  not as dynamic  as in Norway and Sweden but cannot be 
judged as totally inefficient, which is often the case in the previous studies. This also 
raises  question  whether  the  previously  mentioned  restrictions  in  the  regulations 
(obligation  to  supply,  price  changing  methods)  can  really  be  considered  as 
restrictions as they were intentionally chosen in terms of customer protection and in 
the light of these rules the market works rather well. Therefore it appears that the 
objective of the Finnish market was different from the Swedish and Norwegian ones 
and this has resulted in a stable system that appears less competitive in terms of 
competition indicators.
Which form of competition is better or more desirable, is a matter of opinion and 
depends on the  point  of  view and desired  outcome.  The common version  in  the 
literature often highlights the dynamic model,  but in the Finnish case, the current 
model might even be more efficient. At least the prices still compare well with the 
other  Nordic  markets  and  the  margins  have  remained  lowest.  The  Finnish  retail 
market has suffered from bad reputation and has been judged as a failure also due to 
the media attention,  which gives a rather negative image.  However, this image is 
largely based on the overall functioning of the market, and especially the problems in 
the wholesale market, such as large profits from generation, have been incorrectly 
interpreted as problems in the retail market. If markets were viewed based on the 
prices,  Finnish market  could be even considered as the most  efficient  one at  the 
moment,  as  the  system  efficiently  restricts  the  over  pricing,  but  it  has  to  be 
remembered that this system also contains several problematic points and whether 
the overall situation is negative or positive is somewhat questionable.
Notable  changes would be required to change the situation in the Finnish market 
towards the dynamic model, but as the prices are rather low and often even lower 
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than spot price protecting the customers from the price peaks, it could be questioned 
are changes even needed. Stricter unbundling requirements or looser price changing 
regulations would probably increase competition in the sense of customer activity, 
new entrants etc., but at the same time prices would most probably increase and the 
variable  price  contracts  would  become  more  volatile  and  less  profitable  for 
customers as has happened in Norway and Sweden. Therefore, as long as there are 
no signs of monopolistic or oligopolistic behaviour and the use of market power, the 
current  situation  is  not  especially  worrying  and  the  future  changes,  especially 
metering renewal, are expected to change the situation before alarming situation has 
time to develop.
However, the Finnish case is not particularly special in the sense of customer activity 
and  other  competition  indicators,  as  the  neutral  or  modest  results  of  retail 
competition so far seem to be more the rule than the exception, based on the rather 
modest results around the world. Therefore, the exceptionally dynamic markets of 
Norway and Sweden are more of an interest considering the research question chosen 
for this thesis.
Norwegian  appear  to  be  the  forerunner  in  the  development  towards  dynamic 
competition in most of the aspects, not just in the European scale but also compared 
to  the  other  Nordic  countries.  Regulation  in  Norway  has  been  most  effective, 
Norwegian were the first ones to establish a comprehensive price comparing service 
and  the  procedures  are  working  well  and  effectively,  for  instance  the  switching 
process takes the least time in Norway. Retailers seem to have adopted competition 
rather quickly and have done efforts in their part to improve competition. In addition, 
the correlation between the retail and wholesale prices is the strongest in Norway, 
which is often considered to be a sign of a well functioning market and also to reflect 
price  signals  all  the  way to  customers efficiently.  Moreover,  long traditions,  the 
political characteristic of electricity, volatile prices and the reputation of the power 
sector  have  altogether  formed  a  dynamic  system  together  with  the  efficient 
regulatory framework.
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Sweden seems to follow the Norwegian example closely. Regulators learned from 
their  mistakes,  for  instance  for  not  taking  care  of  customers  informing  in  the 
beginning, and have aimed to improve the situation since. The correlation between 
the retail price and wholesale price is weaker than in Norway but has become closer 
over time and nowadays the changes in the wholesale market are quite well reflected 
on the retail side. Margins have remained higher than in neighbour countries due to 
several reasons, which casts some doubts on the efficiency of competition, but as 
they are still fairly small and competitive, the situation does not seem very worrying. 
Bad reputation of large retailers, activity of smaller companies, new entrants, volatile 
prices, media attention and political will and pressure have altogether created rather 
dynamic, mature and transparent market.
As  was noticed,  the  drivers  of  the  Swedish and Norwegian  markets  are  diverse, 
especially compared to the British case, which was discussed shortly in this thesis as 
well. This shows that probably one retail model does not work everywhere, but the 
design  should  be  market  specific.  Some  fundamental  characteristics  should  be 
working,  especially  regulations,  such  as  efficient  separation,  smooth  switching 
process etc., but the actual drivers can be various.  Finnish case gave an interesting 
point in this aspect too. The chosen model differs from the Norwegian and Swedish 
models but appears to fit the Finnish goals nevertheless. Therefore, the model should 
fit the desired objectives, which might differ from market to market. Considering the 
long term goal of the European Union to achieve one internal  electricity market, 
different models will create challenges and it would be more desirable to harmonise 
the systems  already in  an early stage.  However,  the development  has  been more 
short-sighted  and  the  national  or  areal  objectives  have  perhaps  been  stronger 
motivators for the chosen models.
One point  that  is  often discussed in the context  of retail  markets,  is  whether  the 
competition has been beneficial  to consumers or not. This was mainly out of the 
scope of this study, as it would require very detailed analysis and forming a scenario 
of the situation if the markets were still regulated, and thus the concentration was 
given to the drivers of dynamic model of competition, which is often discussed in the 
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literature and is easier to measure and compare between countries. However, during 
this project these questions came up often and the situation seems to create different 
opinions and is definitely one of the most important questions of the market reform. 
Thus, when viewing the retail markets, the customer point of views should be kept in 
mind.  Dynamic  market  itself  does  not  guarantee  benefits  for  consumers,  and  it 
should  be  considered  when  planning  introducing  competition  or  further 
improvements. Customers are not generally interested in the market themselves but it 
should not  mean that  their  role  could be forgotten.  Therefore,  the reform should 
perhaps focus more also to the customers  point  of view instead of staring at  the 
common competition indicators.
All  in  all,  even  if  some  progress  has  already  occurred  since  the  introduction  of 
competition  into  the  retail  markets,  particularly  in  the  Swedish  and  Norwegian 
markets but to some extent in the Finnish market as well, there still exists space for 
improvements and potential for further benefits in all the three markets, especially 
stemming from the installing of automatic meters and from further integration of the 
retail  markets.  The consequences of these future changes are somewhat  disputed, 
although the  expectations  are  mainly  positive.  It  is  sure  that  these  renewals  will 
change  the  retail  markets  significantly,  partially  removing  some  of  the  current 
problems, but also creating several new challenges to the market participants.
To  conclude,  this  thesis  managed  to  recognise  the  factors  behind  the  presumed 
success  of  the  Norwegian  and  Swedish  markets,  which  was  one  of  the  main 
objectives, but in addition it was noticed during the research, as a slightly surprising 
finding, that the Finnish market is not as inefficient as was assumed in the beginning 
of  the  research,  although  the  situation  is  rather  problematic  in  some  aspects. 
Furthermore,  the  international  aspect  of  the  research  and  the  interview  survey 
brought up very clearly and interestingly the varying opinions that can be formed 
from the markets, which highlights the complex features of the electricity markets 
and the difficulties connected to the understanding and interpreting the situations. Of 
course, as in any subject, various opinions occur, but it would seem that electricity 
markets are especially controversial. The retail markets as a research subject is very 
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wide and interesting area and there still exists several aspects to be researched, for 
example, as the situation in the Finnish market turned out to be more complicated 
than expected and interesting aspects were found, wider analysis could be conducted. 
In addition,  it  would be interesting to make a survey,  which one of these market 
designs is the most efficient, if not viewed only with the commonly used competition 
indicators. Moreover, as one of the most important objectives of market opening is 
the  resulting  benefits  for  consumers,  more  customer  oriented  analysis  would  be 
valuable.
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